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DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
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CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DECEMBER ISSUE

LYMAN BRYSON, Professor Emeritus of Education in Teachers College, Columbia University, is also counsellor on public affairs of the Columbia Broadcasting System, and director of the CBS program, Invitation to Learning. He is the author of *Science and Freedom* (1947); *Communications of Ideas* (1948); *The Next America* (1952); *The Drive Toward Reason* (1954). His recent articles in the *Political Science Quarterly* are "Lincoln in Power" which appeared in the June 1946 issue; and "Notes on a Theory of Advice", in September 1951.

LANE DAVIS is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the State University of Iowa. His major field of interest is contemporary political thought, especially that of current political movements in Britain and the United States.

HENRY G. AUBREY is a Visiting Lecturer in the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of the New School for Social Research and is also affiliated with the Research Department of a metropolitan banking institution. He is the author of a number of articles, mostly on economic development.

ARDATH W. BURKS is Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, The State University of New Jersey. He is co-author, with Dr. Paul M. A. Linebarger and Dr. Djang Chu, of *Far Eastern Governments and Politics* (1954).

STANLEY ELKINS and ERIC MCKITRICK are currently at work on a book of essays in American history. The first part of their article, "A Meaning for Turner's Frontier", appeared in the September issue of the *Quarterly*.

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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

CIRCLES OF PRESTIGE[1]

THE purpose of this essay is to describe what I believe to be the processes by which publicity for one's name has become the chief prestige-symbol in American life. By name-publicity, I mean the appearance of one's name, real or professional, in public print, or its sound on the broadcast air, the pervading evidence that one's name has arrived and that the public is taking notice. To say that this is the predominant American prestige-symbol is to say that it is sought for and enjoyed as the fruit of achievement, that to enjoy it by accident or personal favor is good luck not bad, that it plays a bright part in the dreams of youth.

Like any other dominant value, name-publicity can be the motive for heroic as well as for comic behavior. Any major trait of a culture is likely to have both its heroic and its comic aspects. Many of its manifestations lie so deep in assumptions that they are never noticed.

At the heroic end of the spectrum of action which is motivated by desire for name-publicity is loyal service to the reputation, rather than to the program, of an institution. Still beyond that is vigorous action on behalf of a person who has been "unjustly" deprived of credit for an achievement or a good deed. Many a wife, or mother, or grown-up child, in America now, will resent with generous bitterness a mistake in public opinion which deprives a loved one of the "honor" due him for his work or his talents. We need to examine both the concept of justice here and the concept of honor. The semantic evidence in these matters is always tricky but it is not wholly irrelevant. Unless

[1] Originally this article was written for the Harvard session of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, held in September 1954.

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public notice is a value, unless name-publicity is a prestige-symbol, then there can be no injustice in any one's being deprived of it, no matter what foul or forceful means were used to deprive him. It is not "unjust" to take away from anyone a worthless thing. To disguise name-publicity with the label "credit" does not change its character.

At the other end of the spectrum is seen the comic, the type called the "ham". The derisive word is often used to cry down a troublemaker who deserves sharper adjectives; modest hamming is only a small infringement of the best American taste. A ham is a person who wants to be admired by persons whom he does not know. This means, of course, that he is not asking questions regarding the standards of these strangers who applaud him, nor in fact caring much for their reasons. Merely being noticed is achievement. The ham is a comic character but he is not a type who can be traced back through literature. The pretentious man is comic in all civilizations because the artists can show a gap between what he is and what he pretends to be. So also are the too-ambitious social climber, the befooled lover, the stupid clown, the rigid fanatic, and the others. But not the ham. There are reasons for this which ought to be evident as we go on. A comic character has to be institutionally possible; being merely humanly possible will not earn him a place in literature.

Enjoyment of prestige-symbols is a public sign of reputation and reputation is public approval, granted for one reason or another. Achievement is one means of getting a reputation and enjoying prestige-symbols and other gains but it is not a prerequisite. Some persons have name-publicity without achieving anything, even anything evil, although the possession of the symbols may bring them some of the rewards which more logically acquired reputations bring to others. A good example is a person who makes a career out of letting the public in on the secrets of a personal life, such as having a hermaphrodite body changed by surgery into a female body. And, obversely, someone whose achievement is of substantial usefulness to society may fail, for accidental reasons or because malice has intervened, to get the reputation he deserves.

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We are using the word reputation to mean the public awareness of some person's position. Position is access to the rewards of achievement that are socially conferred. These usages are not unusual but we must, in social analysis, restrict common words to precise signification, if we are to make any precise statements. A person has a reputation when his position is generally known, he has a position if he has received or is receiving some of the gains which a society or a group confers on achievement or on some semblance of achievement. Neither reputation nor position need be founded on merit but they are what merit "deserves" according to the mores of the society.

The rewards of achievement, or the gain, can be divided into two kinds. We can call one "content", the other, "prestige-symbol". Content is mostly money and power but there are other tangibles of preferment and privilege. Prestige-symbols are the principal intangible gain. These two kinds of gain are independent; that is, a position may bring more or less of content with more or less of prestige, but they are not irrelevant. The success myth of American society implies that both kinds of gain are generously conferred on any hero or heroine.

General Theory of Prestige Circles

To describe what has happened in America as name-publicity has gained its present dominance and become the form of prestige-symbol which means most to most Americans, it is necessary to have a general theory of prestige, even though crude, and also to examine some historical examples of transformation. The general theory proffered here can be stated in these terms: Every person lives in concentric circles of potential reputation. At least three of these must be described.

Every person lives in a first circle, or circles, which are small groups of face-to-face confrontations and contacts. This kind of central circle is the "small-group". Many persons live in more than one small-group. In any small-group there may be some persons who have reputations which extend, as if along a radius, into the next larger circle which surrounds the small-group. This next larger circle can be called a "special-world". It is the circle which includes all the persons who would accord or deny reputations for professional or other special achievements

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not implied in the small-group contacts. These special-worlds often exist actively, filled with passions of triumph and defeat, although their existence is not noticed by members of the same society who do not belong. I remember a charming sketch of two whitewings discussing a third street sweeper. One remarks: "Did you ever think Bill was really very good in corners?" In my own memory is registered the mild shock of discovering, when I first by accident became director of a science museum, that museum-directing was a special-world. It had its organs of publicity and fame, its rivalries, its gossip, and its glory. I had never even imagined that such a world existed until I fell into it.

Many special-world groups are, of course, less esoteric. Everyone takes it for granted that men who are engaged in the same business have good and evil opinions of one another which are very different from the opinions they hold of mankind in general. The residue of these opinions is a special-group reputation.

Position in a small-group does not much affect a reputation in a special-world. Reputation in the special-world, however, often leads to reputation in the next, the largest, of the circles, which we can call the "public-world". This is one circle surrounding all the others; here are the heroes, the villains, and the comics of the public mind.

In the public-world, we are far removed from the warmth and immediacy of small-group contacts. *Esprit de corps* has gone with the smaller solidarities. Competition is more brutal and more admired. Persons who have reputations in the public-world, such as the politicians and entertainers who make up the largest part of its population, are well known to many consumers of reputations who have never seen them in the flesh, spoken to them, or exchanged any other kind of communication. They are known as pictures on screens or in print, as voices, as loosely coagulated presences in print. Their fellow citizens to whom they are known are called consumers of reputation rather than admirers because reputations may be either favorable or adverse; they are still reputations and still bring gains.

Many of the reputations which reach out into the public-world from special-worlds are based on achievement of substantial value. In fact, such reputations are much more likely

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to be based on achievement than those which are made entirely and *de novo* in the public-world. To illustrate, we can say that a man who bases a political career, which is a struggle for prestige-symbols and other gains in the public-world, on his reputation as a lawyer among lawyers is trying to extend his earned special-world reputation into the wider circle and has something more than public approval to back his claims. On the other hand, a pretty girl who is put into a motion picture before she has a reputation, and thus demands a reputation in the public-world before she has earned any other kind, is the more likely to suffer or gain by the caprices of popular judgment or accident. The important point for our purpose is that this lucky girl, if she is lucky, will, in the near future, get at least as much gain from her reputation, in the form of prestige-symbols, as will the lawyer who earned his chance in a narrower, more exacting competition. They will both get name-publicity.

We can now go back and take a closer look at the constituents of these groups and relations among them. Regarding the innermost, the small-groups, to which all persons must belong in any society because they comprise the most intimate relations, we note that members of complex societies belong to many. In simple social organizations, there are fewer social classifications. It is true, of course, that primitive systems of blood and possible marriage relationships are often complicated to a degree which bewilders and fascinates the inspecting anthropologist. But, otherwise, there are only a few sex and age and rudimentary occupational associations which provide the structure of the interpersonal business of living. As societies become elaborate they become also more tolerant, except for the highly artificial and unstable "monolithic" societies of modern revolutionary states. In most modern societies, especially in America, there are many varieties of personal loyalty patterns which may be found among those who associate superficially as members of the same society but distribute their personal associations in various ways.

The small-group gains are probably heaviest in content and least important as prestige. In the closest relations it is impossible to distinguish usefully between prestige which demands

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and affection which gives. But it is also true that, in the small-groups, the qualities and achievements of the holder of a position are more fully known than in larger circles. The qualities and achievements are either approved, or admired, or else they engender fears. This does not mean that judgments in small-groups are more likely to be valid than the more impersonal elements in wider reputations—the accepted myth that we know best those we know most, to the contrary notwithstanding. They may be based on mistaken admirations, that is, on admirations for qualities not really possessed by the admired one; or based on unfounded fears. They are probably warmer and that gives us the feeling that they are nearer truth.

The boundary line between the small-group and the special-group is dim and the line between the special-group and the public-world is still more difficult to draw cleanly. This is because membership in the special-world brings to the holder of a reputation there some enjoyment of the symbols of prestige which dominate the public-world and which the managers of the organs of general publicity often extend to those who are eminent in the special-group.

The publicists need material for exploitation. The make-up of a modern newspaper reflects this fact. Any one of the marriages of a famous movie actress may be described on the front page, which shows that she lives in the public-world with all the involved penalties and privileges; the marriage of the daughter of a middle-class professional or business man will be described in the "society" columns. Or, in a similar fashion, a change in the control of a great insurance company or a railroad, a deal big enough to be of interest in the public-world, will be noticed on the front page; a new vice president of an ordinary, large-scale business will get his picture in the "business" columns.

We have remarked that position in the small-group does not lead to reputation in the special-world as readily as position in the special-world leads to a wider reputation in the outermost circle of the public-world. The small-group is knit together, or organized nervously, by face-to-face contacts. This means that control by naked power is more possible there but it also means that competition may be softened by affection or pity,

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Many kinds of achievement which are acknowledged and rewarded in the small-group are impossible in larger circles. This, it may be remarked in passing, has been the cause of a factor in current social changes. Feminism, in America, has been the embattled resentment of women and their friends against confining their abilities to work in the small-groups. In face-to-face relations, women have been powerful in all societies and all systems. Feminists have wanted them admitted to competition for gains in the larger circles and also seem to want—this is weakened by its inescapable vagueness—recognition in wider circles for achievements in small-groups.

At the same time, we should guard against taking too seriously the folk myth that the possession of the prestige-symbols of the public-world deprives one completely of the satisfactions of the small-group or person-to-person living. The fact that it is a folk myth does not prove it either right or wrong but does dangerously infect thought: the folk myth is a natural development in an equalitarian country like America. Royal families, such as are left in European countries, are generally regarded by Americans as very nice people who might be normal and happy if they were not by duty bound to reign. This can be seen in deft comedy in a motion picture. such as "Roman Holiday", as well as in the response of Americans generally to the pictures of Elizabeth II being crowned, or to visits by Greek Queens and Kings. The folk myth, as usual, is a half-truth.

The facts are, in so far as observation is possible in these difficult precincts, that great figures in the public-world may have happy personal relations in what is left of their small-group lives if they are unusually intelligent and reasonably lucky. This residual truth which is useful for our purposes is that they have to struggle much harder to attain such primitive enjoyments than do the men and women and children who do not carry the great prestige-symbols. The famous cinema blonde, desired by all men, may discover that the single exception is her husband.

There is still more to be said on this level of analysis, however, about the relation between the small-groups to which even kings and tycoons must belong at home, and the public-world where

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being a king or a tycoon or a cinematically exposed blonde is greatness. Although the reputation in the public-world does reflect back into the small-group, making success there more difficult, it is also diminished at home because reputations in which there are highly artificial elements tend to lose their glitter seen close-up. Folklore is full of proverbs on the point: familiarity breeds contempt is only the most brutal of the sayings. It is to counteract this effect that professional public relations experts in America so often bend their efforts toward establishing that their client is "a human being after all", thus arguing that if you knew him in a small-group you would not despise him for being only human but love him because he was, after all, just like yourself.

However, the influence which runs in the opposite direction, that is, from small-group relations to public-world behavior, is likely to be underestimated. For example, a great publisher who appears to his rivals and his staff to care only for money and power may risk both in a crusade for righteousness because he wants the respect of some of the people he dines with. This kind of action may be confused with a sacrifice of money and power, content, that is, for prestige gains, and in any real instance it might be very difficult to extricate from each other the motives involved. For our purposes there is no need to do so, but it is important to take into account the fact that great decisions are often made for what seem, in the public-world, like trivial reasons. This is related to the more extensive fact, so sharply noted by Lord Chesterfield in advising his son toward a successful life, that accident and caprice, as well as private motives, enter into great matters. Chesterfield, in fact, makes the failure to see the effect of small-group and personal influences on public-world behavior the mark of an outside observer.

There are subtle and heretofore unobserved effects of public crisis, however, in the relations between the influences of experience in the different groups where any individual simultaneously finds himself. We can make only tentative statements about these phenomena, in anticipation of study by more penetrating techniques than we now possess. But it would appear that the feeling of crisis, no matter how much or how little

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justified by events, will increase the effect of small-group influences on all kinds of public-world behavior. This shows itself in the fact that public figures of all kinds will act, in real or imagined crises, more obviously than in calmer times on basic "natural" motives, which is the same as saying that they will act more on small-group feelings and ideals. Small-group motives do not change so much in time and place, in cultural transformations, as do public-world motivations. Responses to or desires for prestige-symbols are almost wholly the product of cultural training. The kind of leadership known as charismatic is leadership by a person with whom large numbers of others can identify themselves in a small-group intimacy with a transcendent mystical respect.

Transformations in History

With these notes on a theory in mind, we can consider with equal brevity the several pertinent historical transformations, hoping again to instigate more searching studies. Our purpose is to contrast name-publicity, which is the contemporary American desire, with the symbols which it supplanted.

In England and in France, to take two countries whose history is familiar, the prestige-symbol in the eighteenth century was not name-publicity but family-name. They are wholly different. The family-name symbol was, and, wherever it feebly continues, still is, an inheritance from feudalism. In the feudal organization, loyalty (outside the Church) was more to a hierarchy of persons than to an impersonal institution. The personages were themselves, strictly speaking, formalized into institutions, but to follow this would take us too far afield, as would also any discussion of the probability that the Church outlasted feudalism because it was a hierarchy of forms, not of men.

Pertinent to our inquiry is the fact that family-name had a halo of inevitability, backed by assumptions stronger than any serving similar purposes in contemporary America. It was assumed that family-name, a status-symbol, could be acquired only by birth, that it implied ancestry of a certain certainty, "noble" blood, in the organic phrase. But when a man whose biological origins were obscure commanded attention, he was given a family-name by public opinion, much as public opinion

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today confers our prestige-symbol, publicity. The only effective public opinion, of course, was the throne and its controlling support; its decisions were final. If the king, speaking for this group, called a man a duke, he was a duke, and his descendants, from that moment, had noble blood, whatever might be said by envious peers.

This, I would say, makes family-name as logically a gain from reputation as is the differently conferred and less durable symbol now used in the United States. The fact that it was inherited more firmly and effectively gives it a character which we are required to scrutinize but it does not defeat the analogy. Inheritance works also, feebly, in the modern American system; the daughter of a movie actress and an Asiatic playboy will be given a certain degree of prestige before she has time to grow up and either earn or destroy it. Obviously, persons are much more mobile in the modern system; it took decisive military or fiscal eminence, not momentary flash power, to get a title in England or France in the eighteenth century. Family-name was a much more brutally dominant prestige-symbol than anything tolerated in an equalitarian society.

The American colonies did not fix the British system in their own manners in the century and a half of colonial dependence, and the Revolution set in motion counterinfluences of emotion-charged force. What might have happened, if George III had been better advised, can be guessed at by looking at Canada where there is a sometimes uneasy mixture of the American independence with the British tradition.

Provisionally, when we embark on historical comparisons we can take as a test of dominance the extent to which a prestige-symbol is manipulated in exchanges and rivalries for content, that is, what manipulative relations exist between the prestige-symbol and such tangibles as money and power. In eighteenth-century England, money and power were constantly used in manipulating family-name prominence; in modern America money and power are used to manipulate name-publicity.

It was a story told me by a friend which first crystallized my growing understanding of the rôle played in modern America by name-publicity. His tale was a complaint against an injustice.

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He had been robbed of "credit". Anyone who accepted the current standards of American life, and who believed he was telling the whole story, would have had to agree that he had been misused. He had, as a skilled producer in the communications industry, turned a dubious assignment into a triumph. Whereupon, the superiors in his company who had been quite willing to have him billed as sole agent when the outcome was doubtful, and had led him to believe that he would be published to the world as sole genius of writing, production and direction, moved in without apology and distributed the higher credits among themselves. They left him a meager by-line fame.

This is a clear case of manipulation. Power, which is here the employer's combination of money and emotional coercion, was used to acquire, shamelessly, the prestige-symbol. It would not be difficult to find examples in which, working in the contrary direction, the symbol coerced money and was used as power to acquire a tangible gain.

The prestige-symbol can be accepted as a substitute for content. It can be used to buy or coerce content. Or, content in the form of money or power or other tangibles can be used to force the granting of the prestige-symbol. These manipulations are roughly the same in any society.

For example, in eighteenth-century England and much more in the nineteeth century, a man who got possession of large wealth from banking or transportation or brokerage or more adventurous enterprises could found a "noble" family with title, landed estate, and all appurtenances. *Per contra*, a duke might be a formidable rival in any economic struggle big enough and sanctified enough to tempt a duke. It is true, of course, that these matters were seldom as crudely set up as I have made them. They are concealed by the passage of time, as when the second or third generation of a great enterpriser assumes all the prerogatives and prestige of the founder's achievement. Balances shift between gains in content and gains in prestige when any symbol is dominant and we must keep in mind that all gains, even tangible content, are charged with emotion. One who possesses any of the rewards of socially valued achievement is likely to believe he has a moral right to all the others.

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These are the typical manipulations of ambitious men and they show the standing of a prestige value in a social system. It is often said, as if it were a final judgment, that men "really" want money and power and the tangible rewards of achievement or luck. This is true, but it does not follow, as is assumed, that men want prestige-symbols only as tools of manipulation whereby the tangible content can be obtained. Did a man who spent a fortune to get a title want only a bigger fortune, which he thought the title might enable him to get? Is the man who uses his power to take a prestige-symbol away from a weaker man wasting his power? Or is he using it to get what is for him a valued object? The manipulations, as was said, are worked both ways: prestige to get tangible contents; tangible contents to buy or capture prestige. The proportions of these two kinds of gains which will please men of different temperaments and different biographies cannot be calculated. Both kinds of gain are imbued with emotion; each kind seems to its possessor to confer a moral claim to more.

Prestige Changes in America

Turning back to America, we can recall that the first European immigrants into the wilderness brought hierarchies and symbols with them. The Spaniards of the South and Southwest who came to convert the Indians and get rich, the adventurers and outcasts of Virginia who came to get a new start, the patroons of the Hudson Valley, and the Puritans of New England who sought a free field for a new theocracy, these kinds of Europeans did not expect to be new kinds of Americans. What they all discovered, in the processes that were to make Americans of their descendants, was that the family-name symbols were less effective in the new conditions. Both the difficulties and the opportunities of living here gave an overpowering influence to the more tangible content of reputation from the beginning, and after the Jacksonian Revolution the agrarian strength from the West, which came close to being sheer power and money content without symbolic decoration, blanked out the prestige-systems of Virginia and New England and New York. The War between the States completed that work.

For a period of about seventy years, from 1830 to the turn of

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the century, the economic preoccupations of the Americans gave them a crude simplicity of standards. A society restlessly on the make will not, it seems, set up prestige-symbols of general dominance apart from the ostentatious possession of the material contents of success. The little islands of social and intellectual and spiritual discrimination which existed all through this time were picturesque and some literature came out of them. Since this is an attempt at something like a scientific analysis, the writer is not bound to say whether Ralph Waldo Emerson and Nathaniel Hawthorne of Concord, Massachusetts, were more or less significant phenomena than Jim Fiske, since we are speaking only of the reputations men enjoyed during their lifetimes and of the signs by which public acknowledgement of achievement was shown. In these terms, there were, in fact, no symbols generally current in American life at the beginning of our industrial development. There was no royalty and no court, so there was no public opinion of the feudal or aristocratic sort which conferred prestige-symbols in eighteenth-century England. Family-name could not well be established in a country where there was no "noble" blood, since there were no labels to proclaim it.

It is easy to make the mistake of thinking that there was, in these early and in the Western-moving pioneer societies, no gentility, no refinement, no civilized balances of taste and judgment, no quest for the elusive grails that are not measured in money and power. The spiritual side of American pioneer life is the side which later American sentimentalists have conspicuously failed to see. Only in very modern writers does it begin to get sensitive notice. But refinements and spiritual threads, running heroically through physically crude existence, are not the source for the kind of general prestige-symbol we are looking for, nor for any other kind of generally accepted signs of public approval.

It would be difficult to discern any one prestige-symbol that dominated America in the great boom. I mean to include in this a much longer period than is usually embraced in any ordinary boom and recession rhythm; American history was one boom with intermittent and sometimes painful pauses, from 1870 to 1914. The economy breathed with a kind of second

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wind after the War between the States, because as a matter of fact that war, if all its moral meaning and its tragedy are disregarded, was a recession of unusual costliness, caused by the resistance of the Southern slave economy, antiquated and doomed of its own weakness, against the natural drive of industrialism.

Other huge and prolonged booms of this kind might be found in history but there are no easily found records to indicate when they happened. The combination in the United States was practically unique. There were these factors: an ample supply of industrial skills and technical lore imported from Britain where the industrial revolution had gone on just long enough to have found solutions for most problems of beginning industry; next, and as a result of the same historical chance, a supply of capital also partly imported from Britain; next, an ample supply of crude labor as needed, imported from Britain, Ireland, and the European continent; next, an ample supply of all the raw materials needed for industry as then developed; and lastly a great single market.

In achieving its own leadership in the generations just before the American boom, Britain had only a small helping of these same kinds of advantage. Industrial techniques were mostly invented by her own enterprisers. Labor was supplied by the abandonment of submarginal agriculture and by the rapid growth in population which industry made possible. The imported capital came from Holland, in vaguely measured amounts. The market was the world. The British record may possibly show more of human greatness than the American; in quantity it is comparatively meager. These are hardy generalizations, I know, and one is ready to have them flatly denied. No matter. The important point for this discussion is that, whether unique or not, the American achievement, for about seventy years, was colossal. And in a society in which the dynamism is so powerful and the changes so incessant, social approvals do not settle into patterns as stably and discernibly as in slower times. In the two great halves of the great boom, before and after the War between the States, money and power were practically interchangeable and this included political power.

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In crudely corrupt countries, such as the United States was throughout most of this period, it is taken for granted that political skills will win wealth and that wealth has, in its own right, a voice in politics. Wealth, allied to political power, exercised as direct and practically irresistible a control over the lives of Americans as had been enjoyed in aristocratic times by those whose gains in money and power were labeled with the prestige-symbol, family-name.

A general prestige-symbol of this kind was needed in American society, it seems, when money and political power began to be separated. The new prestige-symbol became possible when modern agencies of publicity were invented.

Money, by itself, ceased to be a sufficient symbol when its possession and ostentatious use were no longer admired. Riches, richly displayed, continued to be envied for a long time after that but wealth and virtue, wealth and greatness, wealth and happiness, ceased to be natural couplings in American thought when it became profitable for journalists and politicians to tell in public what most people already knew.

It is easy to make this seem too simple, however. The life of the first J. Pierpont Morgan, which began in 1837 and ended in 1912, spans the period. Morgan was never a corrupt character; he was far too regal in temper and too tremendous in personal power to care about pilferings. Aside from a few minor and quite possibly innocent scandals in his financial youth, he made a career out of good judgment, audacity, and personal influence. He was powerful enough to pull the country out of a panic twice, almost wholly by his own judgment and courage. There were men with more money, but he showed more than any other how money itself can be a prestige-symbol.

Morgan was, however, the man in whose career, symbolically and actually, money was clearly separated from political power. Morgan was shocked when Theodore Roosevelt attacked his financing combines without first calling him in and allowing him to agree to make legal rearrangements. He thought of himself as not above the law, but above political attack. He did not perceive that Roosevelt was putting into bold action a new theory of politics, the dramatization of political action as

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a fight against wealth, not as creative business, but as entrenched privilege, an attack by politicians as friends of the poor. Theodore Roosevelt was innocent of Marxism; but he and the muckrakers invented or discovered, or put into dramatic form, a pseudo-Marxist version of American history which has not been abandoned by politicians in either party since.

When wealth is only a tangible advantage and not a desirable symbol, and political power is ostensibly in conflict with it, and in the meantime great new engines of prestige-conferring machinery are coming into play, a new form of prestige-structure will be raised. The process was interrupted and obscured by two world wars, much as the big boom was interrupted by the War between the States. Military rank became for a while the dominant prestige-symbol and this affected many other concurrent kinds of change. The growing rebellion of women against being confined to small-group reputations, as had been showing itself in a fight for the vote, and also for public office and for freedom in the secondary levels of business achievement, showed its current form in the rush of women into military service. Women had always done most of the hard work and suffered serious privations and most of the anxieties in all wars; but in small-group action and for small-group rewards. Now they wore uniforms, got rank, and moved into the special-world competitions. At the same time, of course, manners were relaxed and women also began to smoke and drink in public, dress as nakedly or naturally as they pleased, and otherwise reject customary restraints. This did not, perhaps, directly contribute to the changes in prestige-factors; it did make it more useful to have new prestige-symbols which would apply as well to women as to men. No one at that time, perhaps, foresaw the moral atmosphere after the Second World War when women in the entertainment world would be famous for anatomical peculiarities.

It would be the kind of mistake indulged in generously by moral and esthetic critics of the "mass" media of communication to fail to take into account the fact that the mechanical, as well as the economic, structure of all agencies of mass communication makes them greedy of facts and fancies that can be expanded into

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reputations. They want "front-page personalities" whether or not any living human beings deserve such honor. In this, the various agencies differ as to methods of exploitation but not as to need.

We can take as a primary example the daily newspaper. In spite of inroads by electronic devices, the daily newspapers are still for most people the chief source of information on current events. The broadcasters may beat them to public attention in meager statements of flash events and compete seriously in the analysis of significance. Also, television may make still pictures less exciting. The news magazines, too, offer a different kind of rivalry. But it is not yet evident that all these kinds of competition make the newspaper less necessary. The economic problems which have reduced the number of dailies so drastically are not our business at the moment.

What are the newspapers? They are agencies for merchandising novelty. Novelty and significance are not the same thing; many significant facts have no novelty or no eye-catching value. Many novel and momentarily exciting facts have no significance. It is unfair to the newspapers to ask them to keep events in proportion, and what we get—thanks to their enterprise and skill—is a generous dose of what can be called news. To publish, on the front page of a newspaper, the picture of the most important personage in the country, on every day of the year, would not be news. We should discover, if we had any means of selecting such a face, that it did not change and the picture would soon be a postage stamp design—not an eye-catcher.

What the editors want is valid professional excuses for printing new faces, as many as possible, or old faces in new and surprising scenery. Their method may be as vulgar as to trick J. P. Morgan into getting snapped while he holds a midget on his knee at a congressional hearing, as trivially human as showing a hole in Adlai Stevenson's shoe while he campaigns for the presidency, as strange a combination of banality and touching honesty as Mr. Hoover fishing, or as lethal as the look on the face of an investigating Senator. A new face in an old setting, or an old face surprised. One cannot deny all significance

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to these scenes; that is not our point. But significance is not the criterion by which they were chosen.

Consequently, if there are no worthy subjects, the space is filled with subjects even less significant and name-publicity is conferred on miscellaneous men and women and children, as if the newspapers had a stock of labels designating greatness which they were bound to use up somehow and would stick on anyone handy. This is what we, the consumers, buy.

In spite of differences in their techniques of appeal and the psychological differences among their consumers, all agencies of public communication are alike in this. Their disdainful largesse may be handed out capriciously and accidentally at first; if anyone stays in the pictures, he must earn further prestige. Continuing reputation may be earned by achievement, by misfortune, by vulgarity, which in a person of established reputation is a fascinating spectacle, or by manipulations already referred to. If there is any steady correlation to be observed, or guessed at, it is the positive probability that men of substantial achievement will earn more evidences of prestige in the long run than will the light and lucky.

This high-geared demand for new names to attach reputations to is related to the serious problems of mass communications in recruiting talent. Just as radio and television producers are required by the periodic regularity of their shows to use inferior scripts and worn-out ideas, since they produce more shows than the natural flow of talent justifies, so news editors are required to confer reputation, involving prestige-symbols at least and possibly content also, on far more persons than "deserve" such rewards, since not enough persons are known to have the true combination of achievement and exploitable "news" color. It is also a factor in the behavior of managers of news media that reputations have most news interest when they are in the build-up or the inevitably succeeding takedown phase. Plateaus are monotonous in all kinds of experience.

In this they are somewhat manipulated, of course, by the public relations experts who translate content (money and power) into prestige (name-publicity) for their clients, individual, personal, or institutional, but it would be more nearly accurate

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to think of these public relations experts as middlemen in a business in which the newspapers and other agencies are eager customers.

Another good example of the general habit of judging all modern events in terms of old institutions and older ideas is the fact that Americans speak of the instability of reputations in their own world as an evil. They have inherited faith in stability, or "permanence", from the older world where the system of family-name prestige made stability not only a desired element in prestige, as it would be in any system, but necessary. Family-name could not be a prestige-symbol unless it was possessed by a family line as well as by a family group.

Name-publicity is an ephemeral symbol for many reasons, some of which have been indicated, but for the American equalitarian society it is an advantage to have prestige short-lived. The gospel of equality has not meant in any society a devotion to permanent equality of position. The passion for equality can be regarded only with ironic doubt unless it is seen that the passion is real when it inspires a man to equal the gains of others. It is negative. It is the sentiment, "I am as good as anybody", or more often, "I am as good as he is." It does not, as political doctrine, generally mean, "He is as good as I am." In fact, that high sentiment marks not the equalitarian but the superior person.

Americans, like others who have built equality into their habitual political evaluations, making it, as Tocqueville said, the greatest of their values, are no more confused about it than others have been. They would probably be uneasy if told that their sentiment is negative, a correction of claims to superiority rather than a denial of admissions of inferiority. This is not important. But it is of great importance that we, in trying to understand the American situation, see that it stimulates effort to have all reputations subject to change. No one in the present name-publicity atmosphere is *hors de combat* or secure. So all small ambitions can be kept alive. This is related to the already mentioned vulgarity of reducing all famous personages to "human" dimensions. This serves to reassure the presently humble that no one is safely in a niche above him,

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and that the humble cannot safely be kept down. An observer might say that whereas Napoleon hoped that every soldier in his army would carry a marshal's baton in his knapsack, just in case, every American has ready a toothy smile for a news photographer should one come along.

The lack of deep contentment, or indeed of anything but boredom relieved by excitement, which can be observed in the lives of many famous persons in America today may be the result of the precariousness of the guerdons we are describing. The head that wears the crown of public notice so obviously wobbles. But there may be deeper reasons. The tangible gains, the content rather than the prestige-symbols of reputation, may well prove on possession to be less than had been expected. This would probably not poison possession, unless there was also a constant doubt of worthiness in those who truly deserved what real gains they got; matched by the suspicion that something was not being delivered according to promises, in those who deserve little. It is evidently of the nature of these joys to disillusion and dismay anyone capable of truth and to satisfy only the paranoid politician or the self-adoring entertainer. There is no very convincing evidence that other prestige-symbols, in other times and places, were more solidly gratifying; their relative permanence may well have led to boredom when it did not lead to resentment.

It may properly be said, with the caution that this may be a value judgment and thus suspect in an objective description, that the greatest disadvantage in the present American prestige-system is the kind of behavior it induces in those who feel themselves growing dim in the public eye. It is not our business to compare it with the kind of sycophancy toward the monarch or higher nobles which once plagued the noble whose family position was endangered. He was not as vulnerable as is, for example, the movie star, or the Senator, although he could not, unless greatly talented, do much to enhance his position except by pleasing the "public opinion" of the throne. The person in the limelight in American society, unless he is greatly gifted, may, after he has become a great man, sink to antics to get public attention which would have revolted him before he had

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prestige to protect. Unless he is a self-deluded fool, he may well question the validity of his position, but adulation, or American equivalents in public notice, can easily dim the judgment while it whets the appetite. One can see this sometimes in popular writers, still more in popular lecturers in America, who slowly disintegrate morally as they distort more and more of their own minds to keep up the incoming fodder of praise. This may even be true of one who, by rare chance, gets to be famous for a genuine contribution to clarity or depth of public understanding. He discovers the fact, no more often true in America probably than elsewhere, but very true, that "if you make people think they are thinking they will love you but if you make them think they will hate you" (Fred Rodell).

These statements are no doubt infected with valuation. They do not, I think, discredit the observations on present American conditions, or the sketches of history. As part of the process by which America is being transformed, the symbols of prestige have changed.

LYMAN BRYSON

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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BRITISH SOCIALISM AND THE PERILS OF SUCCESS

I

WHERE does British socialism go from here? No one—not even the British Labor party itself—really knows. Friends and enemies alike seem agreed that the Labor party has been having acute trouble charting the immediate road ahead on the long trek toward the Socialist Commonwealth. Having come to power in 1945, the party succeeded so well in putting its declared objectives into effect that it ran through most of the program of action elaborated over the past half-century. Practical success raised the threat of ideological bankruptcy and, although the party has been seeking a new program with persistence and vigor, it has not been having an easy time finding it.

The carefully phrased and admittedly vague programs submitted to the annual conferences of the party during the past three years have done little more, at most, than pose the problems which party policy-makers must solve. The continuing controversies between regular party leaders and the Bevanites, between trade-union leaders and socialist intellectuals, the continuing discussion of policy in various periodicals, and the conflicting views aired in Fabian and Labor party publications, all demonstrate that the party, so far as its policy is concerned, is in a period of change and uncertainty. In fact, it would be difficult to find a parallel to the present situation. The problem is more than a conflict of personalities or another chapter in the long-continued argument between socialists and trade unionists. It is much more than simply a debate over proper strategy for electoral victory or how to implement a generally agreed policy.

The differences over policy have been stated in numerous ways: extension of nationalization *vs.* consolidation, socialism *vs.* the welfare state, an American-oriented *vs.* a more independent foreign policy, increased armaments *vs.* more social services, state capitalism *vs.* workers' control of industry, more planning *vs.* the existing planning system, centralized control *vs.* progressive decentralization, the transfer of power to the working class

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vs. the present order which leaves considerable power with the managers and the property-owning classes. The alternatives seem almost endless. Differing policies to deal with both foreign and domestic problems have been set forth in more or less detail by parliamentary leaders, intellectuals, trade unionists and others. But the existence of these various and conflicting suggestions is not the difficulty. Such differences on policy are, if anything, a sign of health. The trouble is rather that the Labor party seems unable to decide on a coherent policy after the alternatives have been stated and discussed at length.

Why is it that the Labor party has had such difficulty? To get to the heart of the present crisis, we need not waste our time trying to discover which combination of policies is the most truly socialist, or what policies make the most sense in terms of immediate electoral success for the Labor party. These matters are, after all, what the Labor party must decide for itself. The questions that need answers are why the Labor party has had such difficulty making up its collective mind, and what the underlying reasons are for the lack of general agreement among British socialists today.

One possible answer to this question can be eliminated at once: that British socialism and the Labor party have run out of the sort of brains and leadership which distinguished the movement and the party in the past. Even the most cursory reading of current socialist literature and comparison with the writings of the past should dispel any such illusion. In philosophical depth, psychological insight, historic, economic and sociological knowledge the current crop of intellectuals compares very favorably with the old. It is not brains, ability or willingness to work and write which is lacking. Nor has the parliamentary leadership of the Labor party gone to seed. Attlee, Morrison, Gaitskell and Bevan can stand comparison with such men as MacDonald, Snowden, Clynes and Henderson.

The long-continued tension between socialist intellectuals and trade-union leaders has also been advanced as an explanation for the current difficulties the party is having in making up its collective mind. There is certainly a great deal of truth in this. It is, however, scarcely the whole explanation. British socialists

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(as distinguished from the Labor party) are not all of one mind. They have also found that Labor accomplishments raise embarrassing problems and tend to divide rather than unite them on the proper course for the future.

In the past, the socialists have been a major force in determining Labor party policy. Their suggestions, usually modified and toned down by other elements in the party, have provided the material from which previous Labor party programs have been built. Present socialist difficulty over achieving consensus on future policy is certainly a major element in the current dilemma of Labor. Why are socialists divided and, as a group, undecided as to how they should proceed? This is the primary question which this article will consider.

II

One obvious difficulty faced by British socialism comes directly from the successes of the Attlee Government. Labor and socialism, for the first time, have a vested interest in the accomplishments of British government. Having had a part in creating a new society, the socialist now has an interest in what is, as well as in what ought to be. Socialists now necessarily talk in terms of preserving gains as well as extending them, and this can produce awkward situations for a movement committed to the total reconstruction of society. To some extent, socialists have now inherited the problem which has dogged parties of moderate reform in the past. No longer can they stand for total reconstruction; rather they must speak of pushing further—of partial reconstruction. They must distinguish—this must go and that must stay.

This is, of course, not an altogether new position for British socialism, for it was never a movement which totally rejected existing British society. Nevertheless, there has been a sufficient change to raise differences between those socialists inclined to emphasize the protection of past achievements in a hostile world through a policy of consolidation, and those who would press on further, minimizing gains already made and emphasizing the need for further advances toward the socialist millennium.

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But the problems which Labor success poses for socialism are not exhausted by acknowledging the development, or encouragement, of conservative stand-pat sentiments. This is probably the least of the problems which success raises. As several socialist intellectuals have already pointed out, the semi-socialist welfare state has been a most embarrassing success. Without ending the inequities of a capitalist society, it has succeeded in reducing them and in improving the lot of the underprivileged classes to a very noticeable degree. As several of the contributors to the New Fabian Essays note, the welfare state is likely to be something more than simply a short-lived and inherently unstable transition stage to a more complete socialism. While conservatives, particularly in the United States, view the welfare state as the first step on the slippery road to a socialist totalitarianism, socialist theorists in Britain are viewing the welfare state in mild dismay as the chief roadblock in the way of further socialist progress—a socialist-made life preserver that promises to keep the old society afloat for an indefinite period (in a somewhat altered condition) by relieving many of the acute tensions which have generated pressure for change in the past.

Thus, the success of the welfare state strikes at the dynamic which has driven socialism forward in the past and brought it widespread popular support. The biting denunciations of existing society which drew response from many in the past because they knew from the evidence of their own lives that society was not satisfactory no longer bring the same sort of response. The indecencies and inequities have not been eradicated but they have been greatly lessened. And this being so, the need for militant work for change—revolution if necessary—no longer seems quite as imperative as before. Once again the change has been one only of degree, but the difference in degree is significant.

One might expect intellectual socialists to remain convinced of the need for sweeping change; one might also expect the same attitude in older men of the Labor party still fighting a society which no longer exists. But those whose socialism is primarily emotional and especially the younger ones—those who have in the past responded without any deep thought to socialist

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arguments because they made sense to them in terms of their own experience—are less affected by the old arguments, less likely to take the trouble to do the grinding daily chores which must be done if a socialist party is to prosper and win political power. Young intellectuals are less likely to be attracted to a socialist position.

As numerous socialists have come to realize during the last few years, changing conditions have to some extent outdated socialist doctrines. The attention now being given to the changing nature of ownership in a capitalist society is symptomatic of the realization of many socialists that they must readjust their views. The often uncritically accepted maxim that ownership and control go hand in hand is now being reëxamined. This brings into question the whole policy of nationalization. There is, as yet, no indication that British socialism has any intention of abandoning a policy of widespread nationalization. Nevertheless, several tendencies are noticeable. One is the increasing insistence that public ownership is not the only way to deal with the problem of ownership and control in an economic system organized on socialist lines. This is not wholly new, of course, yet the emphasis on measures of control through taxation policy and regulation seems to be greater than before. Moreover, the case for nationalization has been forced by events to become considerably more sophisticated and explicitly socialist, and, consequently, somewhat less attractive to moderate socialists who place primary emphasis on winning the next election. No longer is nationalization urged to improve efficiency or remedy some particularly acute problem in a particular industry, the position taken in the 1945 election manifesto of Labor. Nor, on the other hand, is nationalization expected any longer to bring the socialist society into being in one fell swoop. Rather, further nationalization is argued in terms of a further shift in power from the owning classes to the working class, and as the first step toward the solution of the problems of an industrial society. Industries must be nationalized, not because they are inefficient or exploitative, but because considerations of powers require it. But nationalization will not, in itself, bring a socialist society. It merely clears the ground for further work on such

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diverse problems as worker motivation, labor-management relations, industrial efficiency, capital development, effective central planning techniques, and so on. It is not hard to see that such arguments as these are likely to discourage or frighten away many of the floating voters who brought victory in 1945 and 1950. Political expediency (for what it is worth) seems to demand that nationalization be toned down and emphasis in domestic policy placed elsewhere.

In addition, the nationalization which has already taken place has produced a number of troublesome organizational and personnel problems which are far from satisfactorily settled, even in theory. While most socialists wish to press on with further nationalization (though disagreeing among themselves as to the optimum speed), there is a pretty general realization that nationalization has been both more difficult and less immediately helpful than it was expected to be. Such a realization is a sobering one which encourages backward glances and second thoughts.

Thus the socialist finds that the welfare state, however good it is in itself, has had the effect of putting a block in the way of what, as good socialists, they must consider more important—the complete reconstruction of the economic system. At the same time, the partial reconstruction which has been carried through has proved rather disappointing in the short run. At best, the road ahead is harder and longer and more difficult to travel than even the most practical of the hard-headed Fabians had visualized. Such a view of the future, especially when the present is not intolerable, can be discouraging to a policy of audacious advance.

III

All of these things, however, are difficulties which any ambitious reconstructor of society might expect to crop up in his path. None of them is a decisive reason for abandoning the struggle. A confident and resourceful socialist must, after pausing to catch his breath, size up the situation and reassure the irresolute, plunge ahead toward the millennium which he knows so surely awaits him somewhere in the future. But

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would he drive ahead if he thought he were going nowhere? It seems unlikely. The thing which would be fatal to the socialist would be loss of confidence in the rightness of his cause, in the general correctness of his approach, in the probability of ultimate success. It would be an unwarranted exaggeration to say that British socialism shows evidences of such a complete loss of nerve—it doesn't. Nevertheless, there are certain symptoms of a changing outlook that bear on this point.

The possibility, even the certainty, of progress has been a common view of those who wished to reform or reconstruct society. Nothing succeeds like success, and nothing is as attractive as the certainty of success. Whether phrased as the inevitability of gradualness and the permeation of the ruling classes or the expropriation of the expropriators, socialists have had in common a belief that time and history are on their side.

As Richard Crossman has sketched out in his brilliant essay in the New Fabian Essays, belief in the inevitability of progress and the certainty of democratic socialist success has suffered severe erosion under the impact of events of the twentieth century. The certainty that capitalist society is doomed has not been seriously questioned, although the success of the welfare state has led some to push back the possible date of final collapse. However, the happy assumption that the alternative to capitalism is democratic socialism now seems doubtful. Once it was enough to show clearly that capitalism was on the way out to establish that socialism was on the way in. If not capitalism, then socialism. The establishment of post-capitalist régimes in Germany, Italy and particularly in Russia which are far removed from the democratic socialist ideal has shown all too clearly that there is more than one possible alternative to liberal capitalism. The simple antithesis is gone. Developments in a number of different fields, especially in psychology, have called into serious question some of the basic assumptions on which democratic socialist dogma rests. An optimistic view of man as a rational being who can make up his own mind and manage his own affairs is increasingly difficult to hold without many qualifications. Progress no longer seems such a certainty. A second look at history, taking into account a somewhat wider

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field than late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British experience, provides a good case for the view that the approved developments of the past two centuries are little more than civilized exceptions to the general rule of barbarism. Progress seems increasingly less likely and civilization increasingly fragile. A socialism which is wedded firmly to the values distilled from several centuries of liberal thought and action can no longer look to the future with the calm assurance that these values will survive and increasingly mold society into institutions of greater equity and justice. Willingness to reform a society radically requires a conviction either that the basic foundation of society is firm enough to take considerable social change without disruption, or that conditions are so desperate that reconstruction is the only possible hope, the only possible solution to a desperate situation. It is the dilemma of British socialism that either view is increasingly difficult to hold with conviction. The result, once again, is likely to be a decline in the dynamism of the movement which aims to reconstruct society.

One of the most interesting notes which appears in much current British discussion of socialism is the recurring reference to the managerial state. Without exception, those socialists who mention the managerial state speak of it with loathing and something that seems close to fear. This, they appear to say, is something which we must avoid above all. The term managerialism sums up the alternatives to democratic socialism—the rival which will replace old-fashioned capitalism if the socialists are unsuccessful or careless.

Two things are striking here: first, the clear assumption that such an illiberal and essentially totalitarian society is a possibility—not just a scarecrow raised by middle-class propagandists to frighten people into being content with the *status quo;* secondly, that socialism may, unless carefully thought out, lead directly toward the managerial society. There is a possibility that measures of nationalization and planning might end the danger of concentration of private economic power only to replace it with an even worse condition. This fear leads a number of recent socialist writers to stress the need for decentralization in administrative structure and reinforcement of

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parliamentary controls over nationalized industry. The autonomous public corporation and the idea of keeping nationalized industry out of politics—or rather, keeping day-to-day administration out of politics—are being given a long, suspicious and critical second look. This same fear explains, to come extent, the renewed discussion of the old idea of workers' control of industry. The contradictions involved in linking nationalized industry more closely to a responsible minister and parliament and at the same time giving the workers a more effective voice in the management of the industry are largely ignored, or covered up in verbal formulae which stress the part both of these developments can play in preventing the concentration of power in the hands of politically irresponsible managers.

In reading socialist discussions of the possibilities of managerialism, one cannot help thinking that as Europe was once said to be haunted by the specter of communism, so socialism is now haunted by the vision conjured up by James Burnham and, especially, by George Orwell in his novel *1984*. While this apprehension may not be generally felt within British socialism, it does seem to have affected many of the intellectuals who do most of the thinking for the movement. To the extent that fear of the possibility of managerialism exists, to the extent that the happy confidence of the nineteenth-century socialists in the rationality of man and the certainty of social progress has disappeared or declined, it seems likely that the confidence necessary to carry through long-run plans of social reconstruction has been reduced.

As a result, it seems increasingly reasonable for socialists to take a cautious approach to future problems. Yet this timidity may breed its own reaction. Seeing the dangers of doing nothing, some may call for another dash forward regardless of possible dangers in the future. The defection of Ramsay MacDonald in 1931 after a decade-long retreat from aggressive socialism taught socialists the horrid result of too much caution. The domestic policy recommendations of the Bevanites—to the extent one can say they have a coherent set of proposals for domestic policy—exhibit this tendency. Greater ministerial control of nationalized industry

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combined with greater workers' control and more extensive economic planning combined with greater decentralization in administration of plans are typical suggestions. These proposals certainly urge forward movement. They would resolve indecision by action, even if the actions urged appear somewhat contradictory. The emphasis is on the need for going ahead rather than on the details of policy—an emphasis other socialists can reasonably question until they know more exactly what are likely to be the effects of the actions proposed.

IV

Finally, in seeking to understand the present crisis in British socialism, we must turn back to the success of the socialists in reforming capitalist society. Unquestionably one of the greatest assets of the socialists, in Britain and elsewhere, has been that they were seeking a solution to the most serious problem raised by an industrial civilization: the miserable and inequitable life of the average working man. Even where their proposals have been based on incorrect or obsolete information and doubtful assumptions they have struck a spark because, whatever their faults, they were directly concerned with a problem which was a living reality to many—too many—human beings. In attacking the indecencies of an industrial society, in proposing a way to end the exploitation, insecurity and misery which marked the lives of a great many persons living in that society, socialism touched the quick. One may say of socialism that it has been mistaken but never that it has been irrelevant. It is this fact which probably accounts for the sneaking fear which has dogged conservatives for the last two generations: the fear that socialism, revolutionary or creeping, is the wave of the future which can be delayed but not destroyed. Only the existence of such an unspoken and probably semiconscious major premise can explain the obsessive fear of so many conservatives (especially in the United States) that socialist doctrine, if taught, would exercise a fatal fascination for the young who would be unable to resist its seductive attractions.

But today the inequities of capitalist society have been reduced. The status of the working class is better, both relatively

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and absolutely, than it has been before. Things are far from perfect, but the desperate urgency is no longer present. For this accomplishment, the socialists have claimed a good deal of the credit and their claim has been widely accepted. It may be that a combination of circumstances in Britain following World War II for which the socialists can take little credit has actually been the primary cause of improvement. This is a moot point which deserves careful examination but which cannot be considered here. The assumption of this discussion is that the socialist claim is essentially correct: that they deserve most of the bows they have taken for this accomplishment.

As was mentioned above, such success does create problems. It is likely to reduce the willingness of many socialists to continue to work hard to achieve a fully socialist society. But this is not the only effect. As the urgency of socialist reconstruction has declined, another set of problems has grown much more acute and become as obviously crucial, as the status of the working class was a few decades ago. Today the relations between nations and the possibility of another world war resulting in the total destruction of European civilization have an immediate and easily understood impact on the lives of all. Even the most thoughtless, ignorant and self-centered can understand the impact of the hydrogen bomb on political priorities. All problems of politics now revolve around the central problem of survival in an atomic world split by the cold war.

This shift in the degree of urgency of political problems raises a real danger for the socialist. In seeking to solve second-rate problems first, in persistently viewing present problems in the light of past priorities, the socialist may lose the one great virtue which has redeemed his many political mistakes in the past. He may become irrelevant.

This is not, of course, to argue that socialists have in the past been indifferent to problems of foreign policy or that they are indifferent at the present time. Nor is it to say that socialist domestic policies are irrelevant to foreign affairs. It may be that the solution of the international problems facing Britain lies in the complete socialization of British society. Such an argument, however, carries neither the force nor the conviction of

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earlier socialist arguments that the expropriation of the capitalist would strike at the heart of what was wrong in capitalist England. The connection between domestic reconstruction and peace is tenuous and questionable at best. Even the intellectual who is willing to hear out the argument may disagree; others are likely to be too busy to listen.

The domestic successes of the socialists and the changing world situation have combined to rearrange political priorities decisively. If socialists are to retain the political initiative in British politics which they have held for at least a generation, they must now take the initiative in foreign policy. What is needed is a set of recommendations for future policy as distinct and different in the foreign field as nationalization has been on the domestic scene: something that will promise eventual success in reaching the socialist goal of a peaceful and equalitarian world order and will catch the imagination of ordinary Englishmen.

There is no doubt at all that the need is recognized by those who do the thinking for British socialism. There is also little doubt that attempts to develop such a distinctive policy which would come at the problems besetting the world from an appealing new angle have been a dismal failure. The Labor party in the past has generally accepted liberal attitudes toward international politics. Its programs have stressed good will and peaceful intentions, reduced armaments and collective security; it has been reluctant to take account of the large rôles which power and force play in international politics. Labor foreign policy has, for the most part, been a generous and rather Wilsonian variant of well-established British policies. This approach has not been without its successes, of which the graceful withdrawal from India was one of the last and possibly the greatest of all.

The post-war years have not been a very happy time for those who hold to such views. Under Bevin's leadership, the Labor Government took a different tack—different, that is, for socialists. Bevin's resolute action in nailing down Britain's place in the cold war was well done. Although not distinctively different in the foreign policy from his Conservative opponents, Bevin acted with sufficient vigor and resolution to give at least the

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illusion that within Britain, for a time, the initiative was in his hands. He was generally supported, except within the Labor party where he was opposed by some socialists.

In the last few years, however, the initiative on foreign policy seems to have been entirely lost by British socialists. Unlike the situation regarding domestic policy, the differences within British socialism over foreign policy have not been about the speed of advance toward the millennium, but rather about the much more fundamental question of which direction socialists should go. It is not that socialists are agreed on a policy which many think wrong or hopeless; it is rather that they are not agreed at all, and thus react to new issues with the indecision characteristic of a movement not quite certain of where it is going.

This is well illustrated by socialist attitudes toward the integration of Europe and the rearmament of Germany. Few would deny the importance of these questions. The Schuman Plan and the E.D.C. were opposed by British socialists (fighting shoulder to shoulder on this particular issue with Communists, miscellaneous neutralists and various elements of the Right) or assented to with a grudging reluctance unlikely to fire the enthusiasm of anyone. At present, the Labor party is almost evenly divided over the rearmament of Germany. A slight majority support the position of the Conservative Government and the United States while a powerful opposition urges support for a neutralized Germany by arguing that a rearmed Germany would be a greater threat to peace than the U.S.S.R. and exploiting the traditional socialist aversion to considering the power aspects of international problems. Both sides provide impressive evidence of the divided mind of British socialism in the area of foreign affairs and the difficulties in the way of developing a clear-cut approach to international politics that is, to some extent at least, unique, appealing and constructive.

It is interesting to speculate on the reasons for this continued failure at a time when socialism can least afford it. Is it because there is no new approach which offers some hope of success which has not already been tried? Are many socialists too firmly committed to the structure of the present national state

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to develop and support policies leading beyond it? Does the road to power seem longer and more difficult in a developing supra-national community than in Britain alone? This would not be the first time that much socialist talk of internationalism camouflaged firm commitments to the national *status quo*. Although there seem to be no necessary reasons why a policy of nationalization and extensive national planning could not be harmonized with a developing supra-national structure, there are a number of practical difficulties to such an approach that might discourage the socialists from attempting to follow it.

These questions, however, refer chiefly to the difficulties British socialists have had in developing a consistent attitude toward European integration, and the difficulty is really much broader than that. Perhaps the most realistic explanation is that socialists are divided in their evaluation of the situation in which Britain finds herself at the present time. Does Britain actually have sufficient freedom of action to make decisive changes in her foreign policies? Some socialists apparently think that such an area of freedom does not exist and that the only responsible course is support for policies on which both parties are generally agreed. Given their commitment to liberal values in a savage world, they feel that no other course is possible however unfortunate this may be for socialist hopes of a renewed initiative in matters of policy. Other socialists think differently and oppose the going policy without, as yet, providing an alternative which can carry the body of their fellow socialists with them.

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This, then, is the situation in which the British socialists find themselves: on the domestic scene difficulties arising from their very success and increasing sophistication; on the foreign scene a continuing inability to agree on a distinct and workable policy. Socialist domestic success and the changing world scene make their failure on foreign policy increasingly serious.

These socialist difficulties have a direct impact on the policy troubles of the Labor party. In search of a new program, the party is unable to turn to its socialist intellectuals for satis-

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factory answers. The socialists cannot give a lead because they are not agreed among themselves on exactly where they are heading or how fast they ought to go. The result is a situation within the Labor party which is variously described as a healthy rethinking of basic postulates (by the friends of the party) and the hapless confusion of intellectual bankruptcy (by its critics).

The party, as a going political organization, is not in really serious difficulty—at least not yet. A program of socialist consolidation, continued social and economic reform and mild anti-Americanism—in other words, a continuation of the policy *status quo*—should, given the accumulation of almost inevitable mistakes on the part of the Conservatives, eventually pay off in political victory. While reform parties have often found the obsolescence of their doctrines a slow poison that brings ultimate disintegration, this danger, barring some catastrophe, is a very long-run problem indeed, for Labor has immense reserves of organized loyalty to draw upon.

But for British socialism, considered as a system of political and economic thought, the crisis is more immediately serious. In its simplest terms, it is whether or not socialism is still relevant to the solution of the main problems facing Britain today. That question still has to be answered. Whether or not the socialists can make the grade remains to be seen. One thing, however, seems reasonably certain: change and adaptation are the key to survival in the intellectual world as elsewhere. Unless British socialists are able to meet the problems of the mid-twentieth century on the terms set by those problems, their system of thought will soon cease to be of interest to anyone, except those who leaf through dusty histories of past political thought.

LANE DAVIS

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

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STRUCTURE AND BALANCE IN RAPID ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE EXAMPLE OF MEXICO*

I. *Introduction*

THE analytic focus of this paper will be sought in two dynamic aspects of economic change: rates of growth and changes in structure. It will be quite single-mindedly oriented toward these two aspects, thereby deliberately departing from the customary organization of such studies. Accordingly, after a brief introduction, the discussion will take its departure from the big aggregates and proceed to an analysis of the productive sectors; along the way, the preconditions of growth will be mentioned. Finally, after the path of growth has become manifest, it will be possible, in an empirical manner, to throw some light on that ephemeral concept of "balanced economic growth".

The selection of Mexico as a case study requires explanation. Real gross national product increased at an annual rate of around 7 per cent in Mexico, from 1939 to 1952. This is very rapid growth indeed by any standards, rarely if ever exceeded or even approached as an over-all rate in modern times, though the product of industry alone may, on occasion, have grown faster elsewhere. Moreover, since the period referred to is a recent one, the statistical material, though far less than perfect, is rather plentiful and affords a fair measure of structural detail as well.[1] Finally, Mexico shares with other countries certain symptoms of "under-

* This is a somewhat abbreviated version of a paper prepared for the Conference on Strategic Factors in Periods of Rapid Economic Growth, held in April 1954 under the sponsorship of the Committee on Economic Growth of the Social Science Research Council.

[1] This is largely due to a recent study made by a joint working party of the Mexican government and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, published under the title *The Economic Development of Mexico* (Baltimore, 1953); it is probably the most elaborate statistical study of an underdeveloped country now available. For the sake of greater compactness this paper will not be encumbered by footnotes giving specific source references. Current official materials were also used, especially the yearbooks of *Nacional Financiera S. A.* and of *Banco de México*, as well as unpublished mimeographed surveys by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, and other incidental sources.

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development" which ought to make the study of her growth generally significant beyond its monographical interest.

Since it is not possible to provide, within the limits of this paper, a complete picture of the Mexican economy, its geographic base, its resources and their development,[2] the main characteristics need to be summed up with an eye on their relevance for the kind of analysis planned for this paper. Mexico always had, and still has, an essentially agrarian economy. In 1921, about 71 per cent of the gainfully employed were engaged in agriculture (including cattle-breeding, hunting and fishing, and forestry). The census of 1940 sets the share of agriculture at 65 per cent and the best available estimates for 1950 are around 62 per cent. This trend is in line with the usual concept of what happens in the course of development and it is also borne out by a rising trend of industrial employment which increased by more than one quarter since 1939. Mining, on the other hand, at one time the chief point of attraction for the Spanish overlords, kept declining in relative over-all importance for the economy; recently mining products dropped from first to second place among Mexico's exports which, as in most underdeveloped countries, consist chiefly of primary commodities.

The problems of subsistence and growth must be viewed against a rather alarming demographic background. During the two decades preceding 1940, the population increased respectively by 15.5 per cent and 18.7 per cent but between 1940 and 1950 the rate of increase grew to 30.8 per cent. Since the birth rate does not show any sign of decreasing while the death rate still keeps falling, we have to anticipate for the foreseeable future a rate of population growth of at least 3 per cent a year, one of the highest in the world. The minimum task of economic development, that of increasing national income faster than population, thus emerges as a rather formidable one in a country which is not, by any means, generously endowed with natural resources. On the contrary, arable land makes up not more than about 15 per cent of the total area; worse yet, it is estimated that nearly half of the land has insufficient moisture throughout

[2] A brief historical outline, focused on developmental factors, was attempted by the author in "Mexico: Rapid Growth", *Economic Development: Principles and Patterns*, edited by Williamson and Buttrick (New York, 1954).

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the year. Erosion through age-old deforestation and wasteful cultivation tends to reduce the area further, while the limits of expansion without major capital investment have long been reached.

Unfavorable geography—precipitous mountains, arid plains and tropical coasts—also dominates other basic developmental aspects. It impedes the mobility of resources, material and human. An ethnically diverse nation from the outset, Mexico's unification into a monetary and market economy is undoubtedly retarded by such physical obstacles; the coexistence of rural underemployment and sporadic labor shortages, typical for many underdeveloped countries, may be partly due to the physical environment, in addition to the difficulties of anticipation and training for special skills.[3] In terms of capital, the scarcest of all resources in most underdeveloped countries, unfavorable geography spells greater requirements in order to overcome physical obstacles. While the network of railroads was largely completed before the First World War, its modernization and maintenance absorb large resources. The expansion of roads is one of the most important tasks now being attended to, including rural roads to integrate the vast and previously nearly inaccessible hinterland into a widening market economy. The climate itself—tropical downpours followed by a prolonged dry season—is responsible for large capital needs to provide for irrigation and drainage for the extension of the arable land area, and for the needs of power in a country where coal is found in one corner of the country and oil in regions nearly as remote from the central areas of industrial activity.

Past progress of development appears rather remarkable against this background of difficulty. Before the First World War, Mexico had developed from modest beginnings[4] into the largest industrial producer in Latin America. At this point, however, problems of social imbalance caused an upheaval which left an indelible imprint on Mexican politics and socio-

[3] An elaborate and highly revealing field study on the attitudes of labor toward industrial jobs in Mexico was provided by Wilbert E. Moore in *Industrialization and Labor*, Studies of the Institute of World Affairs (Ithaca and New York, 1951).

[4] See Henry G. Aubrey, "Deliberate Industrialization", *Social Research*, June 1949.

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economic concepts. While the progress of industry and of mining was aided by the policies of a dictatorship under Porfirio Díaz, agriculture was left behind and deteriorated through an inefficient and semifeudal system. Social unrest developed into revolution and civil war which resulted in a new constitution in 1917; the implementation of this by reform and other social action, however, took place but gradually. It was only in the last half of the 'thirties that large-scale land reform was put into effect, ending a prolonged period of political unrest. In the opinion of this writer, there is ample ground to believe that this far-reaching change was a precondition for further economic progress in other economic fields as well. Notwithstanding many shortcomings which are gradually recognized and remedied, it may be surmised that the Mexican land reform restored a measure of balance to the economy which could thereafter "take off" for another spurt of rapid growth.

II. *The Pattern of Growth, 1939–1952*

Production and Income

Mexico's gross domestic product at market prices increased from 6.7 billion pesos in 1939 to 52.2 billion in 1952, net domestic product at factor cost from 5.8 billion to 45.9 billion. In that period the currency underwent a sizable inflation, the wholesale price increasing about fourfold. In real terms,[5] therefore, the growth was less rapid. With 1939 = 100 as a base, real net domestic product rose to 235.1 in 1952. Since the population increased an estimated 40.8 per cent in that period, per capita net income grew about two-thirds within thirteen years. Expressed in annual rates, total real income increased 6.9 per cent a year, and per capita income 4 per cent, a very rapid growth indeed. It is, moreover, interesting to note that the speed of growth varied throughout the period. From 1939 to 1946 the annual rate of aggregate growth was 8.2 per cent, while in the ensuing period of adjustment from 1946 to 1952 it was only 5.6 per cent.

The reasons for this difference in rhythm are worth exploring. Wartime shortages were responsible for the increased need to

[5] No single deflator was used in arriving at real output figures, but the aggregate was built up from volume indices of the several sectors, derived by varying methods.

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manufacture at home. This phenomenon, observed in developed countries as well, has frequently been a powerful stimulant in the history of industrialization. Curtailment of competition by other countries provided export opportunities for Mexican industries which were not able to hold their markets after the war, for example, the textile industry. Thus, the economy was stimulated to the greatest level of activity which its capacity permitted; the existence of idle productive resources before the war helped boost output beyond a level which new investment alone could have achieved under wartime conditions. Later, however, a slackening of tempo followed the end of the emergency; a lessening of foreign demand, readjustments in the domestic economy after a period of extreme strain which created bottlenecks in transportation and other basic facilities, change of investment in the direction of capital-intensive slow-maturing projects—all this made for a reduced over-all rate of growth.

It is interesting to investigate to what extent the various sectors of the economy shared in the total, as real national output more than doubled between 1939 and 1950.[6] In this period of rapid industrialization, the share of manufacturing increased from 15.7 per cent in 1939 to 19.1 per cent in 1946, while that of agriculture (including the cattle industry, forestry and fishing) dropped from 20.3 per cent to 17.4 per cent. Thereafter, however, a change took place: from 1947 to 1950 the share of manufacturing receded to 18.3 per cent, while that of agriculture and related activities increased again to 19.6 per cent. The declining importance of mining is illustrated by a drop from 4.8 per cent in 1939 to 2.9 per cent in 1950. A lag of transportation and communication is reflected in a fall from 5.8 per cent to 4.3 per cent; the output of petroleum and of electric power also lagged, though less significantly.

Clearly, the share of all these activities would have been higher in 1950 except for the disproportionate growth of commercial services from 23.7 per cent in 1939 to 30.9 per cent in 1952 after reaching a high of 33.0 per cent in 1946. It is not easy to decide how much of this growth ought to be attributed to each of two factors which can be related to the process of

[6] 214.4 per cent of 1939. A breakdown by sectors was not available after 1950 at the time of writing. All percentage shares are calculated at current factor costs.

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economic growth: a widening of the market economy and an increase of commercial and speculative activity brought about by inflation. While the latter has hardly been absent it may have had less over-all significance than in similar situations in other underdeveloped countries, where speculative building is similarly motivated; the share of construction in 1952 barely exceeded that of 1939 in Mexico. Other services declined, those of government quite prominently; so did professional services and rent, doubtless under the impact of inflation and of shifts in the distribution of income.

The distribution of income underwent a spectacular change during the period of observation. The share of wages, salaries and related payments declined from 30.5 per cent in 1939 to 21.5 per cent in 1946, then rose again slightly to 23.8 per cent in 1950. Conversely, profits increased from 26.2 per cent in 1939 to 45.1 per cent in 1946 and declined to 41.4 per cent in 1950. If we group wages and salaries with the working income of entrepreneurs (presumably representing small business) and mixed incomes of labor and capital (chiefly in agriculture) we have an estimate through 1952: the percentage share of this group dropped from 65.7 in 1939 to 47.5 in 1952; that of profit, rent and interest combined increased in the same period from 34.3 to 52.5.

Persons who are interested in the social cost of rapid economic development will find these figures highly significant. Shares alone do not, of course, give a complete picture and it should be understood that the contrast between the incomes of the two groups is not one of gain versus loss but of different rates of advance: the income of the first group increased at an annual rate of 10.7 per cent, that of the other at only 4.4 per cent, in real terms. Nevertheless, what we witness here is clearly a major shift toward profits. Inflation had doubtless a major share by causing a lag of real compensation for work of all kinds, but also of rent and interest; by the same token, inflation permits the advance of profits as price increases of all kinds of merchandise and other tangible assets take place, and are anticipated in normal and even more in speculative transactions.

This rather crude generalization by-passes a great deal of

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factual and institutional analysis, well worth undertaking but by far exceeding the scope of a study which can only outline major elements of change. The question cannot fail to arise, however, whether the experience of industrial countries whose early phases of rapid growth were also accompanied by great inequality of income duplicates what happened in Mexico under such different historical circumstances. This painful social problem is not frequently discussed in these terms in developing countries, but we may well inquire whether rapid growth is bound to bring about, in one form or another, greater inequality of incomes than enlightened social conscience would want to endorse. If inflation really was responsible for inequality in Mexico, there may be some justification in describing that mechanism as "enforced savings". To the extent that the lower income groups are thereby prevented from consuming a larger share of the total increase of output and income this concept may be literally true, but misleading if it also implies that increased profits are not consumed either. This, however, was only partly true in Mexico, and while investment increased sizably it did not grow nearly to an extent which would appear to justify the increasing inequity of social distribution from a developmental angle.

Consumption and Investment

According to the best available estimate, the volume of aggregate consumption increased about 129 per cent and per capita consumption about 63 per cent in the years from 1939 to 1952. This corresponds to an annual rate of growth of 6.5 per cent for total consumption and one of 3.8 per cent per capita. The last-named figure would appear encouraging to those who are looking for signs of an improved standard of living as the fruit of rapid economic development. If we bear in mind the unequal distribution of income, the question arises to what extent the lower income groups did in fact participate in the gain. Estimates of consumption by factor groups are clearly very hazardous, but figures elaborated by the regional commission of the United Nations appear to imply that the consumption by recipients of profit, rent and interest as a group increased about 60 per cent faster than the consumption of the

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remaining group, apart from the fact that the share of the government's current expenditure increased. Hence it may be surmised that a disproportionate share of the gain in consumption can be attributed to a relatively small group of high income earners. There are, however, indications that the standard of living of the population at large must have improved, at least as far as the consumption of food is concerned; apparent consumption of staple foods, such as corn and beans, increased much more rapidly than population, and that, at least, can hardly be attributed to greater consumption by the wealthy alone.

A high rate of consumption among the upper income earners implies a lower rate of investment than would appear desirable from a developmental angle. In that respect, Mexico shares with other underdeveloped countries a number of traditional and institutional obstacles to investment, too complex to elaborate in this paper. On the other hand, the scope of entrepreneurial initiative has been widening visibly and all available statistics give evidence of increased investment activity. The ratio of net investment to national income increased from 4.2 per cent in 1939 to 7.6 per cent in 1950 and 8.5 per cent in 1952. The ratio of gross investment to gross domestic product grew from 9.7 per cent in 1939 to 13.8 per cent in 1950 and 14.4 per cent in 1952. This shows that, after all, as national income grew, an increasing proportion was devoted to capital formation.

In this manner gross investment had in 1952 increased by 189 per cent over 1939, an annual rate of 8.5 per cent. Within the total, public investment grew faster, at a rate of 9.6 per cent, or 232.6 per cent over 1939, while private investment increased by only 161.8 per cent, at a rate of 7.6 per cent a year. It would be a mistake to conclude from these figures that the contribution of private investment was less important because public investment grew faster; in 1952 private investment amounted to 4.2 billion pesos compared with only 3.3 billion in the public sector. In the writer's opinion, the size of the private share in such rapid development is rather remarkable in a backward economy; it may help to explain why Mexico was able to progress so quickly without any over-all development plan and with a minimum of centralized investment control. This does not

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mean that the direction of investment was not governed by an awareness of developmental requirements, at least in the public sector.

Real net product increased from 1939 to 1945 at an annual rate of 8.2 per cent compared to a growth of investment of 9.9 per cent; while from 1946 to 1950 output increased less, at an annual rate of 5.9 per cent, but investment increased more, 10.8 per cent. It would be tempting to conclude that investment was more "productive" in the former period and if investment-productivity is viewed mechanically, as a simple incremental output-capital ratio, this would be true. In the Mexican case the explanation of the ratio's apparent decline is twofold. First, productive capacity had been used to the limit under the pressure of wartime demand confronted by a shortage of imports. Moreover, in order to increase capacity, investments which would yield the largest increase of output in the shortest possible time were preferred. After these easier methods were exhausted, further increments of output tended to require larger investments for new units rather than for mere expansion; moreover the neglect of maintenance made itself felt, bringing to light a measure of capital-consumption which, it may be presumed, had not previously become visible as an offset to investment but was later responsible for larger investment without commensurate increase of output. Secondly, the direction of investment partly changed toward more capital-intensive types with long output lags, implying changes in the structure of investment to which we now turn.

Characteristic for this kind of shifts is investment in electric power which grew from 1.2 per cent of total investment in 1939 to 5.3 per cent in 1950; public investment was largely responsible, rising from 40 per cent to 75 per cent. Similarly, the share of petroleum investment, all of it public, increased from 2.1 per cent to 4.8 per cent in the same period. The share of transportation and communications was allowed to decline from 1939 to 1948, but recently a great deal more attention was paid to this basic field, especially in the form of improving the deteriorated railroad system and constructing new roads.

Investment in agriculture is of great interest from a structural angle. From 13.3 per cent of total investment in 1939 the

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share of agriculture fell as low as 10.1 per cent in 1945, then rose to 21.6 per cent in 1949 and 19.5 per cent in 1950.[7] We can here, to some extent, also observe the effect of government initiative and encouragement in the fields of large-scale irrigation and credit. In this connection it is interesting to note how public investment in agriculture, at first smaller than the private type, began to lead in 1942 until it reached 60 per cent in 1946. By 1948, however, private investment was back in the lead, presumably partly following the trail blazed by government action, partly as a result of the mounting yield and attractiveness of export crops on newly irrigated land.

Industry's share in total investment dropped abruptly from 26.3 per cent in 1939 to 11.9 per cent in 1942, largely, it is believed, as a result of difficulties in obtaining capital goods from abroad. To overcome the lag, the percentage rose steadily to 29.7 in 1947, thereafter declining to 20.3 in 1950, in line with the structural shift whose other pole we previously observed. Private construction followed an inverse course, increasing from 17.1 per cent in 1939 to 24.9 per cent in 1944 under the stimulus of wartime opportunities, industrialization, and rapidly rising upper-class incomes, producing demand for luxury buildings. Thereafter the importance of construction declined again, keeping the share of investment in that type of activity around 14.5 per cent from 1948 to 1950.[8]

While the over-all shares changed little from 1939 to 1950, a distinct reversal of trend became apparent in the post-war period toward greatly increased emphasis on public services, largely slowly maturing, capital-intensive projects whose share grew relatively at the expense of more immediately productive enterprises. This explains, to a large extent, the steady inflationary pressure to which we referred before. While these investments create new income all along, in the form of wages

[7] The magnitude of the increase is partly due to large expenditures for fighting foot-and-mouth disease, an effort which reached its peak in 1949.

[8] It should be made clear that the technical difficulties of estimating investment in Mexico are very great and that all figures are approximations, achieved by various degrees of compromise with reality. Inaccuracies are, however, not believed to affect the over-all picture here presented. For lack of material, investment in service industries other than transport and communications are not included. Changes in inventories are also not included.

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and other expenditure, their product materializes only with a large time lag in consumable output; some projects, moreover, such as roads, never produce measurable output at all, their benefits being altogether indirect or intangible, no matter how important.

The Development of Agriculture

The form into which this paper has been cast does not permit a digression into the historical and institutional aspects of Mexican agriculture, no matter how tempting. We have already expressed the belief that the land reform was a socially inescapable step, even though it may have created a tendency toward stagnation, since excessively small holdings now prove to be as resistant to improvement as large estates used to be in the past, though for entirely different reasons. In the mountainous, overpopulated central area both irrigation and mechanization are frequently not practicable and it is, therefore, not surprising to find that the sizable increase of output, achieved in the period of observation, took place largely on new and irrigated land in the northern part of the country.

The volume of agricultural production nearly doubled in the thirteen years to 1952. An attempt was made to impute to three major factors the gain of about 84 per cent from 1939 to 1950. It was estimated that an increase of the area under crops contributed about 44 per cent of the gain, increases of yield about 23 per cent, and a structural shift in the area devoted to various crops about 33 per cent. These factors will now be outlined in turn.

Cultivated area devoted to the twenty-three most important crops increased only little during the decade before 1939 but grew from nearly 7 million hectares in 1939 to about 10 million in 1952. Cultivated land under irrigation increased from about 240,000 hectares in 1939 to about 1,570,000 in 1952, a very sizable increase, and one which contributed most to the growth of output. It is less easy to appraise the remaining increase of area though it appears likely that better utilization of arable land more than offset abandonment for erosion or other causes. On the other hand, the use of land not really suited to the traditional subsistence crops had always been an adverse factor in Mexico,

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and since overpopulation is largely responsible for that situation, statistics of area are not a uniquely useful indicator.

Nevertheless, because the extension of area except by irrigation does not have much scope in Mexico, efforts extended to irrigation are of the utmost importance. Many very large projects are still in progress in a total of more than thirty and will not bear fruit until later; the addition of more than 300,000 hectares of irrigated area in 1952 is the largest ever made in any single year, and more can be expected in the future. Besides the large projects, small-scale efforts by individuals, communities or coöperatives should not be underrated and will be favored by agricultural credit.

Cotton, corn and wheat, in that order, were the chief beneficiaries of additions to the irrigated area and from 1939 to 1950 their volume index of output increased respectively by 274 per cent, 58 per cent and 37 per cent. Even larger percentage increases were achieved in other crops, like rice and sugar, and in some which, with cotton, coffee and cocoa, have recently become good export earners, such as tomatoes, citrus fruit and pineapple. Corn remains the most important single item of food for the rapidly growing population; the tonnage increase from about 3 to 4.7 million metric tons perhaps illustrates the magnitude of the achievement better than the previously mentioned percentage figure. Beans, another food staple, increased less, from 330,000 tons in 1939 to about 500,000 tons in 1950.

As to agricultural yields, that of corn per unit of land increased, on an average, at least by 10 per cent in the period from 1925/29 to 1945/48 and there are indications that it increased some more in the meantime, perhaps as much as another 10 per cent. This is rather remarkable, considering that corn is grown everywhere, including the steepest slopes and other types of unsuitable land. A part of the improvement is doubtless due to the extension outward from the arid central zone to more humid and to irrigated land. Rather spectacular improvements of yields were achieved by the use of new hybrid varieties, but between 1949 and 1951 not more than perhaps 4 per cent of the area was sown to hybrids; thus, while now still limited, the prospects for the future appear promising.

Similarly, an increase of about 30 per cent was achieved in

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wheat over the afore-mentioned period and there may have been another rise of, perhaps, as much as 20 per cent since 1948. Much greater yield increases can be expected in the future, since the use of fertilizers, especially important on humid and irrigated land, has only begun to accelerate with the help of imports and greatly stepped up domestic production. The use of insecticides is still in its infancy in Mexico, and mechanization, while expanding rapidly, has much scope in the newer, less mountainous areas. The use of simpler implements and the improvement of skills by education and demonstration have also a long way to go. Many limitations are, unfortunately, inherent in the predominance of small plots; according to the census of 1940 over 40 per cent of all plots were smaller than 2½ acres while another 35 per cent ranged from 2½ to 12½ acres only.

The third factor refers to the structure of agriculture and its recent change. To the extent recent improved statistics can be trusted, two modest but significant shifts have occurred: from subsistence to commercial crops and from domestic to export crops. Representative of the first-mentioned shift is the reduction of the share of total area devoted to corn which dropped from about 69 per cent in 1925/29 to around 65 per cent in 1949/50, when beans amounted to only 7 per cent instead of nearly 11 per cent. Food crops, in the aggregate, fell from 92 per cent to 83 per cent in the same period. Oilseeds, on the other hand, increased their share of area from less than 1 per cent to more than 3 per cent and textile fibers even more, from under 5 per cent to about 10 per cent. Cotton alone, recently Mexico's largest single export, about trebled its share of total area under cultivation; so did cacao and, almost, citrus and other export fruit though, naturally, their share in the total area is small. The area under sugar-cane cultivation nearly doubled.

From this inordinately short discussion of a complex topic which gave rise to a large and weighty literature, one derives the over-all impression of Mexican agricultural development during the last fifteen years or so as a rather spectacular change from centuries of near-stagnation to rapid, though spotty, development. This is doubly remarkable because the country had only just emerged from a long period of unrest and of as-

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similation of a far-reaching land reform[9] affecting better than one third of the population Following a period of world depression, such a drastic change with its attendant administrative and institutional difficulties could be expected to cause a delayed, rather than a dramatic, improvement. Nonetheless, a rate of growth of output of nearly 5½ per cent a year was, on an average, achieved over the last thirteen years and greater gains can be expected in a country whose governments have never lost interest in agriculture which is still basic for a majority of the population. Interesting structural changes have also been observed; they are characteristic for economic development which is accompanied—or should be—by a shift to commercial production of agricultural crops as the territory is being opened up and introduced to progressive methods.

Industrial Development

Space will not permit us to trace the history of Mexican industrialization throughout its entire course. The rhythm of industrial growth can be illustrated, however, by a time series covering about fifty years.[10] With 1929 = 100, the volume index of manufacturing production increased from about 36 in 1899 to 377 in 1952, a more than tenfold growth in fifty-three years from a level that was not, by any means, insignificant, since, it will be recalled, Mexico then ranked first in Latin-American industry. This implies an average yearly rate of growth of about 4½ per cent, but if we exclude the thirteen revolutionary years from 1910 to 1922 during which industrial activity was disrupted until it regained its prerevolutionary level, the average annual rate of growth would amount to about 6 per cent. This would, indeed, be considered good over a long period even in countries more developed than Mexico and it is likely that errors caused by shortcomings of statistics tended in the direction of underestimation.

This time span includes, naturally, periods of uneven industrial growth. From 1899 to 1909 the volume of production ap-

[9] During the years of most active reform yields generally dropped.

[10] This is a composite of three indices, making the best of somewhat doubtful material. There is every reason to believe that the earlier periods of growth suffer from underestimation due to deficiencies of reporting and a lag in including new enterprises in the statistical sample.

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proximately doubled. Between 1922 and 1936 it doubled again, the great depression notwithstanding. From 1936 to 1946 the volume of manufacturing output doubled once more, and this period included the acceleration of activity after the outbreak of the war. The index increased 128 per cent, from 1940 to 1950, and around 135 per cent to 1952. Over the last-mentioned thirteen-year period the average annual rate of growth was thus 6.8 per cent, but during the war years from 1939 to 1945 it ran as high as 9.4 per cent. After a pause for adjustment in 1946–47, industry vigorously resumed growth but flagged again recently.

If we now turn to the analysis of industrial growth since 1939, we find a significant shift in composition. In 1939 the production of capital goods and consumers' durables made up only about 17 per cent of the total value, but the share rose to about 29 per cent in 1951. While measurement by value is not an ideal procedure under inflationary conditions, there is no reason to presume that it made for an overestimation of the shift; on the contrary, the prices of textiles which accounted for not less than 31 per cent of the value of manufacturing output in 1939 increased much more than the general index. Thus, it could well be that the shift toward heavy industrial output was even larger in volume terms than by value. Unfortunately, the statistics of some industries are too deficient for a complete survey by volume, but the most recent and extended growth series of individual industries which could be collected are presented in the accompanying table.

It is customary to view iron and steel production as a major indicator of industrial maturity since, as a rule, such basic heavy production is not undertaken unless industrial enterprise and the size of the market have progressed sufficiently. In fact, the Mexican iron and steel industry dates back to the turn of the century, but only one modern blast furnace was available before the Second World War. Since then, as the table shows, growth has been rapid, more than trebling in thirteen years, resulting in annual growth rates of 9 per cent and 10.8 per cent respectively, for iron and steel, which far exceed the average industrial growth rate.

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GROWTH OF SELECTED MEXICAN INDUSTRIES

Industry	*Base Year*	*Unit*	*Output: Base Year*	*1952*	*Annual Rate: %*
Iron	1939	tons	99,248	304,992	9.0
Steel	1939	tons	142,178	536,553	10.8
Cement	1939	tons	409,800	1,639,600	11.2
Sulfuric acid	1947	tons	33,365	92,208	22.5
Alcalis	1947	tons	9,499	16,721	11.9
caustic soda	1947	tons	1,873	12,620	46.4
Ammonium sulfate	1941	tons	2,800	60,000	32.1
Superphosphate	1941	tons	3,500	56,000	28.6
Tires	1939	piece	255,000	748,000	10.9
Inner tubes	1939	piece	171,000	548,000	10.9
Paper: kraft and semikraft	1939	tons	28,811	83,209	10.8
printing	1939	tons	18,844	22,411	1.4
writing	1939	tons	4,260	11,890	8.2
Motor vehicles assembly	1941	piece	13,888	45,043	11.3
Glass containers	1943	piece	148,320	245,990	10.6
Textiles: general	1939	index	100.0	158.1	3.5
cotton goods	1939	index	100.0	186.0*	5.8
woollen goods	1939	index	100.0	108.7*	0.8
silk and rayon goods	1939	index	100.0	106.1*	0.5
Canned food	1939	tons	11,882	34,660	7.4
Vegetable oil	1943	tons	163,596	226,522	3.5
Cigars	1939	000 boxes	949,900	1,417,346	3.2
Beer	1939	million liters	160.5	572.1	10.3
Sugar	1940	tons	292,324	691,075	7.4

*1950.

The cement industry is considered an indicator of construction activity, public and private. The year 1952 marks the end, though not yet the completion, of a vast six-year program of public works which included several very large hydroelectric projects. Private construction increased very rapidly, especially in the large cities, reflecting rapid general growth and also speculative activities based on inflationary trends and rapidly increasing earnings of the upper income groups; thus the surface area of new buildings erected in the Federal District has grown fourfold since 1939. It is therefore not surprising to find that the manufacture of cement nearly quadrupled.

Among the consumer goods industries the textile industry is the oldest and, still, the largest in Mexico. Its beginnings date back nearly one and a quarter centuries and, except for specialties, it has long been able to take care of domestic re-

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quirements. Its rate of growth since 1939, at 3.5 per cent, illustrates the lag of consumer goods behind heavy industry. The textile industry has ceased to be a dynamic element also in other respects: as the oldest in the country it illustrates the problems of obsolescence to which overprotection and a sluggish internal market contribute. Much of the equipment dates back to the turn of the century and not more than, perhaps, 15–20 per cent of spindles and looms could be called modern though several new mills were built after the war. High costs and prices result from low productivity and, in turn, restrict an already small market still more.

Let us now view the growth of industry in terms of its resource base, fuel and power. Wood used to be the chief fuel, industrially and domestically; the sorry history of deforestation and soil erosion in Mexico owes much to the lack of other accessible fuel. Coal is located in the extreme north, far removed from the main centers of economic activity. Once oil became a major source of available energy, it quickly replaced other fuel in railroad transportation. Natural gas and, above all, hydroelectric power have become increasingly important in the economy. Thus, from 1925 to 1946 coal and coal gas dropped from about 38 per cent to 9 per cent of energy consumption, expressed in kilowatt-hours of electricity equivalent. In the same period oil and similar fuels increased their share from around 46 per cent to 65 per cent, natural gas came up from nothing to about 6 per cent, and electricity increased from about 16 per cent to 20 per cent of a rapidly growing total.

In the thirteen years until 1952, including a period of adjustment after nationalization, oil output increased at an annual rate of 4.8 per cent, but during the last seven years of the period the rate was 9 per cent. Refining capacity grew apace, and this rate of growth, barely exceeding the average for industrial production, provides only a slim margin for future expansion of needs. Oil, once a major export commodity, is, on balance, now chiefly consumed at home; given more ample supply and transportation facilities, more could probably be used to good advantage, as the consumption figures of other developing countries show.

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Electric power facilities have been growing rapidly: capacity installed increased from about 680,000 kilowatts in 1939 to more than 1½ million in 1952, and electricity generated grew from 2.4 billion kilowatt-hours in 1939 to 5.3 billion in 1952, at an annual rate of 6.2 per cent in the thirteen years since 1939 and also in the eighteen years since 1934, but at a faster rate of 8.4 per cent in the last seven years since 1945. This acceleration of output is, indeed, very essential for economic development and, even so, there have been repeated instances of power shortage for which droughts were also, on occasion, responsible. It is quite likely, however, that an even faster rate of growth could have been absorbed by the expanding economy, even though relatively little is used for residential lighting outside the large cities, since only about 20 per cent of the population uses electricity. Public policy, including capital assistance, played a large rôle in the expansion of power output; though a large part of the industry was traditionally in private hands in Mexico, considerably more than half of yearly investments since 1944 are attributable to public funds.

Once more summing up a very large topic, it appears that Mexican industrial development has been pushing ahead rapidly, in part carried along by past impetus, partly by the specific needs and opportunities of the war. This progress was greatly aided by public policy and encouragement in many fields too numerous to elaborate on: tariff protection, fiscal exemption, monetary policy, public credit, especially through *Nacional Financiera*, an autonomous government agency with many of the characteristics of development corporations in other countries. By way of illustration, the total of this institution's outstanding investments and credits to all sectors of the economy amounted to more than 1½ billion pesos, nearly 170 million dollars, at the end of 1952. Foreign loans, obtained and guaranteed by *Nacional Financiera*, also played a rôle but it is interesting to note that foreign investment never exceeded 10 per cent of all industrial investment reached during the war period, rapidly decreasing in relative importance after that, as domestic capital formation kept increasing. Nonetheless, the marginal importance of such investment in periods of rapid growth may well be greater than the statistics seem to indicate.

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III. *Problems of Balanced Growth*

No one has yet provided a satisfactory definition of balanced growth, or an inventory of its criteria. In fact, in most developing countries the statistical material is not sufficiently detailed to permit meaningful analysis. We are a little more fortunate in this respect in Mexico. Hence, for better or worse, an attempt will be made to approach the topic from two angles: (1) Since a low average productivity is a prime cause of low incomes and slow progress, we shall dwell on problems of production and efficiency, the supply side of the economy, as it were. (2) On the other hand, the structure of economic activity affects the level of reciprocal demand between industries and between sectors, while the level and the distribution of incomes affect consumer demand, whose increased satisfaction ought to be the ultimate rationale of all development efforts; hence we shall finally approach the problem of balance from the angle of demand, of incomes and markets. As we have moved from the aggregate to the particular in the preceding part of the study, we shall now retrace our steps in first discussing problems of balance within sectors and then between the sectors of the economy.

If the problem of balance is viewed from the angle of a single industry the ideal would be found in its perfect integration in all directions; in other words, the flow of materials to it and the demand for its products should grow apace in such a manner that the new capacity could be fully utilized within a reasonable time. This ideal is not realized even in industrially advanced countries, since indivisibilities of plant and fluctuations of economic activity would cause less-than-optimal utilization at some periods even if planning had been perfect, which it rarely is. Yet, the time lag in approximating optimal positions, the bottlenecks encountered in the process and the ability to overcome them in short order, these could be considered criteria for the appraisal of balance in the process of economic growth. From this angle we find substantial instances of imbalance in Mexico. To state them does not mean to claim a prevalence of faulty planning though this may well have been a factor in some respects. The problem is whether and to what extent such temporary imbalance is inherent in the discontinuity of the

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process of growth and the lack of integration which, after all, are major symptoms of underdevelopment itself.

Let us take the steel industry as an example. We saw how rapidly its output recently grew, doubtless a major achievement and the backbone of industrial growth at large. Yet this increased output was much less than could have been obtained, had it been possible to use the existing plant to near-capacity. In the four years from 1949 to 1952, utilization of blast-furnace capacity was only approximately 49, 54, 60 and 70 per cent, respectively. Steel production did somewhat better, but in 1951 it was only 71 per cent of steel-making capacity, in spite of imports of scrap and pig iron. The years here mentioned were not isolated instances, but they are representative of the entire period since blast-furnace capacity was doubled toward the end of the war. The factors responsible for the "shortfall" are the poor location and insufficient increase in the production of suitable coal and metallurgical type coke, together with inadequate transportation facilities for the fuel.

It is unfortunate that coal and iron ore deposits are widely separated, which must be chalked up to unavoidable geological accident. Perhaps more propitiously located sources can be developed, for there are indications of deposits in the west-central sector. Still, the problem was not new nor the bottleneck of supplies unforeseeable, though perhaps not easily remedied. In fact, a large new coking plant is now being completed and will relieve the difficulty within a year, not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. On the other hand, plans to double pig iron capacity once more are already being made and were mentioned as part of the new president's program. It will be interesting to watch whether bottlenecks similar to those which have plagued the industry for a full decade will then be avoided.

Other instances will be touched upon more briefly. The cement industry has also grown very rapidly in the face of nearly insatiable demand. Yet, in the four years previously discussed for steel, utilization was only 66, 70, 74 and 78 per cent of capacity. Just as in the case of steel it was not lack of demand which held back output but, again, shortages of transportation facilities and of fuel; except during two war years, production never

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exceeded 80 per cent of capacity. Similarly, paper and food-packing could be cited as examples of industries which expanded too fast by comparison with their raw material base.

If we analyze the significance of overcapacity for economic development, we need not approach it from the angle of profitability. We do not know the break-even points in Mexico, but operations at such relatively low utilization are not necessarily unprofitable. In fact, the coexistence of underutilization of plants and high levels of demand make it nearly certain that sufficiently high prices will take care of the profit angle in a well-protected industry. What matters for our purpose is the loss of national efficiency in three ways: (1) shortages of basic materials which delay the growth of other enterprises and, probably, cause higher costs and lower productivity in the affected industries; (2) lower productivity and higher costs in the underutilized industry itself which are passed on in the form of higher prices and, eventually, reduce the average productivity of the entire economy and keep incomes lower than they might have been; (3) protracted underutilization of capacity means overinvestment and, hence, underutilization of capital, perhaps the scarcest of all resources in underdeveloped countries.

It would not do to point to the fact that excess capacity may not persist for long because demand is bound to catch up with it in due course. We have seen in the case of steel and cement that it is perfectly possible for capacity and overcapacity to grow apace for long periods of time. Sometimes this may be unavoidable, but probably a related simultaneous investment would have avoided or, at least, shortened the unproductive interval; economy of investment in one place can cost dearly in others and in the entire economy. While there may not always be enough capital or initiative to make all the related moves at once, timing, coördination and understanding of the intricacies of industrial integration hold the key to the problem.

In agriculture, the crux of the problem appears to be that Mexico has been so long and so largely devoted to traditional subsistence agriculture that a change can only be slow and painful. Where a small plot is all that stands between the farmer and starvation, he finds it hard to accept the risk of change;

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thus, in regions where traditions are strongest, the soil becomes more and more eroded and exhausted. On the other hand, it is easy to demonstrate that a better balance between crops would be desirable: only 9 per cent of cultivated land is devoted to industrial crops and 10 per cent to export crops; yet these commercial agricultural activities contribute, respectively, 21 per cent and 27 per cent to the total gross agricultural income, while the 81 per cent under food crops provide only 52 per cent. About half of the entire cultivated area is still devoted to one single crop, corn. Clearly, progress and balance in agriculture depend on a further modification of the traditional "corn economy", if this term stands for all subsistence crops. Progress has been made, but a large part of the slow and difficult task still lies ahead.

The balance between industry and agriculture, as distinct from the balance within each sector, is of special interest to the development economist who has learned that a gradual shift from agriculture to industry is of the essence. It is doubtless true that a shift of resources from a sector with inherently lower to one of higher productivity is bound to increase the output per unit of such resources, be they labor or capital. Hence, where productivity in industry is higher than in agriculture a shift toward the latter is desirable. However, what seems really to matter in this context is, again, not so much a matter of principle as of timing. If the shift is made too rapidly it invites a danger of leaving agriculture behind, a sector which in a still basically agrarian economy must be relied upon both as a source of food and as the market for an important part of final, consumable output. Moreover, where rapid growth is desired, the largest additional output per unit of investment can sometimes be obtained where the economy is most backward: by increasing agricultural yields, thus boosting production and incomes in close interaction.

One may be permitted to judge that in Mexico the balance between industry and agriculture has been fairly well maintained, if the entire period of thirteen years is considered when, as we have seen, the volume of industrial production increased by 135 per cent, that of agricultural output by 97 per cent. While industry might be expected to gain more in a trend toward

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diversification, agriculture was not left behind. Yet, at certain intermediate periods it looked as if this might not be the case. By 1945, for instance, the product of manufacturing had increased by 71 per cent, but that of agriculture by only 20 per cent. In the ensuing years the relation changed, and agriculture forged ahead, largely as the result of official policy and promotion.

A similar time of adjustment may be observed at present. After another period of rapid industrial growth between 1948 and 1950, an interval for readjustment would seem in order, and, in fact, Mexico is now undergoing what some describe as a "pause" in its economic development. Nearly all rates of growth have decelerated during the last years. In part, this is due to external causes, the raw material boom following the Korean emergency and the present recession which has affected Mexico earlier, as the result of lower export demand. The government's deflationary policy also fits in. It is perhaps a combination of monetary considerations and a change of economic emphasis which prompted the present administration to embark on a policy which may also point in the direction of restoring the developmental balance. Public investment and promotion will be directed to agriculture and to projects which will yield output quickly rather than to big, slowly maturing schemes which were preferred previously. In terms of our preceding discussion it would appear as though this policy might alleviate stresses and, perhaps, help remove bottlenecks. Significantly, by far the largest slice of the 1954 budget has been assigned to transport and communications, more than 25 per cent of public expenditure, much more than ever before. This is of particular importance if we recall the place of transportation in some specific bottlenecks which we have discussed. Moreover, the program of rural feeder roads is being pushed; this might contribute as much as any other single factor to the promotion of agricultural and related development which, in any case, has been allocated the second largest slice of 13½ per cent of federal expenditure in the new budget. The resources of autonomous agencies and monetary authority have also been increasingly mobilized for basic and desirable purposes, including agricultural credit, long one of the weakest links in the chain of promotional activities.

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The Mexican government has also become increasingly concerned with the issue we left for the end of our discussion of balanced growth: the distribution of income, inflation and prices, and the lag of industrial markets. We have already pointed out the relevant facts, thus little additional evidence is needed. The sugar industry's progress has suffered from a lag of demand. The textile industry operated at only about 47 per cent of capacity in 1951. In this case the vicious circle induced by low efficiency is especially apparent if we relate the obsolescence of the textile industry, to which we referred, with the fact that from 1939 to 1950 the prices of yarn and fabrics increased 26 per cent more than the wholesale price index of 210 commodities. Thus the export markets, acquired during the war, vanished again and domestic consumption, already pinched by general inflation, flagged also. Similarly, though the statistics are not very reliable, it appears that the production of leather footwear was in 1951 and 1952 lower than in 1946.

A reason for the lag of demand for mass consumer goods may be found in the shift toward a more unequal distribution of income which resulted after the war under the pressure of inflation. Even though aggregate incomes rose, a sharp reduction of the share accruing to the lower income groups, which include the large mass of customers for important industries, is bound to make itself felt. If we recall the argument for "enforced savings", here is the other side of the coin: if consumption is reduced too much, the market on which industry depends does not develop, and that, too, can become an obstacle to development. As in all other things, this is a matter of proportion and balance.

It thus appears that still another element of balance needs watching: that between consumption and investment. A mechanical application of Keynesian concepts can easily conceal the rather elementary fact that the physical output of increased production has to be integrated into the circular flow, lest the process of growth itself grind to a halt for lack of internal consistency and balance.

Henry G. Aubrey

Elmhurst, N. Y.

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CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN PAKISTAN*

IN August 1953, the flat, low-lying, and hot Federal Capital of the new state of Pakistan, Karachi, was seething. The annual "rainy season", which normally produces a few inches of precipitation, had dumped tons of water on the city of temporary dwellings. Relief organizations were desperately trying to deliver medicines, food and clothing. They were hampered by the intense concentration of population: the former sea and air port, now capital of Pakistan, had since the partition jumped from 357,000 (1941) to over a million (February 1951). Of this total, 50 per cent reported themselves as refugees, victims of partition and continuing tension. The rains practically wiped out many of the refugee settlements.

Pakistan's sixth year of independence had brought student riots, severe food shortages, disorders led by Muslim fundamentalists, deposition of the Nazimuddin Cabinet, and continuing trouble over Kashmir.

Indeed, news from Kashmir disturbed Karachi far more than did the rains. On August 9, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, Prime Minister of Kashmir, had been arrested and removed from office because, as it was announced in India, his Cabinet "had lost the confidence of the people." In Srinagar, Kashmir, fire brigades and police dispersed pro-Pakistan demonstrators, protesting the installation of pro-India Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad as the new Prime Minister. On August 11 in Karachi, police warned foreign tourists to avoid the city as thousands demonstrated in Jehangir Park and Prime Minister Mohammed Ali declared that neither he nor his government would rest "until they have secured for the people of Kashmir their in-

* The author of this article stopped off briefly in Bombay, India, and in Karachi, Pakistan, in August 1953, after a year's travel and research in the Far East. His visit was made possible by grants from the Social Science Research Council, the Calm Foundation of Rutgers University, and the Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan. While in Japan he was affiliated with the Center at the Field Station, Okayama, first as Research Associate and later as Director of Research.

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alienable right to determine their future by free exercise of their vote." [1] The next day, there was especial élan in the ranks of units of the Pakistani Army, parading in dress rehearsal for Independence Day, August 14. Motorized columns, uniforms, guns, and even bagpipes made these troops look vaguely British, and contrasted strongly with the squalor of nearby refugee squatter settlements. In the harbor, British-type frigates hung flags and lights on all rigging. At the last minute, as a mark of sympathy for Muslim brethren of Kashmir, the government canceled all celebrations. Speaking in commemoration of six years of independence on August 14, Prime Minister Mohammed Ali warned: "We are bound to the people of Kashmir by ties of religion, culture, tradition, economy and geography. It is but natural that we should feel the deepest sympathy for them in their hour of trial." [2]

Meanwhile, in government buildings in Karachi there was frank and open discussion of Pakistan's central political issue. Pakistan had won partition and independence on the basis of Muslim religious principles, and yet had operated for six years without a formal constitution. Religion and politics are not separated in the Muslim mind; but how can urgent, modern needs be adjusted to thirteenth- and fourteenth-century fundamentalism? How could Pakistan reconcile the interests of West Pakistan, more knowledgeable in the needs of the modern state, with those of East Pakistan, less exposed to modernization and more tense in Hindu-Muslim relations?[3]

These, then, were the raw materials from which the Pakistan

[1] *The Times of India*, Bombay, August 10, 1953; *The Times of Karachi*, August 12, 1953.

[2] *Pakistan Day Speech by the Hon'ble Prime Minister Mr. Mohammed Ali*, Department of Advertising, Films and Publications, Government of Pakistan (Karachi, n.d. [1953]).

[3] I am very grateful to Mr. Abdul Qayyum, of the Pakistan Government Information Office, for material on the constitutional problem, for a briefing on key issues involved in constitution-making and, especially, for the amazing display of democracy in his own information office. He debated vigorously with a member of his own staff over the feasibility and advisability of incorporating Muslim principles versus secular concepts as a basis for the new organic law. There was no attempt to hide such fundamental differences of opinion which invaded even an official information office, designed to show the best side of Pakistani politics to visiting foreigners.

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Constitution had to be made: a nation born of partition, and divided by 1,100 miles of hostile Indian territory; the largest Muslim state in the world, struggling for a viable economic base; and a people fired more by the fate of Kashmir than by the need for a workable constitutional law.

Since Independence Day, 1953, world-wide attention has been drawn to Pakistan. Events have moved in rapid-fire sequence: Pakistan, with Turkey, has emerged as a partner of the United States in the attempt to construct a Middle East defense pact; relations between Pakistan and India have worsened over Kashmir; domestically meanwhile, the Mohammed Ali Government, on the threshold of a new constitution, was shaken first by political defeat and near rebellion in East Pakistan last spring, and then by a governmental crisis in Karachi in the fall.

Internationally, the arms-aid agreement between the United States and Pakistan—announced by President Eisenhower on February 25, 1954—introduced an entirely new factor into the politico-military equation of the whole area from the Mediterranean to Indochina. The pact drove American-Indian and Indian-Pakistani relations to a new low, as Prime Minister Nehru objected on grounds that aid would reintroduce imperialism into Asia.[4] Indeed, last January India was reported to have abandoned plans to appoint a neutral plebiscite administrator for Kashmir. And in February, the provisional Constituent Assembly of Kashmir was encouraged to accede formally to India. Such international developments made all the more urgent Pakistan's prolonged attempts to adopt a permanent constitution.

The history, religion and origin of Pakistan in partition, however, as well as the area, the population and the form of Pakistan's interim government, will probably have greater influence upon any emergent constitution than will international events.

For a time it appeared that the Muslim League of Pakistan

[4] Disclosure of a projected pact between Turkey and Pakistan was significantly timed to coincide with the official visit to the United States of Turkey's President Celal Bayar. Apparently the Administration in Washington hoped to grant aid indirectly in this fashion in order to mollify India. See *The New York Times*, January 31, February 26, 1954.

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had finally bridged the treacherous gulf between provisional government and permanent constitutional rule. Then last April the League was shocked by a defeat in elections for the East Bengal Provincial Assembly, at the hands of an opposition United Front. The victorious group was an amalgam of five Bengali parties (including Communists), which flaunted the potent political slogan, "Bengal for the Bengalis!" Over the week end of May 16–17, some 400 persons were killed in riots at a burlap mill outside Dacca. The new United Front Government of East Bengal, under Chief Minister Fazlul Huq, did little to control the violence. Finally, during the first week of June the Federal Government at Karachi moved troops into Dacca and invoked its power to dismiss the provincial government. Soon the Karachi Government once again held a firm grip on East Bengal.[5] But the cost was great. A constitutional formula, ready for adoption in June, was postponed indefinitely. No one can now predict when Pakistan will have a constitution.[5a]

Nevertheless, the recent history of constitution-making is of great interest. It goes a long way toward explaining separatist tendencies in East Bengal. Furthermore, whether the Karachi Government is able to fit East Bengal into Pakistan or not,

[5] For a summary of the trouble in Bengal, see *The New York Times*, Review of the Week, June 6, 1954, p. 2E.

[5a] Further developments since the writing, but before publication, of this article make constitutional rule even more remote. Basic Principles (described below) were approved by Pakistan's Constituent Assembly on September 21. The Assembly was scheduled to convene October 27 to make a last review of the draft constitution, and to pass an adoption resolution on December 25, birthday of the late Mohammed Ali Jinnah. On October 16, Prime Minister Mohammed Ali arrived in Washington to complete negotiations for military and economic aid. On the same day, the final draft of Pakistan's Constitution went to the printer. On October 21, the United States announced an aid program of $105,000,000 for Pakistan. On the same day, a political crisis broke in Karachi. On October 24, the Governor General, Ghulam Mohammed, declared a state of emergency throughout Pakistan and dissolved the Constituent Assembly, claiming it had "lost the confidence of the people." Prime Minister Mohammed Ali, who had rushed back to Karachi, obediently announced a reshuffle of his Cabinet. "Constitutionalism is important," said the Prime Minister. "But more important by far is the security and stability of our country." Apparently constitution-making had been put off once again. For a summary of these dramatic events, see *The New York Times*, Review of the Week, October 31, 1954, p. 2E.

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any forthcoming constitution must start with the antecedent compromises which were painfully worked out during the nation's first seven years of independence.

The first Muslim contact with the subcontinent of India was made in the early seventh century when an Arab general invaded and conquered Sind. By the tenth century a conquest of all of India was begun by Muslims, who came through the Khyber Pass from Central Asia. These Turks, Afghans, Persians and Turkomans brought Islam and indirect rule by Sultans and Moghul emperors in Delhi, until disintegration invited expansion of British rule after the eighteenth century. The concept of Indian nationalism, which can be dated from the founding of the Indian National Congress in 1885, was in effect a revival of Hindu nationalism by those who regarded British, as well as former Muslim, rule as alien. In parallel, the All-India Muslim League was founded in 1906. The idea of a separate Muslim state emanated from the vision of Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, often called "the Poet of the East", and was adopted as a political goal by the League in 1940. From vision, the state became reality through the driving force of the League and the skillful leadership of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who acted as first Governor General until his death in 1948.[6]

Under international law, Pakistan became a new sovereign state on August 15, 1947 (London time), under The Indian Independence Act which had received Royal Assent the previous July 18. Section 7 of the Act read: "As from the appointed day [August 15], His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have no responsibility as respects the government of any of the territories which, immediately before that day, were included in British India."[7] From that time, the only remaining tie between the United Kingdom, on the one hand,

[6] *Pakistan Facts and Figures*, Department of Advertising, Films and Publications (Karachi, n.d. [1953]); for an excellent background survey, see W. Norman Brown, *The United States and India and Pakistan* (Cambridge, 1953).

[7] 10 and 11 Geo. 6, c. 30, "An Act to make provision for the setting up in India of two independent Dominions, to substitute other provisions for certain provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, which apply outside those Dominions, and to provide for other matters consequential on or connected with the setting up of those Dominions." See Russell H. Fifield, "New States in the Indian Realm", *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 46, No. 3 (July 1952), pp. 450–463

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and India and Pakistan, on the other, has been membership in the Commonwealth of Nations.[8] The old Indian Empire had been a charter member of the United Nations Organization; upon partition, India inherited the original membership. Pakistan's application for membership was approved by the Security Council on August 18, 1947, and by the General Assembly the following September 30. Early in 1948, the Indian Constituent Assembly released a draft constitution providing a sovereign democratic republic; this organic law was adopted on November 26, 1949.[9]

The partition of the old Indian Empire, as is well known, also resulted in the division of Pakistan, a cardinal factor in the new state's constitution-making. West Pakistan consists of the provinces of the North-West Frontier, the Punjab, Sind, and the centrally administered areas of Baluchistan and Karachi; East Pakistan, separated from the West by a distance of 1,100 miles, consists of the province of East Bengal, to which the district of Sylhet has been added. Kashmir (including Jammu), according to Pakistan, has "been waiting for more than 4 years to exercise its right of self-determination."[10]

The total area of Pakistan is 365,000 square miles. The first national census, taken in February 1951, showed a total population of 75,842,000, of which 42,063,000 were in East Pakistan and 33,779,000 in West Pakistan. Of Pakistan's 76 million, about 86 per cent were Muslim (in West Pakistan, 97 per cent; in East Pakistan, 77 per cent); about 6 per cent were caste Hindus and about 7 per cent scheduled castes. In terms of total population, Pakistan is thus the largest Muslim state and the sixth largest state in the world today.[11]

Until a constitution is adopted, Pakistan is governed under the Government of India Act, 1935, as amended, by the Governor

[8] Both India and Pakistan, under the Statute of Westminster, have the right to secede. 22 Geo. 5, c. 4. India announced she desired to maintain membership in the Commonwealth at the meeting of Commonwealth Ministers, April 1949.

[9] *The Constitution of India* (New Delhi, 1949).

[10] *Pakistan Facts and Figures*, p. 3.

[11] As against China's 475 million; India's 357 million; the U.S.S.R., 194 million; the United States, 154 million; Japan 84 million. Indonesia, with a slightly smaller population (75 million), may have a larger total of Muslims. *Five Years of Pakistan (August 1947–August 1952)* (Karachi, n.d.), pp. 6–7. The 1951 census, at a glance:

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General, who is also Head of the State. The Governor General was limited in power and presumably was to act only on advice of ministers. Pakistan's new constitution is being framed by a Constituent Assembly, which also acts as a parliament or Federal Legislative Assembly. Within the Assembly, the Muslim League Parliamentary Party is, of course, the most powerful political force. Administration is handled by a Cabinet, collectively responsible to the Constituent Assembly through a Prime Minister, who is appointed by the Head of the State; other ministers are appointed on advice of the Prime Minister.[12] The central judiciary consists of a Federal Court of Pakistan with original, appellate, and advisory functions. Its judges are appointed by the Governor General.

From the beginning, the Dominion has been a federation: subjects which are the responsibility of the Central Government and those which are the responsibility of the provinces have been clearly defined. As a federation, the Dominion consists of:

1. *The Governor's Provinces* consist of Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier Province, and East Bengal, each with an elected Legislative Assembly, a Cabinet, and a Governor appointed by the Governor General of Pakistan. These provinces are represented

	PAKISTAN	*Baluchistan including States Union*	*East Bengal*	*Federal Capital Karachi*	*North-West Frontier Province*	*Punjab including Bahawalpur*	*Sind including Khatpur*
Area (sq. mi.)	364,737	134,002	54,501	812	39,259	79,716	56,447
Av. persons per sq. mi.	208	8.8	777	1,387	150	259	87
Population (1,000s)*	75,842†	1,174	42,063	1,126	5,900	20,651	4,928
Muhajirs (refugees) (1,000s)	7,226†	28	699	617	51	5,281	550
Muslim (%)	85.8	98.5	76.8	96.0	99.8	97.7	90.8
Urban Population (%)*	10	12	4	95	9	17	14

* Includes non-Pakistanis.
† In round numbers.

Sixth Year, Pakistan, 1953 (Karachi, n.d.), p. 135.

[12] The Government of India Act, 1935, As Adopted by the Pakistan (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, Government of Pakistan, 1948. Ministries include: (1) Defence, (2) Foreign Affairs & Commonwealth Relations, (3) Finance & Economic Affairs, (4) Commerce & Education, (5) Food, Agriculture & Law, (6) Interior, (7) Kashmir Affairs, (8) Industries, (9) Communications, (10) Labour, Health & Works, (11) States & Frontier Regions, (12) Refugees & Rehabilitation, (13) Minority Affairs, (14) Information & Broadcasting. *Pakistan Facts and Figures*, pp. 22–23. More recently portfolios have been reduced to nine.

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in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly by delegates from their own Legislative Assemblies, elected in the proportion of one per million inhabitants.

2. *Autonomous States*, which have acceded to Pakistan, have assigned the responsibilities of defense, foreign relations, and communications to the Centre, or the Central Government. Rulers of these states maintain relations with the Dominion through the Ministry of States & Frontier Regions.

3. *Baluchistan* is governed by an agent to the Governor General, with the aid of locally nominated advisers.

4. *Tribal Territories* maintain relations with the Centre through chiefs and councils of the North-West Frontier and through the Governor of the Frontier Province as the agent to the Governor General. (Similarly primitive peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts are the responsibility of the Governor General through the agency of the Governor of East Bengal.)

5. *Karachi*, chosen by the Constituent Assembly as Federal Capital, is governed by an Administrator, responsible to the Central Ministry of the Interior. A Pakistan Citizenship Act provides acquisition of citizenship through birth, descent, migration, marriage, or naturalization; dual citizenship is not recognized. Isolated East Pakistan, with its 54,000 square miles, population of 42 million, and average density of 800 persons per square mile, is the unique factor in the problem of federation.[13]

One of Pakistan's earliest, most acute problems was to provide an administrative corps to handle the vast problems of the new Dominion. Officers of the former Indian Civil Service and Indian Political Service, who continued to serve Pakistan, as well as appointees to the Pakistan Administrative Service immediately after partition, were the main elements from which the Civil Service of Pakistan was recruited. In 1951, about 80 per cent of all posts in departments and ministries were on a permanent footing. Generally the government followed a policy of reserving 15 per cent of the vacancies in the Central Superior

[13] In many areas of East Pakistan, densities of over 1,500 are common; at the confluence of the Padma and the Meghna, the density reaches nearly 3,000! *East Pakistan* (Karachi, n.d.). See also *Five Years of Pakistan: A Brief Survey* (Karachi, n.d.).

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Services for candidates of non-Pakistan domicile; the remaining 85 per cent were available for open competition. Lack of qualified officers at the higher levels led to the creation of a General Administrative Reserve for professionals and business men.[14]

One of the greatest handicaps to constitution-making in Pakistan, frankly faced by the drafters, is the fact that the vast majority of the people are uneducated and lack political experience. Before partition, over 80 per cent of the population of the subcontinent of India was illiterate; in the case of Pakistan the percentage of illiteracy was even greater.[15] Ultimately, the political life of a people is the reflex of its social conditions. Here, as Dr. Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, Minister of State and member of the Constituent Assembly from Bengal, has pointed out, Pakistan faces a dilemma: unless the people are entrusted with responsibility, they will never attain political maturity. The risk, concluded Dr. Qureshi, must be taken.[16]

For Pakistan, partition did not mean merely the geographical division of the subcontinent; it also symbolized the determination of Muslims to break away from what they regarded as a dangerously alien culture. The Urdu language, similarly, became symbolic of the expression of new nationalism. Even more basic was a developing intranational conflict between those who would make Pakistan a modern, democratic state, along Western secular and liberal lines, in a pattern often loosely referred to as "Islamic socialism", and Muslim fundamentalists or "puritans", who wish to establish an Islamic theocracy, perhaps more accurately a "mullahocracy". The former, deposed Prime Minister, Khwaja Nazimuddin, for example, is a pious Muslim who leaned over backward to meet the demands of conservative mullahs.[17] His influence was felt strongly

[14] *Five Years of Pakistan*, pp. 10–11; *Sixth Year, Pakistan, 1953*, p. 24.

[15] According to the 1951 census, there were 10,374,000 literates in Pakistan, or about 13.8 per cent of the total population. *Five Years of Pakistan*, p. 154.

[16] "The Future Constitution", Presidential Address, Political Science Conference, Lahore, December 1949, in Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, *Pakistan: An Islamic Democracy* (Lahore, Institute of Islamic Culture, n.d.), p. 10.

[17] The mullah, in Mohammedan usage, is a teacher or expounder of the law and dogmas of Islam. An informed discussion of the religious issue is presented by George L. Abernethy, "Pakistan at the Crossroads", *The Christian Century*, vol. LXX, No. 40 (October 7, 1953), pp. 1130–1132.

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at certain stages of constitution-drafting. Yet the reaction to his leadership was bitter: progressives were outraged with the appeasement of mullahs; mullahs, in turn, were bitter over being offered the form, but not the substance, of control. Bitterness led to riots and demonstrations in February and March 1953, and had to be quelled by martial law. The appearance of Mohammed Ali, former Ambassador to the United States, as successor to Nazimuddin, represented the bid of younger, more progressive elements in the Muslim League. He moved vigorously to put down agitation, while at the same time promising that Pakistan would have a constitution even if it had to be adopted piecemeal.

The machinery for drafting and the direction taken by drafters can be briefly outlined, before turning to essential elements in the developing organic law of Pakistan. The inaugural session of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was held in August of 1947. Mohammed Ali Jinnah was elected President of the Assembly on August 11, 1947. Since this body also served as a legislature, however, its attention was first turned to immediate, critical problems, like the resettlement of refugees. Each year since, the Assembly has had first to consider legislation. The legislature met twice in 1952–53: in November passing twenty-four official bills; in March, sitting in budget session and bringing out eighteen official bills.[18]

Activities of the Assembly as a constituent body may, in turn, be divided into two essential tasks: (1) interim constitutional legislation, adapting the Government of India Act, 1935, and The India Independence Act to suit day-to-day requirements; and (2) steps to frame the constitution of the state. Work under the first heading has been taken up directly on motion of members; work under the second heading has been delegated to various committees. The Constituent Assembly had, by a resolution of March 12, 1947, appointed a Committee on Fundamental Rights of Citizens of Pakistan and on Matters relating to Minorities, with two subcommittees. This Committee reported back to the Assembly (on rights) October 6, 1950 and (on minorities) December 22, 1952. Meanwhile, on

[18] *Sixth Year, Pakistan, 1953*, pp. 19–20.

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March 12, 1949, on the motion of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, the Assembly passed an Objectives Resolution, broadly defining the aims and objects of the future constitution.

The Assembly next directed a Basic Principles Committee to work out in detail the main principles of a constitution. The Committee had a president, twenty-four members, a Steering Committee, and was divided into subcommittees: on Federal and Provincial Constitutions and Distribution of Powers; on Franchise; on Judiciary; and (created August 7, 1952) on Baluchistan, States, and Tribal Areas. The directive to this group was sweeping: "The Committee was charged with the task of recommending the principles on which the future Constitution of Pakistan should be based."[19] Subcommittee reports were ready, and the full Committee offered an interim report to the Assembly on September 28, 1950. Thereupon, the Committee and its subcommittees canvassed public suggestions during 1951, held further meetings in July and August 1952, and finally completed a 69-page document, *Report of the Basic Principles Committee*, which was presented to the Assembly in December 1952. The Report immediately called forth whirlwinds of controversy, and indirectly led to the rioting of early 1953.

Speaking on Pakistan Day, August 14, 1953, the new Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali, left no doubts that he proposed to proceed to frame an interim constitution. "It is most unfortunate that we have not been able to frame a constitution of our own," he said. The key problem, as he revealed later, was the composition of the eventual Federal Legislature and the division of powers as between the Upper and Lower House. The December Report had failed to satisfy the Units.[19a] A second, perennial problem had also embarrassed the Prime Minister himself. Speaking at the Coronation and Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London, Mohammed Ali had said that Pakistan could have no theocratic constitution because Islam recognizes no priesthood and there could never be, as such, a rule of priests. Back home, the Prime Minister

[19] *Report of the Basic Principles Committee* (Karachi, 1952), p. 1.

[19a] Units are local subdivisions, represented equally in one house and in proportion to their population in another. See notes 35 and 45 *infra*.

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nevertheless gave this assurance: "I must make it clear that we are determined to frame a Constitution which will be in full conformity with principles of Islamic democracy and social justice."[20]

On October 7, 1953, Prime Minister Mohammed Ali moved that a revised version of the Basic Principles Committee Report be considered by the Constituent Assembly. Apparently, obstacles which had bogged down the making of a constitution had been resolved, largely through conciliatory efforts by the Muslim League Parliamentary Party. The Prime Minister thanked God for allowing the Assembly to proceed and for lighting the way to "the consideration and adoption of principles which will form the basis of a constitution suited to the genius of the people, a constitution that will set the country on the road to rapid progress, a constitution that will redound to the glory of Islam."[21] In the Constitution Proposals, therefore, together with the Objectives Resolution and the Basic Principles Committee Report, are to be found the antecedents of the proposed Pakistan Constitution.

The Objectives Resolution begins: "In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful; Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust; . . ." Thus the Resolution, like the American Declaration of Independence, sets the tone by making broad assumptions concerning the nature of man and his relation to the state. A fundamental assumption is that political and social conflict all over the world is due to the fact that spiritual development has not kept pace with material progress. The late Liaquat Ali Khan, first Prime Minister, once stated that Pakistan was to function as "the laboratory of practical Islam." Western democracy claims to be based on Christianity. The Communists have replaced all ideologies with dialectical materialism. Islamic ideology is thought to be different and

[20] *Pakistan Day Speech*, pp. 10–11; see also *The Constitution Proposals* presented to the Constituent Assembly on Wednesday, October 7, 1953 by Mr. Mohammed Ali, Prime Minister of Pakistan (Karachi, Department of Advertising, Films and Publications, Government of Pakistan, n.d.), p. 3.

[21] *The Constitution Proposals*, pp. 1–2.

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distinct: a belief in the sovereignty of God, the dignity of man, and the purposive reality of all life. Dr. Khalifi Abdul Hakim, Director of the Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, believes that Islam offers the people of Pakistan an "ideal" and a "direction". Islamic ideology is therefore said to be primarily theistic, believing in the unity of all theistic religions, despite differences of ritual and law.[22]

"The constitution of a country must reflect the ideals on which its people want to base their political life", wrote Dr. Qureshi, member of the Constituent Assembly. The Assembly, he said, was right in setting for itself the ideals of Islam. But these ideals should be given a rational, dynamic interpretation, for the people of Pakistan and of other Muslim states have failed to keep abreast of world progress in the development of material culture, political institutions, and social fabric. Progress and Islamic ideals can be reconciled in a threefold definition of sovereignty in an Islamic state: (1) the legal sovereign shall be the Muslim law; its definition shall be in the hands of the legislature; (2) the political sovereign shall be the people who will elect and dismiss their governments; (3) the real sovereign will be basically the principles of Islam, brought into the public forum and discussed at length.[23]

The Resolution proceeds to empower the Constituent Assembly, which "shall exercise the powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people," to frame a constitution. This, say Pakistan's constitutional lawyers, embodies a second fundamental principle defined in the Quran: Muslims are expected to order their affairs by mutual consultation, which is the basis of democracy. Indeed, some would say that this principle of *ijma* is perhaps the most important political notion in Islam.

[22] *Fundamentals of Freedom: Objectives Resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on March 12, 1949*, with a Speech Thereon of the Hon'ble Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan (Karachi, Department of Advertising, Films and Publications, n.d.); *Five Years of Pakistan*, pp. 205–206; and the Introduction by Dr. Khalifi Abdul Hakim in Qureshi, *Pakistan: An Islamic Democracy*, pp. i–ix.

[23] "The Future Constitution", in Qureshi, *op. cit.*; and "Sovereignty in the Islamic State", an Address by Dr. Qureshi at the All-Pakistan Political Science Conference, Peshawar, April 10, 1951, in *ibid.*, especially pp. 26–27.

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Old concepts and new social forces are brought together in the exhortation that the "principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed". Fundamental rights include equality of status, of opportunity, and before law; social, economic and political justice; and freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, subject to law and public morality. The corollary is that "adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures". The Resolution calls for adequate provisions to protect the legitimate interests of minorities and of backward and depressed classes.

Geography and history alike demand that Pakistan have a federal form of government. This need clearly emerges in the Resolution: "Whereby the territories now included in or in accession with Pakistan and such other territories as may hereafter be included in or accede to Pakistan shall form a Federation wherein the units will be autonomous with such boundaries and limitations on their powers and authority as may be prescribed". Of course the method of representation is not mentioned at this stage. The independence of the judiciary is assured, but beyond this point the Resolution is silent, for example, on the relation of executive and legislature. In the early stages of debate, some argued that conditions in Pakistan were not ripe for executive responsibility to the legislative body. They argued for what might be called a presidential form. Others replied that objections to responsibility apply with even greater force to a presidential form, so far as Pakistan is concerned.[24]

Aside from the problem of federation, the Resolution skirted the other major problem in making a constitution: ". . . Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunna". The problem can be simply put. Law, said the drafters, must conform to the moral conscience of a people; otherwise it must fail. Theologians, learned in the traditions of Islamic law, have

[24] "The Future Constitution", in Qureshi, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

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kept the torch lighted but have failed to spread its light among the people, whom they mistrust. It was suggested that the constitution provide a body of theologians and jurists who could veto any legislation they considered against the Sharia. "This would be a most retrograde step," wrote Dr. Qureshi, "because the responsibility of understanding and interpreting Islam will be limited to a few persons rather than the entire nation. . . . Instead of harmony it will create resentment and even rebellion."[25] The issue was joined.

If the Objectives Resolution is a broad blueprint, a lofty declaration of rights for Muslim man, the Basic Principles Committee Report and the Constitution Proposals reveal more the need to get down to brass tacks, to incorporate frank adjustments like the Compromise which eventually reconciled the Virginia and New Jersey plans at the Philadelphia Convention. Presenting the Report of the Basic Principles Committee in December 1952, Prime Minister Nazimuddin said the recommendations provided for building "a truly Islamic democracy conscious of its great mission of interpreting the progressive nature of Islam to the modern world. . . . The interests of true religion have been properly safeguarded and religion has itself been given the fullest scope for its beneficent activities." On the other hand, "A Constitution should not be judged from any preconceived notions based upon school book maxims of political science; it should be judged from the point of view of the achievement of maximum compromise between the different sections of the nation."[26]

The Committee recommended that the Preamble to the Constitution should contain the text of the Objectives Resolution, summarized above. Directive Principles of State Policy follow and spell out the means to enable Muslims individually and collectively to order their lives in accordance with the Holy

[25] *Sunna*, the Traditions of the Prophet; *Sharia*, the Muslim canonical law. See *Fundamentals of Freedom;* and "Sovereignty in the Islamic State", in Qureshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 23–24.

[26] Government of Pakistan, Press Information Department, *Basic Principles Report*, D. No. 4677, Karachi, December 22, 1952; also Speech on Basic Principles Committee Report by the Hon'ble Khwaja Nazimuddin, Karachi, December 22, 1952.

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Quran and Sunna. These principles are specific enough to prohibit drinking, gambling and prostitution;[27] and general enough to provide organizations to make the teachings of Islam known to the people, codification of Islamic injunctions as may be given legislative effect, as well as to prevent "activities subversive of the principles embodied in the Objectives Resolution."[28] In the economic sphere, the government should be operated so as (a) to improve the standard of living of the common man; (b) to prevent concentration of wealth and means of production in the hands of the few to the detriment of the common man; and (c) to insure equitable adjustment of the rights of labor and peasantry in order to prevent their exploitation.[29] In education, the state should make every effort to remove illiteracy; to discourage "parochial, tribal, racial and other similar un-Islamic feelings"; and to strengthen "the bonds of unity amongst the Muslim countries of the world."[30] Finally, the state should protect all legitimate rights and interests of the non-Muslim communities of Pakistan.[31]

Next the Committee turned (Part I, Chap. III) to the ticklish procedure for preventing legislation repugnant to the Quran and the Sunna. The principle is set forth that no legislature, central or provincial, should enact any such law. The Head of the State is to set up a board of not more than five members, well versed in Islamic law, to advise him. A single Muslim member of either House may raise an objection, have the objection recorded when the bill proceeds to the other House, and may force a consideration of the bill by the board and Head of the State. Reconsideration of such a bill is then carried out in joint sitting and the bill, if not amended according to the unanimous suggestion by the board, shall not be deemed passed unless by a majority of members present and voting, including *a majority of Muslim members* present and voting. These provisions were not designed to apply to money bills.[32]

[27] *Report of the Basic Principles Committee*, Part I, Chap. II, 2 (2) (b).
[28] *Ibid.*, Chap. II, 2 (3), (4), (5). [29] *Ibid.*, Chap. II, 2 (6), (7), (8).
[30] *Ibid.*, Chap. II, 2 (10), (11). [31] *Ibid.*, Chap. II, 2 (15).
[32] The board must give the Head of the State its views within seven days of receipt of a bill to which there has been objection. In case of a difference of opinion on the board, the Head of the State gives or withholds his assent. If the board is unanimous that the bill is in contravention of Islamic law, then the Head of the State returns the bill to the joint sitting. *Ibid.*, Chap. III, 3 (3), 5 (1) to (9), 6 (1) to (7), 7

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After a definition of Pakistan as a federation of provinces (Part II), including acceding states, Baluchistan and Karachi, the Committee turned to the Structure of the Centre (Part III). In the Directive Principles, it had been held: "Only such person should be elected as Head of the State who, in the opinion of the electors, possesses ability, character, integrity, and piety," and is fit to conduct state affairs in accordance with the Objectives Resolution. The Executive therefore consists of a Head of the State, who should be a Muslim and should be elected at a joint sitting of both Houses of the Federal Legislature, with a Council of Ministers to aid and advise him.[33] The Council of Ministers is responsible to the House of the People only and consists of a Prime Minister, appointed by the Head of the State, and other Ministers, appointed by the Head of the State on the advice of the Prime Minister.[34]

The Committee then steered directly into the treacherous cross-winds of the federation versus provincial rights storm. The course, as set in provisions for the Federal Legislature, was along the lines of a bicameral legislature, representing Units and People, but curiously limited in *both* Houses in terms of parity between East and West Pakistan. Thus a 120-member House of the Units was evenly divided, 60 selected by the Legislature of East Bengal and 60 by the Capital and other Units; so was a 400-member House of the People, 200 directly from single-member constituencies in East Bengal and 200 distributed among all other Units.[35] It was, of course, this rock of distribution on which constitution-making foundered during 1953.

[33] *Ibid.*, Part III, Chap. I, 9 (1) to (3), 13 (1); four members of the Committee dissented from the provision for a Muslim Head of the State. The term of the Head of the State is five years, with two full terms permissible. Chap. I, 16, 17. He is Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan's armed services. Chap. I, 21.

[34] *Ibid.*, Chap. I, 27, 30, 28, 33. During the crisis in October, in the informal opinion of constitutional lawyers in Karachi, the authority of the Governor General—as Head of the State—derived from powers inherent in the British Crown. Both Tamizuddin Khan, President of the Constituent Assembly, explicitly, and Prime Minister Mohammed Ali implicitly, questioned the legality of the Governor General's acts, dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and pressure to re-form the Cabinet. Practically, Governor General Ghulam Mohammed had the support of both the Civil Service and the Army.

[35] *Ibid.*, Part III, Chap. II, 36, 38, 39, 43. Representation of Kashmir was to be determined by law, but was not to upset the East-West parity, Chap. II, 44. The detailed breakdown of the two Houses, according to the *Basic Principles Committee*

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The other side of the federal coin presents the Units (treated in Part IV). Executive powers in the Units are assigned to Heads of Units, appointed by the Head of the State; Unit Heads must be merely citizens of Pakistan (and thus not necessarily Muslims). They are aided by Councils of Ministers with Chief Ministers, appointed by Heads of Units, and Ministers, appointed by the Unit Heads on advice of their Chief Ministers.[36] Unit Legislatures are unicameral, composed of not less than 75 nor more than 350 members, directly elected from single-member constituencies.[37] Heads of Units make regulations for "Excluded", "Partially Excluded", or "Tribal" Areas (Part V). Appended to Committee Recommendations (to Part VI) are Federal, Unit, and Concurrent Lists, for purposes of legislation, of powers exercised: (a) exclusively by the Federal Legislature; (b) exclusively by Legislatures of Units; and (c) both by the Federal and Units' legislatures. Residual powers should be vested in the Federation.[38]

The Directive Principles of State Policy (Preamble) had recommended that the Executive of Pakistan and the Judiciary should be separated within three years.[39] In order to guarantee federal supremacy, the Committee then goes on to recommend (Part X) a Supreme Court, consisting of a Chief Justice (appointed by the Head of the State), and not less than two nor more than six Justices; High Courts, one each in East Bengal,

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Report (altered, of course, by the later formula of the Constitution Proposals—see *infra*, note 45), was as follows:

Units	*House of Units*	*House of People*	*Total*
A. East Bengal	60	200	260
B. Other Units:	60	200	260
1. Punjab	(27)	(90)	(117)
2. Sind	(8)	(30)	(38)
3. N. W. Frontier P.	(6)	(25)	(31)
4. Tribal Areas	(5)	(17)	(22)
5. Bahawalpur	(4)	(13)	(17)
6. Baluchistan	(2)	(5)	(7)
7. Baluch. States	(2)	(5)	(7)
8. Khairpur	(2)	(4)	(6)
9. Capital	(4)	(11)	(15)
	120	400	520

[36] *Ibid.*, Part IV, Chap. I, 81, 83, 84, 89, 92.
[37] *Ibid.*, Chap. II, 98, 99.
[38] *Ibid.*, Part VI, 133.
[39] *Ibid.*, Part I, Chap. II, 2 (14).

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the Punjab, Sind, and the North-West Frontier; and Subordinate Courts.[40] Amendment of the Constitution (Part XV), according to Committee recommendations, would be relatively easy and assigned to the Federal Legislature (a two-thirds majority of members present and voting, provided a majority of total membership is present, in each House, with assent by the Head of the State).

Much of the remainder of the Committee Report deals with matters of legislative policy and procedure, frankly rather ill-suited to a model constitution. Of organic interest are the provisions for adult suffrage (every citizen who has attained the age of 21); for prohibition of grant of titles by the Government of Pakistan; and for assignment of the treaty power to the Head of the State.

As has been pointed out, the Report of the Basic Principles Committee met a storm of debate, which lasted almost a year before compromise paved the way for consideration of the Constitution Proposals in October 1953. Correspondents, sensing a climax in Pakistan's constitutional crisis, provided almost daily, blow-by-blow descriptions of the next stages and compromises.[41]

Beginning September 22, 1953, Federal Cabinet members and Chief Ministers of provinces met daily to try to resolve the problem of representation in the House of the People, reflected specifically in the dispute between the Punjab and East Bengal. Behind the scenes were the powerful influence of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party and the decisive views of Prime Minister Mohammed Ali, who, in June, at the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London, had expressed his personal preference for an Islamic Republic in presidential form. A strong minority continued to insist on a literal inclusion of Islamic law, but the trend toward secularization and modification of religious codes was gaining in popularity.

When the Constituent Assembly reconvened on October 7, the Prime Minister warned members that there had been "far

[40] *Ibid.*, Part X, Chap. I, 162, 163; II; III.

[41] See, for example, the excellent dispatches in *The New York Times* by John P. Callahan from Karachi, October 5, 6, 8, 22, 25, November 1, 3; editorial, October 9; and the reaction as described by Robert Trumbull from New Delhi, November 8, 1953.

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too much delay" in drafting and he predicted an early approval of constitutional principles patterned after laws of "progressive federal countries" and designed to deal a "fatal blow to provincialism." While agreeing to inclusion of basic moral principles of Islam, Mr. Mohammed Ali laid greater stress on the need for a secular organic law. Watched by the press, observers from other Muslim countries, and foreign visitors, seventy-two men and two women thereupon turned to consideration of the 200-odd clauses of the Basic Principles Committee Report, plus some 350 proposed amendments. The scene was colorful: the Hindus among the Opposition were draped in traditional white sheeting; Muslim League members wore ankle-length breeches; the two women wore saris; many members affected Western dress. On November 2, 1953, the keystone of the constitutional arch was put in place: the Constituent Assembly decided that Pakistan should be made an Islamic Republic. An amendment, adding the words "outside the Commonwealth", did not come to a vote, so that technically the country's status in the Commonwealth was left untouched.[42] Before the decision was reached, Hindu members of the Assembly walked out, objecting to the general trend of the proceedings and citing, specifically, violation of minority rights through the expected provision that the Head of the State must be a Muslim. S. C. Chattopadhyaya, leader of the Hindu bloc, commented: "This tramples on the principles of equal rights for all citizens and implies an inferior status for all non-Moslems."

Actually, despite the emphasis upon the Islamic characteristics of the proposed Constitution by the press and despite the objections of the Opposition, the document is not unique or even unusual. Many recommendations are reproductions of existing provisions in the Government of India Act, 1935. The federal character of the Constitution, illustrated by the supremacy of the judiciary and the relationship between the Centre and the Units, is not unlike many federal constitutions of the world. These elements are accepted by constitutional theorists and

[42] In London, it was announced that all other British Commonwealth members would have to approve the decision; no difficulty was expected, however, in light of the precedent of India. *New York Times*, November 3, 1952.

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embodied in the constitutions of Canada and of India, as well as in the provisional Constitution of Pakistan. In three respects, Pakistan's draft departs from other federal constitutions of the world:

(1) in the content of the Chapter relating to Directive Principles of State Policy;
(2) in the Chapter dealing with the procedure to guarantee against legislation repugnant to the Quran and the Sunna; and
(3) in the provision for a Muslim Head of the State.

Mr. A. K. Brohi, Minister for Law, Minority Affairs, and Parliamentary Affairs, who served as a sort of government whip on the floor of the Assembly, has attempted to explain all three. The Directive Principles, he points out, are not enforceable as law and embody only the ideology on which state policy is to be grounded. As to "repugnant" legislation, this feature is indeed a restraint on the powers of the legislature. But, he adds, the provisions deal only with future legislation and with that, negatively. All money bills and legislation touching upon economic structure are excluded from these provisions. Finally, Mr. Brohi claims that, having regard for the fact that over 85 per cent of the population of Pakistan is Muslim, it is a matter of course that the Head of the State will be a Muslim. Neither the Prime Minister nor members of the Cabinet have to be Muslims. Governors of federating Units need not be Muslims. In any case, as a corollary to these provisions, there is the report of the Committee on Fundamental Rights of Citizens of Pakistan and on Matters Relating to Minorities, adopted by the Assembly on October 6, 1950, as well as the Constitution, which provides that every duly qualified citizen is eligible to the services of the state irrespective of his religion, caste, or place of birth.[43]

Indeed, many modern constitutions of the world reveal religious predilections given legislative effect: Ireland, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland and Greece, to mention a few outside the

[43] *The Proposed Constitution: A Reply to Critics*, by The Hon'ble Mr. A. K. Brohi (Karachi, Department of Advertising, Films and Publication, n.d.), pp. 1–3, 12.

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Arab League; Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Syria, among Muslim nations.[44]

On a more mundane level, but perhaps more important, is the fact that the federal formula was unanimously accepted by the government, by the Chief Ministers of East Bengal, the Punjab, Sind, the North-West Frontier Provinces, and Bahawalpur, by all members of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party, as well as by the Constituent Assembly. The principal features of this great compromise were as follows:

The Central Legislature will be bicameral, consisting of a Lower House in which Units will be represented on a population basis, and a smaller Upper House in which each of the Units will enjoy equal representation. For purposes of representation in these Houses, the state has been divided into five Units, grouped in two zones.

The Lower House, with a membership of 300 divided among the five Units according to their population, will be directly elected and will represent the people.

The Upper House, with a membership of 50 equally divided among the five Units, will be elected by the respective legislatures of the Units and will represent the Units.[45]

[44] The Constitution of Ireland, Preamble: "We, the People of Eire, Humbly acknowledging our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ. . . "; the Constitution of Norway, Art. 2: "The Evangelical-Lutheran religion shall remain the public religion of the State"; the Constitution of Iran begins: "In the name of God, the Merciful, the Forgiving"; the Constitution of Iraq, Art. 13 provides that "Islam is the official religion of the State"; the Constitution of Syria, Art. 3 provides that "The religion of the President of the Republic will be Islam." *Ibid.*, pp. 4–6.

[45] The two Houses were thus to be constituted as follows (for the original breakdown under the *Basic Principles Committee Report*, see *supra*, note 35):

Unit	*Upper House*	*Lower House*	*Total*
1. East Bengal	10	165	175
2. Punjab	10	75	85
3. N-W. F. P., Frontier States, Tribal Areas	10	24	34
4. Sind & Khairpur	10	19	29
5. Baluchistan, Baluchistan States Union, Bahawalpur and Karachi	10	17	27
Totals	50	300	350

In Units No. 3, 4 and 5 distribution of seats as between constituent parts of Units shall be in accordance with respective populations. Mohammed Ali, *The Constitution Proposals*, pp. 4–5.

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Equal powers for both Houses are arranged in special provisions, together with an elaborate system of checks and balances. Every measure introduced and passed in the Lower House must also be passed in the Upper House, and vice versa. In cases of a difference of opinion between the two Houses, of votes of confidence or non-confidence, and of election of the Head of the State, measures can be passed only if a majority of the two Houses sitting jointly vote for them, provided, however, that *this majority vote must include at least 30 per cent of the members present and voting from each zone.* For these purposes East Bengal constitutes one zone and the four units of what is commonly known as West Pakistan constitute another zone. If the measure is not passed with the majority as provided, then the measure fails; but, if the measure is of such a nature that, unless passed, administration cannot be carried on, or its failure imperils the security or credit of the Federal Government, then the Head of the State may dissolve both Houses and order fresh elections.

The Head of the State will be elected from a zone different from that to which the Prime Minister belongs. All the above provisions guarantee, of course, that the Central Government will be responsible to both Houses jointly.[46]

Reaction to the Constitution Proposals was partisan, as might be expected, partitioned by Muslim allegiance and the facts of the geography of the subcontinent. In an editorial, the weekly *Hikmah*, Djakarta, November 14, commented that Pakistan's status as a Republic, based on the teachings of Islam, was important to Indonesia because Indonesia's majority population too is Muslim. "Other states will be interested in order to endorse their assertions that an Islamic State is unable to exercise justice and bring welfare to the people. . . . Good luck to Pakistan in her holy but difficult task."[47] Former Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin of Pakistan said, "The greatest crisis facing the country has been overcome." Syed Khalilur Rehman of Punjab commented: "I am happy that the compromise has been brought about and I am sure the nation will join me in hailing the agreement as a victory for the Muslim

[46] *Ibid.*, pp. 5–10.

[47] Government of Pakistan, Press Information Department, E. No. 5412, 256–1.12–53, 19:30 hrs. Djakarta (Delayed).

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League Party." The newspaper *Dawn of Karachi*, October 6, concluded: "Faith has triumphed, and once again national unity and discipline should be as firmly rehabilitated as before." The *Times* of Karachi, October 6, predicted; "We are very well satisfied with it, indeed, and believe that the beginning of a great Muslim renaissance has been set in motion."[48]

On the other side of the troubled and partitioned Indian continent, the Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, left no doubt as to his sympathy for Hindu minorities in Pakistan and his distaste for the Constitution Proposals. The conception of the state envisaged for Pakistan was "rather a medieval conception", he said, and one "totally opposed to any democratic conception." His remarks were followed by deterioration in Indo-Pakistan relations, particularly in regard to Kashmir, and a direct denunciation of the United States for its military aid to Pakistan. In reply, the drafters of Pakistan's proposed Constitution have held that antiquity of an idea, creed, or doctrine is no argument against its validity. Democracy itself has never been rigorously defined, save by the spokesmen of the Communist ideology who have claimed that democracy thrives only on a soil where communism has a foothold. In any case, coming generations in Pakistan will render the final account of the workings of democratic institutions in their country.[49]

The irony in Pakistan's constituent efforts so far lies in the fact that controversy has largely revolved around definition of theological principles. On the side, a frank, practical compromise attempted to adjust the divergent interests of West and East Pakistan. The depth of separatist feeling among East Bengal's Left-wing parties, Hindus, and Muslims outside the Muslim League was underestimated. Now the Karachi Government faces the dilemma of establishing constitutional democracy, while a major portion of the state is under so-called governor's rule, if not martial law. Evidently partition and independence in Pakistan, as in India, did not bring an easy solution to all problems.

Ardath W. Burks

Rutgers University

[48] Mohammed Ali, *The Constitution Proposals*, pp. 14–20.

[49] Brohi, *The Proposed Constitution: A Reply to Critics*, pp. 8–9.

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A MEANING FOR TURNER'S FRONTIER

PART II: THE SOUTHWEST FRONTIER AND NEW ENGLAND*

1

THE South, as well as the North, had its frontier. While many a Massachusetts family in the 1820s may have watched its younger sons departing for the Illinois wilderness, so many a young man from Virginia might at the same time have been found pushing into the unoccupied lands of Alabama and Mississippi. By Jackson's time, wave after wave of yeomen farmers of modest means had come to settle in that country, honest folk of democratic virtue who would form the bulk of the population and from whose sons, a generation hence, would be recruited the heart and body of the Southern army. These people, like those of the Old Northwest, would form their pioneer tradition; their lore is likewise charged with logrollings and skirmishes with the redskin; they too would enact the primitive level of democratic experience. There is many a sense in which the life and institutions of Alabama and Mississippi may stand as the epitome of Southern democracy.

And yet it must be said that the similarity is principally one of style. Few tales have oftener been retold than that of Colonel Dabney at the cabin-raising; few are richer in symbolic meaning and none more tersely circumscribes the essence of Southwest egalitarianism. Thomas Dabney, a Virginia planter who had just established himself in the newly settled cotton country of Mississippi and who had been invited to help raise the cabin of one of his poorer neighbors, appeared on the appointed morning with twenty slaves, directed their labors all day long, and did not leave until the last board had been nailed to the roof. He was never asked to another cabin-raising. The story is instructive; it was hardly Colonel Dabney's social preëminence that was being in the least questioned here; it was rather his failure to perform a simple ceremonial act called for by the

* See the September issue of the QUARTERLY for "Part I: Democracy in the Old Northwest".—ED.

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occasion: had he removed his gloves and lent a hand, the requirements would have been discharged to the full.[1] In just this sense might the spread of Southern Jacksonian democracy be understood; in no way did it challenge the political and social arrangements implied in, say, Dabney's ownership of twenty slaves, but simply represented a kind of taking-off of gloves.

We have already proposed a working definition for "political democracy" which was featured by certain restrictions.[2] We have said that its operation might be observed most strikingly in a frontier setting. But now here are two contemporary frontiers—the Old Northwest, which has been offered as a model, and the Mississippi Territory, which has already been hedged about with ambiguities. We permit the frontier atmosphere of Mississippi to be called a "democratic" one, hinting at the same time that "democracy" may be something less than accurate as a term for describing the ante-bellum cotton kingdom. Actually there are grounds for each of these presumptions. Both frontiers were "democratic"—just as Craftown and Hilltown were.[3] But our hypothesis should also furnish us criteria for finding differences—for seeing how under specific tests one situation might be called more democratic than another, and for discovering the mechanisms which make it so.

A high rate of diverse and complex community problems, according to the argument, tends to guarantee the persistence of a democratic situation. It is, moreover, very difficult for the leadership in such a setting—for instance in a small, growing town—to develop or maintain a rigid and "oligarchic" character. The civic and business interests to be umpired are far too diffuse; the pressures induced are too many and too great; too many jobs are created; too many talents must be called into service.

[1] Susan Dabney Smedes, *Memorials of a Southern Planter* (Baltimore, 1887), p. 67.

[2] "Suppose that political democracy be regarded as a manipulative attitude toward government, shared by large numbers of people. Let it be thought of as a wide participation in public affairs, a diffusion of leadership, a widespread sense of personal competence to make a difference. . . . [It] evolves most quickly during the initial stages of setting up a new community; it is seen most dramatically while the process of organization and the solving of basic problems are still crucial. . . ." See Part I of this essay, POLIT. SCI. Q., LXIX, 325 (Sept. 1954).

[3] See our summary of the study by Robert K. Merton and others, in *ibid.*, p. 326.

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It is here, then, that one might look for what it was that made the Southwest different. Let us say—subject to further refinement—that the difference lay in two related facts. One was the presence, in the earliest counties settled, of a structure of planters whose leadership, at both the local and the territorial level, the people were accustomed to accept. The other was an economic setting, focused upon agriculture, whose daily problems did not compare in variety or intensity with those of the small town. The tempo at which these problems appeared was such that the traditional leadership was not hard pressed to meet them—they could be handled largely within the familiar framework of the county court.[4]

Mississippi Territory, established in 1798 and later divided into the states of Mississippi and Alabama in 1817 and 1819, offered tempting opportunities to ambitious young men from the older planting states. Yet the very nature and limited range of these opportunities favored the man of means; a substantially capitalized head start in the bottom lands of the Mississippi or lower Tombigbee was ever so much more crucial to success than it would have been, say, in Canton or Jacksonville. Seizing and exploiting a choice tract of cotton land was a different order of undertaking from that of platting a quarter-section in town lots; and it was not so easy to augment this domain with more lands and the labor needed to work them as it would be to pyramid a hattery into a string of tinshops and tanneries. The comparison of course refers to the typical *success story* in the two sections; it refers to the fact that, although success, prominence and power were limited ultimately to a fraction in either society (as they are in any society), the fraction was smaller, and mobility within it less, in the Southwest than in the Northwest. Canceling off subsistence and market farming in either section, we see that "opportunity" meant something quite different in one from what it meant in the other. In the Northwest it could mean a great variety of business promotions large and small; in the Southwest it had a much simpler and

[4]It is now proposed that the *Hilltown* experience (rather than Craftown's)' described in the Merton study, be here considered as relevant to that of the Southwest frontier. *Ibid.*, pp. 328–29.

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more limited meaning: cotton. Life here was much less diversified: the economic and social focus was the plantation.

Here, *initial* prominence and power counted for more. There were visible limits to the amounts of choice cotton land to be had in any given place,[5] and it was thus critically important that one either be there first or have the resources for displacing those who were. Extraordinary numbers of those men who would come to prominence in Alabama and Mississippi were men who could do one or the other—who could either be the first to occupy the strategic bottom lands or who could buy out those who may have happened upon them earlier. They were, moreover, men who by previous experience and status were ready and able to furnish a new community's critical requirements: leadership and responsibility. This was never typical in the Northwest, but in Mississippi Territory it meant that the areas first settled, those most accessible and desirable, would quickly be dominated by men of means and that these same men, by their very firstness, would come to play disproportionately dominant rôles in the public life of their states. These "pioneer" areas were the Natchez district on the lower Mississippi, the

[5] This is a sheer truism. But we risk it in order to highlight the fact that cotton land, as the basic unit for capitalist enterprise, is not, so to speak, expandable in anything like the flexible sense that a "business" is: there is just so much of it, physically *there*, to be calculated on from the outset. The initial commitment, in relation to what one can eventually expect to get out of it, is infinitely greater than it is for the small business man who wants to become a big one. See again *ibid.*, pp. 342–43 and note 45; also p. 345, note 51. In the Northwest, even *land itself* was more flexible as a unit of enterprise than in the South. A comparison of land speculation in Mississippi and in Illinois shows that the value of cotton land depended primarily on its natural fertility; thus in Mississippi the technique of speculation tended to be that of the monopolist who could engross lands and hold them as long-term investments. But in Illinois, though fertility was still an important variable, it was only one of several: here, the effect of a railroad, canal, roadway, or growing town on land values was much more dramatic. And, in any case, taxes on unimproved lands made quick turnovers always desirable. Here, the large operator must be speculator, lobbyist, promoter and booster rolled into one. "It was the speculator who brought about the removal of the State capital from Kaskaskia to Vandalia and subsequently to Springfield. It was he who secured the location of the Normal University near Bloomington and the State University at Champaign, Urbana, and other state institutions at particular localities." Paul W. Gates, "The Disposal of the Public Domain in Illinois, 1848–1856", *Jour. of Ec. and Bus. Hist.*, III, 238 (Feb. 1931); compare with James W. Silver, "Land Speculation Profits in the Chickasaw Cession", *Jour. of South. Hist.*, X, 84–92 (Feb. 1944).

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Alabama-Tombigbee basin in southwestern Alabama, and Madison County in the upper Tennessee valley of northern Alabama.

It is unnecessary, in any of these districts, to deny the lonely squatter his distinction as the first white settler. Yet it should be noted with interest that the multitude of *ex post facto* arrangements devised in the Northwest to stabilize the squatter's position were not to be found on a comparable scale in the Southwest: legislative war upon the absentee holder and speculator, taxes on unimproved lands, armed "claim clubs"—such belligerent devices were virtually unheard of in Alabama or Mississippi.[6] Thus the pioneer farmer who found himself on a rich claim in Madison County on the Tennessee, or in Wilkinson on the Mississippi, was oftener than not persuaded to move on, either by a Georgia planter's money or by the insinuating threats of a Tennessee speculator.[7] An actual geographical segregation between planting and subsistence counties tended to appear; the planting counties were the first settled and stabilized, and they became the key counties in territorial and state political life.[8]

Particularly is this the case for Madison County, Alabama.

[6] Everett Dick, *The Dixie Frontier* (New York, 1948), p. 69; see esp. chs. v and vi.

[7] Thomas P. Abernethy, *The Formative Period in Alabama, 1815–1828* (Montgomery, 1922), pp. 10, 30, 52, 55–56. "When . . . [the wealthy planter] found a likely site, he either bought out several small frontiersmen or purchased adjacent land from the government. . . ." Ray Allen Billington, *Westward Expansion* (New York, 1949), p. 322. Frank L. Owsley, in his vivid profiles of the Robbinses and the Ramseys, exhibits the process whereby squatters sold their holdings to better-financed planters. These two pioneer-farmer families gave up their claims to rich cotton lands in order to move to virgin territory where the soil was less fertile but easier to work, or where the population was sufficiently sparse to allow herding. *Plain Folk of the Old South* (Baton Rouge, 1949), pp. 67–77.

[8] The term should not of course be understood to mean a rigid segregation of planters and yeomen farmers. The Owsley and Weaver studies both clearly demonstrate that planters and yeomen farmers were interspersed even on the best cotton lands. Yet the fact remains that few planters settled on poor land and that the bulk of the planting population was concentrated in a limited number of counties. *Ibid.*, p. 10; Herbert Weaver, *Mississippi Farmers, 1850–1860* (Nashville, 1945), pp. 11, 24. Furthermore the rich cotton lands first settled in Alabama and Mississippi were settled by planters and it was these men who rapidly became the dominant figures in the political life of these states. Abernethy, *op., cit.*, pp. 11, 106; Mack Buckley Swearingen, *The Early Life of George Poindexter* (Chicago, 1934), p. 30.

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The men who entered Madison County in 1809, the year the Tennessee River lands were first offered for sale, were predominantly Georgia planters with considerable wealth and numerous slaves, who came for the purpose of raising cotton.[9] These men, by virtue of their traditions and training as men of affairs and substance, furnished a cadre of leadership so ready-made, so natural, that positions of responsibility were assumed by them in their new environment quite as a matter of course. Not only was it they and their families who managed and continued to manage the political affairs of the county, but the county itself, being the earliest major focus of settlement in northern Alabama, assumed an early and continuing dominance in the politics of the state. The great planters of the county sat on its first inferior court, and one of the judges was Thomas Bibb, Alabama's second governor (his brother William was its first); the clerk of the court was William Winston, whose son also became a governor; the chief justice was Leroy Pope, whose grandson, Leroy Pope Walker, would be Jefferson Davis's first secretary of war.[10] Among Madison County's delegates to the constitutional convention of 1819 were two future governors and three United States senators: Clement Comer Clay (who would be both, and whose son, General Clement Claiborne Clay, would also be a senator), Henry Chambers, John W. Walker (who presided over the convention), and Gabriel Moore. By the time of the Civil War, Madison County alone had produced six governors and eight senators, its original political structure, at first appointive, having carried over largely undisturbed.

A precisely similar pattern is seen in the Natchez district, the area first settled in what would become the state of Mis-

[9] Abernethy, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

[10] Edward Chambers Betts, *Early History of Huntsville, Alabama* (Montgomery, 1916), pp. 20–21. The first lawyers admitted to the Twickenham bar at the first session of the superior court (whose clerk, Peter Perkins, represented Madison County in the territorial legislature) included John W. Walker, who was president of the 1819 constitutional convention and later United States senator, Lewis Winston, later attorney-general of Mississippi Territory, and Gabriel Moore, Madison's first state senator and fifth governor of Alabama. Here is another contrast with the Northwest. In Alabama they were lawyers by virtue of their position as men of affairs; in the Northwest, whatever position they had was acquired from the starting point of their being lawyers.

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sissippi: an early pattern of concentrated slaveholding leadership[11] exerting extraordinary influence in later territorial and state political life. The original structure in this area of rich planters and younger sons on the rise is seen to carry over into statehood despite a territorial period of nearly twenty years. Moreover, the delegates of the Natchez district counties to the Mississippi constitutional convention of 1817 not only dominated that assembly and furnished its president, but also included four future governors (David Holmes, Walter Leake, George Poindexter and Gerard Brandon), three United States senators, two members of Congress, two former territorial governors, and the brother of the Confederacy's future president.[12]

Such a case may not be made with quite the same emphasis for the Alabama-Tombigbee basin area, whose importance, for various reasons, was not carried over into statehood on the concentrated basis to be seen in the Tennessee River district or on the lower Mississippi. It always found itself overshadowed in territorial councils by the powerful Natchez community; and the fluidity of its population, with the opening of the Mobile district to the south and the Black Belt to the north, prevented an early focus of power from becoming fixed. Thus it was not the Tombigbee area but rather Madison County, circumscribed by geography and favored by an influx of wealthy men, that quickly assumed dominance in Alabama's affairs. Even so, this is not to deny that the early southern counties still exerted influence disproportionate to their actual strength. Indeed, such was the prestige of Judge Harry Toulmin of Baldwin that the name of this one man, in the early years, was virtually synonymous with that of southern Alabama. Though this region never gave governors and senators to the state with the generosity of Madison County, its own political structure, on a county level, was

[11] Early census figures on slaveholding are available for Wilkinson County, a key county in the old Natchez district. In February 1802 the following persons in Wilkinson County were commissioned to serve as "Justices of the Peace etc." (their names are followed by the number of slaves they owned in 1805): John Ellis (90), Hugh Davis (37), John Collins (84), Richard Butler (110), William Ogden (22), and Thomas Dawson (4). "Census of Wilkinson County, Mississippi Territory, 1805", *Jour. of Miss. Hist.*, XI, 104–11 (Apr. 1949).

[12] Robert Lowry and William McCardle, *A History of Mississippi* (Jackson, 1891), pp. 237–45.

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maintained well into the 1840s by the same wealthy planting families established there before statehood; Clarke County's seat in the state senate was filled during its first twenty-five years by only six men, and the family names of Toulmin, Creagh and Mims occur again and again in the rosters of county officers and members of the legislature from this district.[13]

The economic life of the Southwest frontier, then, was bound up with an interest which was relatively simple—the planting of cotton—and its early government was dominated by planters. Thus it is not surprising that government, on the daily local plane, should itself be simple. Local government in Alabama and Mississippi remained focused at the county level throughout the ante-bellum period, and the same was generally true for the entire planting South. It was, as we have seen, anything but true in the typical county of the Old Northwest, with its hodge-podge of overlapping town, township, school district, and road district subdivisions and the profusion of offices which these units entailed.[14]

[13] W. Brewer, *Alabama, Her History* (Montgomery, 1872), pp. 123, 174, 178; Thomas H. Owen, *A History of Alabama and Dictionary of Alabama Biography* (Chicago, 1921), III, 421; T. H. Ball, *The Great South-East or Clarke County, Alabama* (Grove Hill, 1882), p. 191; John Simpson Graham, *History of Clarke County* (Birmingham, 1923), p. 125; "Alabama Census Returns, 1820, and an Abstract of the Federal Census of Alabama, 1830", *Ala. Hist. Q.*, VI, 333–506 (Fall 1944).

[14] In Indiana we have an ideal case of the development of local government in the Old Northwest. The constitution of 1816 provided a simple county commissioner government not unlike that of Alabama. A rudimentary township, however, was retained and served initially as an election district for justices of the peace. As the number of towns grew and a demand arose for more flexible local government, statutes were passed which incorporated the townships of various counties. Once incorporated, the township elected its own officials, sixteen in number, and managed its own affairs. Further superimposed on the simple county structure were the congressional or school townships with their school districts. These townships, not necessarily coterminous with the civil townships, could be incorporated at the request of twenty families and if necessary could be divided into school districts—each a corporate unity with its own body of elected officials. County government itself reflected the strains of diverse populations and diverse local problems. By 1827 Indiana's counties were under three separate types of county government. Clyde F. Snider, "Indiana Counties and Townships", *Ind. Mag. of Hist.*, XXXIII, 119–52; see our own profile of Stark County, Ohio, in Polit. Sci. Q., LXIX, 350, also Simeon E. Leland, ed., *State-Local Fiscal Relations in Illinois* (Chicago, 1941), pp. 31–32.

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The Southern system, centering as it did upon the county, found its origins in the county court structure of colonial Virginia. The Virginia county court had performed, since time out of mind, the functions of local government—executive, legislative and judicial—all exercised by the same body of men sitting in their several capacities. To their care, according to Thomas Jefferson, were confided "the justice, the executive administration, the taxation, police, the military appointments of the county, and nearly all our daily concerns."[15] The county court consisted of justices of the peace, constables, a sheriff, clerk, coroner, revenue and school commissioners, and officers of the militia. The justices, commissioned by the governor, held office for life, and as a body had power to choose their own new members. The aristocratic traditions of Virginia's ruling families, the great planters of the colony and state, found their most concrete embodiment in the county court, a body which was exclusive, oligarchic, self-perpetuating, conservative and responsible.[16] Jefferson himself served upon it for many years, as had his forbears the Jeffersons and Randolphs. Functionally the system met for generations all the tests of structured leadership: acceptance, respect, and transmissibility of power; for clarity of lineament—rigidity, if we wish—it provides the most appropriate model of a political structure available in America.

It cannot be maintained that the Virginia county court was transplanted in all its oligarchic character to the frontier; for by the time it was set up in Alabama the system had undergone a number of changes—the most dramatic of which involved the election rather than appointment of certain court officials. But in other ways the traditional structure remained surprisingly little altered, and the court tended to be dominated, especially in the early years, by the planting gentry. Let us note briefly

[15] Quoted in Charles S. Sydnor, *The Development of Southern Sectionalism* (Baton Rouge, 1948), p. 39.

[16] Service on the county court was the complete apprenticeship for the young man heading for a career in politics, and most Virginia leaders took their places there as a matter of course. "In eighteenth century Virginia men learned to administer law and observed the effects of law before they were entrusted with its making." Charles S. Sydnor, *Gentlemen Freeholders: Political Practices in Washington's Virginia* (Chapel Hill, 1952), p. 114.

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how this system of county government had spread throughout the South.

The county court system existed not only in Virginia but in each of the other Southern colonies as well, and was carried over in all its essentials into statehood. It was found, *mutatis mutandis*, in Maryland, in the Carolinas and in Georgia. Its migration across the "three frontiers" of Virginia left it unaltered. Thomas P. Abernethy has shown how leadership, carried by men of substance, migrated from the Tidewater to the Piedmont and Valley "virtually without change," and how even in the transmontane regions of the Old Dominion, later to become the state of Kentucky, it was the men of means who seized the choicest tracts of the bluegrass country, who constituted the local gentry, and who filled the offices of the county court.[17] In colonial times, according to Carl Bridenbaugh, the body of yeomen farmers "wanted and asked for the leadership of gentlemen."[18] The same was true at a much later date in Tennessee, whose constitution of 1796 established the county court—already there in fact—in all its original majesty. This constitution also provided safeguards against the special taxing of unimproved lands—a feature contrary to every principle of land legislation in the Old Northwest. Andrew Jackson was a member of the committee which drafted it.[19] On the newer frontier, Louisiana continued, in its parish police jury, the structure of the county court. In Mississippi we see the constitution of 1817 authorizing an appointive court whose justices served during good behavior and were designated by the legislature; and Florida, entering the Union in 1824, likewise retained the county court.[20]

[17] Thomas P. Abernethy, *Three Virginia Frontiers* (Baton Rouge, 1940), pp. 58, 64.

[18] Carl Bridenbaugh, *Myths and Realities* (Baton Rouge, 1952), p. 169.

[19] T. P. Abernethy, "Andrew Jackson and the Rise of Southwestern Democracy", *Am. Hist. R.*, XXXIII, 64 (Oct. 1927). See also Abernethy, *From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee* (Chapel Hill, 1932), pp. 17, 149, 352, 361.

[20] There is a general discussion of how the county court was constituted in Charles Sydnor's *Development of Southern Sectionalism*, pp. 37–43. "All told," asserts Mr. Sydnor, writing of the early 1820s, "there were about 8,000 justices in the four states of Virginia, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Tennessee. They had almost complete control over the local government of some 2,700,000 people—

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Frontier democracy—which in a very few years would be so potently symbolized in the "equal rights" tone of the Jackson Administration—left its mark on the Alabama constitution of 1819, in so far as it concerned the county court. Two of the court officials were made elective.[21] Two years later more changes occurred. Laws were passed in 1821 which separated on paper the legislative and judicial functions of the county governing body, and all officials were made elective except the judge of the county court. That judge, however, appointed by the Assembly, not only presided over the court as usual but was also required to serve with the commissioners of roads and revenue and see that they carried out their functions.[22] How far this constituted a "breakdown" of the county court structure itself may well be questioned. Let us say that in *Southern* terms, and compared with the old Virginia system, many changes had occurred—changes which opened the way to more general opportunities for holding what local offices were available. But the most impressive fact for us is that it was still a *county* court: unlike the Northwest county, its simple structure was not experimented with by subdividing its powers among townships and school districts, and there were few towns to provide independent nuclei of political activity and power. In this sense the structure of local government suffered no breakdown.

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nearly two thirds of the inhabitants of the South. . . . County government was also undemocratic in . . . South Carolina, Mississippi, and Maryland" (p. 42).

[21] Little evidence exists, however, for supposing that this represented a shift in political power away from the gentry. The convention which enacted these changes was overwhelmingly dominated by planters—in fact it was the planters of Madison County who took the lead in the writing of the constitution—and on such questions as the county court there was little or no debate. There was, indeed, some argument over whether or not elected clerks of court should be examined for fitness by a judge of some higher court, but an amendment to this effect was voted down. The "aristocratic" side was upheld by two future governors (Chambers and Clay), but the "popular" side, led by four future governors and a senator (Moore, the Bibbs, Pickens, and Walker), triumphed. *Journal of the Convention of the Alabama Territory* (Huntsville, 1819), p. 25. The striking similarity of this constitution to that of Mississippi has often been remarked upon; see Malcolm Cook McMillan, "The Alabama Constitution of 1819: A Study of Constitution-Making on the Frontier", *Alabama Review*, III, 284 (Oct. 1950); Albert B. Moore, *History of Alabama* (Tuscaloosa, 1951), p. 101; Abernethy, *Formative Period*, p. 43.

[22] Harry Toulmin, *A Digest of the Laws of the State of Alabama* (Cahawba, 1823), pp. 200, 202–204.

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What, then, *was* the nature of "Jacksonian democracy" in the Southwest? The Southwest frontier, as well as that of the Old Northwest, had undergone what we have called the "primitive level" of democratic experience, accompanied by all the ceremonial reflections of that experience. It involved in each case an egalitarian tone, with innumerable "plain-folks" observances and rhetorical disapproval of "aristocrats" and aristocratic tendencies. In the Southwest, as the less desirable back-country lands were filled up and new counties organized in the 1830s and 1840s, great new constituencies of yeomen farmers came into being whose pride was worth catering to.[23] Their presence and their feelings involved no threat whatever to the social and economic arrangements of a planting society beyond a demand for some recognition in its body politic. In this setting the problems affecting the lives of these people were not the pressing problems of government which so dominated the political life of the Northwest county. It was in the nature of their agriculture:[23a] their needs were simpler and fewer, and the pressures upon their politicians were far less. This hardly meant that the observances of the campaign were not important; indeed, they may have been more so, political needs tending as they did to focus upon the sense of ceremonial participation. The people

[23] "When he [the common farmer] frequented public gatherings, what he encountered would seldom be naked hauteur. Rather, there would nearly always be a fine gentleman to lay a familiar hand on his shoulder, to inquire by name after the members of his family, maybe to buy him a drink, certainly to rally him on some boasted weakness or treasured misadventure, and to come around eventually to confiding in a hushed voice that that damned nigger-loving scoundrel Garrison, in Boston—in short, to patronize him in such a fashion that to his simple eyes he seemed not to be patronized at all but actually deferred to, to send him home, not sullen and vindictive, but glowing with the sense of participation in the common brotherhood of white men." W. F. Cash, *The Mind of the South* (New York, 1950), p. 41.

[23a] Life on the Southwest frontier apparently lacked the competitive drive which was so all-pervasive in the Northwest. "Relatively few of the plain folk . . . seem to have had a desire to become wealthy. Their ambition was to acquire land and other property sufficient to give them and their children a sense of security and well being, to be 'good livers' and 'have something saved for a rainy day' as they would have put it." Owsley, *Plain Folk*, p. 134. This created a population which was proud and independent, and it produced a life which lacked the pressures and tensions of town life but lacked also its dynamism and insistent concern with daily politics.

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of the Southwest frontier, like those of the Northwest, carried on the great tradition of the political barbecue, and it is even possible that they enjoyed them more. "In these more sober and prosaic days," wrote Reuben Davis in his *Recollections*, "it may be difficult for people even to imagine the perfect abandonment of a whole population to the excitement and pleasures of such a carnival."[24] And yet the end of the campaign largely marked the end of their concern with government. Whatever satisfaction the back-country politician had to render after getting into office must be understood in terms of the barbecue, rather than of concrete local problems to be bargained and haggled over. Such was the setting in which increasing numbers of young men in the poorer counties began entering politics in this period.

It was against such a background that Franklin Plummer, the amiable wool-hat politician, inaugurated his short but colorful career. Shortly after his arrival in Mississippi, Plummer moved, in 1825, to Simpson County (a new county in the piney woods area), read law briefly, and was admitted to practice. Here, in this non-planting county, Plummer—a great success at the bar—soon found himself virtually running the offices of sheriff, clerk and judge, even though the commissions were held by others. Apparently the political awareness of his future constituents did not extend to active concern about the way these offices were run or who ran them. The following year he was elected to the General Assembly. He understood that, in lieu of concrete pressing demands for county seats, banks, internal improvements, laws against speculators, and the like, it was necessary for him to hit upon some "issue" of guaranteed serviceability. He found it in his neighbors' natural envy of river-county "aristocrats", and spent much of his time denouncing "swelled heads" and "bloated bondholders". In the Assembly he did demand schools and internal improvements, which pleased his constituents, but nothing came of these schemes,[25] and

[24] Reuben Davis, *Recollections of Mississippi and Mississippians* (Boston, 1889), p. 111.

[25] Plummer's failure to bargain seriously for these things may be contrasted with the furious logrolling activities of the Lincoln and Douglas factions over internal improvements and the location of the Illinois capital in the 1830s. "The means by which the Sangamon delegation achieved their triumph were probably

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if there was any disappointment it was not expressed at subsequent elections.[26] He was reëlected for three successive terms.[27]

When he campaigned for Congress in 1830 against James C. Wilkins of Natchez—a wealthy friend of Andrew Jackson—Plummer's speeches contained nothing concrete in the way of a program, though they were fraught with principle: "Plummer for the People and the People for Plummer". Even the most tangible of his "issues" (schools and internal improvements) were no longer at stake. Had these been anything but "barbecue" issues—to the Illinois politician they would be crucial—they could never have been dropped with such ease.[28] But his

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maneuvering and trading of the frankest sort. . . . Stephen A. Douglas . . . bluntly denying that he had traded his vote to the delegation for a land office—and indeed he voted for Jacksonville to the last—declared the delegation had traded everything to obtain the capital. Peter Green of Clay County denied that the trade had been made of votes for the capital at Springfield for votes for a system of internal improvements for the south. But later when it was proposed to repeal the internal improvement system, Lincoln indignantly declared that a bargain had been made between the friends of the system and the friends of Springfield and that it was irrepealable." Theodore C. Pease, *The Frontier State 1818–1848* (Springfield, 1918), pp. 204–205.

[26] Actually there was never enough pressure in the entire state of Mississippi before the Civil War to force much action on either item. The progress of schools and internal improvements in that state may be found epitomized in Bolivar County, a rich river county opened up in the 1830s. In 1839, three years after the county was founded, a resolution was passed by the Board of Police "to take into consideration the propriety of establishing a common school," but no commissioners were appointed for another seven years. They collected no state funds until 1852, when they received $360.50. But actually no real public education system existed before 1886. Nor was it until the 1880s that Bolivar had a railroad. As for roads, one of the first gravel roads in the county was built in 1915 by Dr. J. C. Brooks, partly with private funds, "because of the vehement protest of Mrs. Brooks against living in a county with roads so bad as to require a wagon and six mules to convey her from the train to her home, during or after a heavy rain." Florence Warfield Sillers and others, *History of Bolivar County, Mississippi* (Jackson, 1948), pp. 234, 64.

[27] It is said that all during this time only one vote was ever cast against him. Edwin A. Miles, "Franklin E. Plummer: Piney Woods Spokesman of the Jackson Era", *Jour. of Miss. Hist.*, XIV, 5 (Jan. 1952). At one point Plummer decided that a new constitution was more important than any other measure he had advocated. A convention was in fact called and a new constitution drawn up in 1832—but this was two years after Plummer had left the legislature.

[28] In Illinois, "Local issues, or local applications of national issues, predominated in congressional elections. Thus in his address to his constituents in 1824, Cook [the son-in-law of Governor Ninian Edwards, then running for Congress] found but

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canvass furnished much entertainment to the back-country folk and with their votes he won the election. In Congress, now representing both Natchez planters and backwoods farmers, he had difficulty finding issues of "principle" without getting into trouble with one or the other. He tended at first to favor the Bank, which meant something in Natchez, but after Jackson's veto of the recharter bill he supported the overwhelmingly popular President. Here he must have realized the symbolic importance to the piney-woods people of being against banks, though no issue could ever have held less real significance for them. He supported the Eastern "workingmen's parties", whose program may have made some sense in New York but none whatever in Mississippi, and defined "workingmen" in such a way as to include not only mechanics (of whom few could be found in the backwoods), but also lawyers, planters, and anyone else who supported Plummer's principles—and Plummer.

Amid all this he became somewhat suspect in matters of principle, and began losing his following. He decided to run for the Senate in 1834 and hoped to capitalize on the popularity of Andrew Jackson. But the Democrats were sponsoring Robert J. Walker, so Plummer turned to the Whigs, and the aristocrats of Natchez arranged a $5,000 loan for him from the Planters' Bank so that he might launch his campaign as "the People's Candidate". Plummer still claimed to be more of a Jacksonian than Walker, but unfortunately Jackson himself supported Walker. Just as unfortunate for Plummer's campaign among the plain people (which he lost) was the fact that he conducted it in a stylish barouche with a liveried servant. The one aspect of the "struggle against aristocracy" which had most interested his constituents was the tone—the entertainment and the sense of participation. Violating that, Plummer had lost touch with the

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little room and no important place for the Monroe Doctrine and the slave trade. Instead he stressed the feasibility of an Illinois-Michigan canal, appropriations for the improvement of the Ohio and the Mississippi, the extension of the Cumberland road, a possible system of national internal improvements, a more liberal policy of relief to purchasers of public land and finally and most important the tariff. The tariff by virtue of the home market argument was made an important political issue in the west in the early twenties." Pease, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

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whole point of things. From here on his political career went into eclipse.[29]

Generally speaking, the extension of the democratic style over the political life of the Southwest met with little serious opposition from the planting aristocracy as a class. Indeed, the frontier barons themselves fell into it quite easily; they too, in the heat of the campaign, were not above denouncing each other occasionally as aristocrats. It involved a certain amount of demagoguery which would have horrified a man like Jefferson, whose own career was launched at a time when egalitarian observances were not yet considered necessary—or even seemly —at elections. The folklore of Alabama and Mississippi, even at its most aristocratic level, had been colored in a way which the Virginia gentry of Jefferson's time could hardly have foreseen. But after the planters had made concessions to the style, their own leadership in positions of responsibility and power, when it came to the test, was never seriously at issue.

It must be emphasized, then, the concrete "class interest" provides no usable test for understanding the political battles of this section. In Alabama, even in Madison County, that stronghold of aristocracy, the earliest battles were featured by charges and countercharges of "aristocratic tendencies". Yet this had nothing whatever to do with the social structure—the charges circulated among the upper crust itself, and its members accused each other of having sinister connections with the "undemocratic" Huntsville Bank and belonging to an imaginary "Royal Party". On such a basis Leroy Pope got into political trouble early in the 1820s; such were the terms on which the aristocrat Clement Comer Clay helped to foil John McKinley's bid for the Senate in 1822 (Clay and his law partner were called the "Champions of the People");[30] and such were the issues in Israel Pickens' contest with Henry Chambers for the governorship in

[29] Miles, *loc. cit.*, pp. 1–34; J. F. H. Claiborne, *Mississippi as a Province, Territory and State* (Jackson, 1880), pp. 423–27. Claiborne, a wealthy planter of Natchez, was rather fond of Plummer.

[30] Clay was himself defeated by McKinley for a senate seat in 1826, McKinley then being supported by "the people's tribune", the Huntsville *Democrat*, which three years before had denounced him as an aristocrat. Ruth Ketring Nuermberger, "The 'Royal Party' in Early Alabama Politics", *Alabama Review*, VI, 81–98, 198–212 (Apr.–July 1953).

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1821. At the same time Pickens, the "leader of the masses", was himself the president of a bank—the Tombecbe Bank of St. Stephens.[31]

Nor could much of a connection be made, a little later on, between class interest and the spread of "Jacksonian Democracy" in Alabama; Jacksonian Democracy, in political terms, involved principally the ceremony of supporting Andrew Jackson, who was virtually unopposed throughout all Alabama. All three presidential elections in which Jackson was a candidate found every county[32] returning crushing majorities for the popular hero. In that of 1832, Jackson's opponent, Henry Clay, received a total of five votes in the entire state.[33] For that matter the most notable hotbed of "democracy" was in Madison County itself, where we discover more Jacksonians than anywhere else.[34] It was the nabobs of that county who first cultivated the warrior, long before he became president. Arriving in Huntsville in 1819 amid scenes of great excitement, General Jackson, who had come to race his blooded horses and attend to his landed interests, was promptly taken in hand by the local gentry, fêted, and invited within the bar of both houses of the Assembly.[35] Probably the most consistent line that could be

[31] Moore, *History of Alabama*, p. 116. Franklin Plummer was also the president of a bank. As early as 1812–13, when both states were still under Mississippi Territory, we see the prominent planter Cowles Mead making the same mistake in canvassing for Congress that Plummer would make two decades later. George Poindexter, himself canvassing for governor, saw it instantly: "Mead has injured himself", he wrote, "by coming out here *in a carriage*. It is regarded as too extravagant. I fear he will be defeated." Claiborne, *op. cit.*, pp. 276–77. N.B.: he was defeated.

[32] Every county, that is, except one in the election of 1824: Butler, which returned 102 votes for Adams to 96 for Jackson. In 1828, however, Butler County gave Jackson 87.47 per cent of its vote, and 100 per cent in 1832. Clanton W. Williams, "Presidential Election Returns and Related Data for Ante-Bellum Alabama", *Alabama Review*, I, 284–89 (Oct. 1948).

[33] This is obviously more symbolic than actual. The election was so overwhelmingly in Jackson's favor that the Clay votes were probably just not counted. Returns are available for thirty counties, and the six for which returns are missing include some of the future key Whig counties of southern Alabama. *Ibid.*, pp. 288–89.

[34] The tables clearly show Madison County's preëminence not only in north Alabama but in the entire state. Of Madison's total vote of 1,655 in 1824, Adams received 194, Crawford 155, Clay 21, and Jackson 1,295. Madison's closest competitor in population was its neighbor, Limestone, which gave Jackson 418. The totals mount impressively in the two succeeding elections. *Ibid.*, pp. 284–89.

[35] Albert James Pickett, *History of Alabama* (Sheffield, Ala., 1896), pp. 661–62.

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drawn through Alabama politics up to the Civil War would be based on a geographic power rivalry between the northern and southern parts of the state,[36] a rivalry visible as early as the constitutional convention of 1819.[37] For the rest, it hinged primarily upon battles for office, the vocabulary of which was picturesquely embroidered with democratic metaphor.

It was thus that the demagogue or piney-woods politician could be absorbed without menace to the system, for it was neither the plantation system nor the structure of government, but principally the offices themselves which were at stake. In the 1840s, W. R. W. Cobb's campaign for Congress could be conducted with great success on the basis of "captivating songs", accompanied by winking at the spectators while chewing an onion held in one hand and a piece of corn pone held in the other. At the same time the wife of General Clement Claiborne Clay went about with her husband, aiding that aristocrat's campaign for the Senate by wearing a cambric sunbonnet.[38] An increasing number of men like Cobb, Plummer and Albert Gallatin Brown could be trusted to act as surrogates for the planting class—and in fact it tended to be just such men who spoke most ferociously for the rights of slaveholders.[39] We may doubt how dangerous even the most ignorant of them were thought to be; as one Alabama lawyer told Tocqueville in 1832, "There are always,

[36] Theodore Henley Jack, *Sectionalism and Party Politics in Alabama, 1819–1842* (Menasha, Wis., 1919), pp. vii, 85, and *passim*.

[37] This appears in embryo in the debates over apportionment and the location of the capital. *Journal of the Convention*, pp. 22, 32–33.

[38] Reinhard H. Luthin, "Some Demagogues in American History", *Am. Hist. R.*, LVII, 34 (Oct. 1951).

[39] Albert Gallatin Brown, also of Mississippi, was a plain-folks disciple of Plummer. In his career, though more successful than Plummer's, may be found certain rough parallels with that of his master. He too belabored the rich aristocrats. He too began with certain issues which had their concrete side—schools, for example—but which came to nothing. He too shifted his arguments from the concrete problems to the abstract ones, denouncing banks and abolitionism. Brown made speech after speech in the 1840s and 1850s, full of the wildest fantasies over the abolitionist menace. See James B. Ranck, *Albert Gallatin Brown, Radical Southern Nationalist* (New York, 1937). The rights of slaveholders had little concrete meaning in the piney woods, but Brown was fostering a process whereby the most radical proslavery people in the 1850s would be those who held no slaves. This sort of emotional freebooting operates best in the *absence* of concrete issues: actually the great slaveholders along the river who had strong vested interests in the system were much more moderate.

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in our assemblies, some men of talent; from the first days [of the session] these overwhelm the others and dominate business entirely. It's really they who make and discuss the laws; the others vote blindly."[40]

In Alabama and Mississippi the structure of power looked different in 1860 from the Virginia structure of 1790—or indeed, of 1860—and thus far had the intervention of the frontier taken its effect. But the difference, after all, was one of tone. The structure itself had undergone little basic alteration: as at Hilltown, the press of problems involved in the organization of this new frontier had never reached a level of intensity sufficient to displace the original framework and traditions of leadership.

The position of the "self-made" Jefferson Davis of Mississippi, with his great landed and slave holdings, may symbolically represent all this. His parents had, to be sure, lived in log cabins. His wife, on the other hand, was the daughter of a prominent Mississippi Whig planting family. "Would you believe it," she had confided to her mother during their courtship, "he is refined and cultivated, and yet he is a Democrat." Whatever the details of his pedigree, in short, Jefferson Davis was in every sense a *gentleman*.[41] And what this symbolized in the broadest sense was that the level of social aspirations had never really altered, that the focus of political power had in fact shifted very little from its plantation stronghold. The growing solidarity of the South in the 40s and 50s, and the grounds for that solidarity, demonstrate that the primary demands of Southern society were still the demands of its landed, slaveholding nucleus of social and political power. It was this structure's most basic demand of all—self-preservation—that by 1860 had come to absorb every other.

2

The observation of two frontiers has brought forth a variety of contrasts. We have found that an intense experience of problem-solving in a small-town, small-business culture was the key factor in producing the peculiarly "democratic" quality of political life in the Old Northwest. There, no traditional

[40] Quoted in Sydnor, *Development of Southern Sectionalism*, p. 292.

[41] Mrs. Jefferson Davis, *Jefferson Davis . . . A Memoir* (New York, 1890), I, 192.

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nucleus of leadership could ever have maintained itself. At the same time we discover in the South that the problems of a society whose political, economic and social focus was overwhelmingly rural were never so complex, even in the frontier regions, as to tax the competence of its original landed leadership. The Englishmen who settled our earliest southern frontier had established a structure of government—the Virginia county court—which with some adaptations had proved its adequacy and worth for the needs of an agricultural society. The hectic democracy of the Old Northwest was unnecessary there.

The young Virginian settling himself in the cotton country of Mississippi had thus come from a culture long stabilized. But the New England trader moving into Illinois had also emigrated from a society which by then was marked by a high degree of stability, a society whose problems of organization had long since been solved. New England, by 1830, was the very citadel of Northern culture. Yet New England itself had once been a wilderness. It too had at one time undergone its period of problem-solving; it had likewise had its structure of leadership, founded by Englishmen. Now which of these facts had indeed proved dominant—the structure of leadership or the problem-solving experience? The colony of Massachusetts Bay had had its "Puritan oligarchy". But it had, as well, its town meeting.

When Frederick Jackson Turner fled from his Johns Hopkins colleagues in the 1880s and headed for Wisconsin, he was also fleeing, as it were, from a kind of fallacy in applied logic. The "germ theorists" of that time and place were absorbed with questions about the origins of American democratic institutions—questions whose answers would hold, they trusted, the key to everything. They had followed the thread back and back, uncovering antecedent after antecedent of New England local government in the countryside of Old England; they had followed the ancestry of familiar officers back to Norman constables and Saxon tithingmen.[42] Turner thought the process

[42] See Edward A. Freeman, "An Introduction to American Institutional History", Herbert Baxter Adams, "The Germanic Origin of New England Towns", "Saxon Tithingmen in America", "Norman Constables in America", *Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies in Hist. & Polit. Sci.*, vol. I (Baltimore, 1883); Edward Channing, "Town and County Government in the English Colonies of North America", *ibid.*, vol. II (1884).

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suffocating, this patient search for similarities and continuities instead of contrasts and relief. The error was what philosophers call "the genetic fallacy"; Turner's defense was automatic and instinctive. The fallacy consists in tracing back the pedigree of a thought, a usage, an institution, to the time and place of its origin with never a question why other customs or institutions of that same time and place were not similarly perpetuated, or whether these same persisting usages may not themselves have undergone changes so basic as to render the differences more instructive than the similarities.[43] Turner, who saw the changes and recognized the differences, was consumed with impatience to celebrate them, and did so with the characteristic abstractions of frontier rhetoric.

Yet in removing himself from the scene of this multiple confusion, Turner was in his own experience reënacting much too quickly a process which had lasted 250 years and was in effect by-passing a whole range of its implications. Possibly his intellectual pilgrimage should after all have begun at Harvard. There, such considerations might have ripened in his impressionable mind; his ardor might have been tempered at that venerable seat, hallowed as it is in the surroundings of our first frontier.

The colony of Massachusetts Bay had a political structure which had been formed in England before embarkation and reconstituted virtually intact in the New World. Its government was that of a trading corporation, and thus the personnel of its first Court of Assistants, or board of directors, in 1630 was anything but a random matter. Those who served upon it were men of affairs, and together they marshaled a magisterial procession of talent, character and experience. John Winthrop, the governor, was lord of Groton Manor in Suffolk and had acted in public capacities since the age of eighteen as justice of the peace, steward to his father, and Attorney to the Court of Wards and Liveries; the deputy-governor, Thomas Dudley,

[43] "It [the genetic method] starts out from the idea that all objects of historical analysis have had a *development* and that this development can be rendered significant, or understood, by tracing the spatio-temporal continuity of its structure—whether it be of an institution, or folk-legend, or tool—as far back as possible." Sidney Hook, "A Pragmatic Critique of the Historico-Genetic Method", in *Essays in Honor of John Dewey* (New York, 1929), p. 157.

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was steward to the Earl of Lincoln and captain of English volunteers under Henry of Navarre. The Assistants were all men of parts and substance, including a son-in-law of the Earl of Lincoln, a steward to the Countess of Warwick, the nephew of a Lord Mayor of London, a nephew to the Dean of St. Paul's, and sundry squires of Lincolnshire and Essex. These men, suitors and trusted retainers of England's foremost Puritan peers, landowners and men of business with weighty connections, were collectively animated by the grand design of a Bible commonwealth in the wilderness, to be governed in purity and virtue. To this end they were accompanied by a phalanx of ministers whose piety and intellectual attainments were unexcelled. John Cotton, Thomas Shepard, Francis Higginson, Samuel Skelton, Richard Mather, John Wilson, John Norton and George Phillips were all products of the several colleges of Oxford and Cambridge, experienced in East Anglian parish affairs, and filled with inspiration at the prospect of spiritual stewardship to the commonwealth-to-be. Within a half-dozen years the right and left arms of the state had joined in the erection of a college of learning. Upon its first Board of Overseers sat the chief ministers and magistrates of the Bay, chiefest among whom was Governor Winthrop himself.[44]

That this notable company constituted a structure of leadership both political and spiritual may scarcely be doubted, and for ability, character and learning, their equal, man for man, would never again be seen in the colony. The desire of the Bay to be governed by its best men is found in the fact that only thirty-five new Assistants were elected in forty-eight years, though ten to fifteen were chosen annually by the freemen. The governor was likewise elected annually, yet for the fifty-odd years from 1630 to the revocation of the charter that post was filled most of the time by the men who had composed the first body of magistrates.[45]

[44] Samuel Eliot Morison, *Builders of the Bay Colony* (Boston, 1930), pp. 37, 51–54, 64, 65, 71–72, 107–109, 133–34, 189; Thomas Hutchinson, *The History of the Colony and Province of Massachusetts-Bay*, ed. by Lawrence S. Mayo (Cambridge, 1936), I, 14–17nn., 21n., 31n., 32n., 40n., 55n.

[45] Morison, *op. cit.*, pp. 94–95. "Simon Bradstreet earned a promotion to the governorship by fifty years' faithful service on the Board of Assistants. He was

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Yet actually this structure, despite its apparent stability of personnel, was subjected from the very beginning to the heaviest of strains. This is evident at the topmost level, that of the government of the province, where the effects are least impressive. Here alone, neglecting the local level, a steady breakdown of the theocratic conception was in progress, and by the time of the Glorious Revolution the minister-magistrate axis had been destroyed. The outward signs of the breakdown are discernible early in the history of the magistracy. The franchise was drastically liberalized the very first year (church membership was a wider, not a narrower, qualification than stockholding). The Assistants' sole power to levy taxes was quickly and successfully challenged (no one back in England questioned the magistrates' right of assessing to the rates). The secular demands of an energetic community whose economic life so soon came to focus in trade took inevitable primacy, in the course of time, over the urgencies of religion (religion, which was the structure's right arm). Cotton's Mosaic code had to be rejected for one based upon the common law, and this new code, being an insufficient guarantee of property rights, was itself shortly replaced by another. Even the Church was laid under stress and was forced to compromise its own rules of membership with the Half-Way Covenant. Eventually, in the 1680s, church membership itself as a qualification for the franchise was replaced once and for all by the holding of property. Long before this time the ministers of the commonwealth had seen what the worldly concerns of business were doing to religion. "New England", warned John Higginson in his election sermon of 1663, "is originally a plantation of Religion, not a plantation of Trade. Let Merchants and such as are increasing Cent per Cent remember this."[46] But secular prosperity had brought an irreversible transformation in tone. "He that remembers the good old spirit of those who followed God into this wilderness", wrote Urian Oakes in 1673, "cannot but easily discern a sad alteration."[47]

nine times reëlected governor, but forced into premature retirement at the age of eighty-nine by the arrival of a new charter" (p. 95).

[46] Quoted in Thomas J. Wertenbaker, *The Puritan Oligarchy* (New York, 1947), p. 202.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

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Yet these are only abstract signs; they are as nothing to what was happening concretely, on the local level, to the early structural conception of the commonwealth. Local government began at once to evolve in a fashion quite unpremeditated by the Fathers; it was a transformation set in motion the moment the first Englishmen set foot upon the soil of Massachusetts Bay. The Fathers' prior idea of their commonwealth had involved something of a paradox. Their commitment was to two sorts of things, not necessarily compatible: capitalism and religion.[48] On the one hand, their design of a state grounded in spiritual precepts required a close-knit community organization, and the obvious model was the familiar English agricultural village with its close grouping of houses, its commons, and its outlying fields. On the other hand, their frame of government for the province was the charter of a trading company, and it contained no provision at all for local government.

Governor Winthrop's advance design for the colony was that of a compact settlement to be protected by a fort at New Town. But he reckoned without the inviting necks and bends along the Mystic and the Charles. The ambitious settlers, not to be contained, planted Medford, Watertown, Roxbury and Lynn before the first winter's onset. It was a heavy disappointment to Winthrop in 1635 to see the estimable Thomas Hooker, chafing at the presence of so notable a rival as John Cotton in the same town, lead a band of followers off to the Connecticut valley; a similar sorrow came two years later when John Davenport and Theophilus Eaton departed from the Bay to

[48] The basic insights of Max Weber and R. H. Tawney on this subject are not being questioned here; on the contrary, in so far as Weber and Tawney intended to represent capitalist development as a force disruptive to a social structure previously guaranteed by the church, we are in agreement with their views. Neither of them quite appreciated, however, the function of the American frontier in preventing such a structure from getting a real foothold in Massachusetts. Indeed, this was outside the scope of their work. In any event, the Puritan church plays the same rôle in our polarization as did the Church of Rome in that of Weber and Tawney. What is represented in both cases is a *loosening* of the prior structure. What is seen in Massachusetts, moreover, by the end of the seventeenth century, is not merely a loosening but a complete disintegration. See Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York, 1930); R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (Mentor ed., New York, 1950).

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establish the colony of New Haven. He never ceased to be concerned over the dangers brought on by those who sought the "liberty of removing for outward advantages."[49] The necks and bends of the Mystic and Charles were the gateway to the great frontier: a fact never quite anticipated in his philosophy. Those necks and bends would shelter the pious but would also whet their ambition; they embodied a fact for which there was no precedent, they hinted boundless opportunity. By 1640, twenty towns had been established within the colony.[50]

Here, then, was a form of organization toward which all the settlers' commitments pointed—the town—but whose legal status was of the shadowiest and whose details must be developed in a setting completely new. This fact—that all must be made new—was the great fact dwarfing all others. Most of the institutions themselves would have honorable precedents of some sort or other—the people were Englishmen—but the experience of making them new was one which no Englishman had undergone for centuries. This experience would have consequences profound and ineffaceable; *this*, rather than the institutions, would separate these people from Old England completely and forever.

The town's isolation and lack of prior institutions, combined with the high aspirations of the people, immediately produced the widest range of problems to be dealt with; standards were to be maintained[51] under conditions demanding a level of combined effort for which the settlers' prior experience had little prepared them. Their very dwellings must meet standards

[49] Alan Heimert, "Puritanism, the Wilderness, and the Frontier", *New England Quarterly*, XXVI, 364 (Sept. 1953).

[50] John Fairfield Sly, *Town Government in Massachusetts (1620–1930)* (Cambridge, 1930), p. 21.

[51] "The general purpose of town grants was to get households properly established and the land effectively utilized. The centralized town plot and the customary institutions of church and civil government were regarded as essential, and the grants made in such a form as to encourage and require their development." William Haller, Jr., *The Puritan Frontier Town-Planting in New England Colonial Development 1630–1660* (New York, 1951), p. 36. "The land was freely granted to those who petitioned for it, while the legislative conditions were always imposed for the actual occupation of the soil and for the provision of religious and educational facilities for the settlers." Roy H. Akagi, *The Town Proprietors of the New England Colonies* (Philadelphia, 1924), p. 11.

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(there were no log huts in Massachusetts Bay); there must be a school, a meetinghouse, the town must have pounds and fences. Consider, even, such a homely problem as a fence: who among them, back in England, had ever actually built one? There, even the fences went back to Anglo-Saxon times. With roads it was the same: it was one thing to muster reluctant labor for the repair of the king's highway, and quite another to clear away the trees and build it new. The task called for a different order of participation and commitment altogether. So it was with every other of the town's multiple concerns, secular and religious, civil and military. Necessity would create expanded rôles for literally everyone.

With the flood of problems connected with the setting up of these new communities it became quite apparent, and soon, that local demands were producing deep alterations in the original model of a minister-magistrate axis held together at the top. Within the church itself, the Congregational polity gave each congregation control of its own affairs, including the ordination and dismissal of its ministers; this alone tended to cut across, rather than parallel, the ties with the central government. Still it was in civil affairs that this localism showed up most strikingly, and very early the inhabitants of these communities perceived the need for techniques whereby the energies of everyone might be brought to bear upon their common problems. The result was the town meeting.

The affairs of Dorchester, whose records are the colony's oldest, were at first controlled by the clergymen, aided by the advice of the magistrates, but as early as 1631 the inadequacy of this arrangement was apparent to all. An entry of 1633 shows the general town meeting of inhabitants, with its twelve-man steering committee, later designated as "select men", fully established.[52] That such an arrangement had become universal was recognized by the General Court in an act of March 3, 1635/6, which gave to each of the several towns the right to dispose of its common property, to order its own affairs, and to choose its "owne particular officers".[53] This "right",

[52] Sly, *op. cit.*, pp. 30–31.
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

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together with a broad and energetic participation[54] in the concerns of the town itself, was more accurately a matter of stark necessity than either a right or a privilege. Moreover, with property ownership almost universal[55] and with the need for all available talent crucial and pressing, the niceties of the church-membership qualification for citizenship could scarcely afford to be read too literally. Thus in 1641 the *Body of Liberties*, in recognition of a well-established situation, allowed that public courts, councils, and town meetings might be attended by anyone, freeman or not, and that anyone might have liberty "either by speech or writing to move any lawfull, seasonable, and materiall question, or to present any necessary motion complaint, petition, Bill, or information whereof that meeting hath proper cognizance. . . ." The General Court in 1647 took further note of *de facto* conditions when it allowed the towns to use the talents of their nonfreemen on the boards of selectmen. A bald confession that the magistrates themselves had come to see broad freemanship more in the light of necessity than of privilege is seen in an order of that same year aimed at church members who had deliberately avoided presenting themselves for freemanship, to escape "publike service in ye commonwealth." Henceforth such persons, when elected to office, must serve or be fined.[56]

It was not for want of conservatism or piety that political democracy should thus be so rapidly extended, that these New Englanders should put such strains on the original ties of church and state. It was rather a whole range of crucial secular,

[54] Surveying the list of town officers of Hadley, Massachusetts (founded 1659), we find that in the first ten years of Hadley's existence, thirty-eight men filled the important office of selectman. The maximum possible number during this period would have been fifty, while the total adult male population was ninety-eight. Moreover, it was not at all unusual to find a blacksmith, carpenter, or ex-servant occupying this office. Sylvester Judd, *History of Hadley* (Northampton, 1863), p. 620.

[55] Although by the eighteenth century absentee ownership was to become a serious problem in New England, there were very few nonresident proprietors in the early years of town development. Akagi, *op. cit.*, p. 138. In fact, according to Haller, "Many if not most indentured servants became land-owners and family heads within a few years after the end of their terms, in their old or a new town. *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

[56] Sly, *op. cit.*, pp. 48, 49, 49n.

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military and business concerns which made for an inevitable shift of focus. This is seen everywhere: in the town militia muster, with its elected officers, to meet the perpetual menace lurking in the forest; in the fines levied for tardiness at town meeting (no one's presence could be spared); in the profusion of town officers, nearly all elective, to handle the myriad needs of the new community. The town had its constable, its judge, its selectmen, its fence-viewers, poundkeepers, herdsmen, raters, highway surveyors, hogreeves, pig-ringers, drummers, and wood-procurers, its deputy to the General Court, its "Clark to call town meeting". And the process is further seen in the many inducements which artisans and other tradesmen were offered to come and settle, to the advancement of the town's business.

This gulf, as it were, between the first Court of Assistants and the town meeting is itself dramatic. Yet its full depth is apparent only after a brief look at what local government in England was like at that same epoch. There, we may see many similarities in form; most of our institutions of local government had visible precedents in those of the mother country. The continuities are apparent; the forms were, indeed, "carried in the *Susan Constant* and in the *Mayflower*." But it will also be clear that "democracy" is anything but a matter of forms; democracy cannot of itself be formalized, legalized, written into constitutions; it is a different sort of thing entirely. It is the result of an experience: the experience of setting up institutions—ancient or modern, it scarcely matters—in new surroundings.

The smallest unit of local government in mid-seventeenth-century England was that of the ecclesiastical parish, a unit for the regulation of both church and secular affairs. It was a traditional arrangement, involving an Established Church, which made the Bible commonwealth in Massachusetts a conception by no means without antecedent. In practice there were four principal officers: the churchwarden, who supervised the property of the church and the collection of the church rate; the constable, who enforced the law and kept order; the surveyor of the highways, who reported on the state of the roads, supervised the parishioners in making repairs, and collected the highway rate;

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and the overseer of the poor, who employed the paupers and levied the poor rate.[57]

The body of villagers from whom these officers were chosen was the vestry, theoretically composed of all the members of the parish. It was in fact considerably less than representative, comprising traditionally but the "principal", the "chiefest and most discreet", the "most substantial" of the parishioners.[58] Service in the offices was rotating, compulsory and unpaid, and was at the same time limited to the few householders of the community who were assessed to the rates.[59] Actually the vestry, which in a certain sense functioned as a co-opting parish oligarchy, which had a say in the levy of the church rate, and which elected the churchwarden and audited his accounts, was itself subject to the most rigid of controls and surveillance by the officers of the shire. Of the parish officials, the only one over whom the vestry had any control was the churchwarden; the others were appointed by the county justices of the peace, or sometimes, as with the surveyors of highways, selected by the constables and churchwardens. In any case all the officers were primarily accountable to the justices of the peace. It was the justices of the peace to whom they looked for final orders, and the extensive powers which they exercised over the parish were derived from the justices, not from their fellow parishioners. The parson himself was traditionally appointed by the chief landowner of the parish, one of whose privileges was the "presentation of the living". The problems which the vestry was called upon to meet were simple, traditional and few; it made no fundamental decisions; it was in no sense a policy-making body. The parish, as an administrative unit, was regarded by no one

[57] Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *English Local Government from the Revolution to the Municipal Corporations Act: The Parish and the County* (London, 1906), I, 15–40.

[58] *Ibid.*, I, 39; Eleanor Trotter, *Seventeenth Century Life in the Country Parish* (Cambridge, 1919), pp. 18–19.

[59] "Here, on Easter Monday or Tuesday, the clergyman would meet the three or four farmers who occupied land in the parish, and who probably formed, with himself and the squire, and possibly the miller, the innkeeper, and a small freeholder or two, the only persons assessed to the rates." Webb, *op. cit.*, I, 43. "The labourers, who included two-thirds of all the heads of families, were not rated, and held no other position in the parish organization than that of recipients of relief." *Ibid.*, I, 48.

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as an organ of autonomous self-government. It was, according to Sidney and Beatrice Webb, ". . . an organ of local obligation—a many-sided instrument by which the National Government and the Established Church sought to arrange for the due performance of such collective regulations and common services as were deemed necessary to the welfare of the State."[60]

Another local unit, a remnant of the Middle Ages, was the manor court, still active in the seventeenth century. This court, presided over by the lord's steward, who in turn supervised the bailiff, concerned itself with administering the common lands of the manor, appointing the drivers, poundkeepers and hog-reeves, and adjudicating the petty concerns of the peasantry. There was sometimes more than one manor within a parish, and thus the two units did not necessarily coincide, though the lord of the manor was often likely to be one of the justices of the peace. The position of the justice of the peace involved his being not only the principal officer of the countryside but also the landlord of most of the persons with whom he dealt.[61]

Yet manor and parish aside, it was actually at the *county* level that the true focus of English local government was to be found, the county (shire) being the intermediary between crown and subject. The military commander of the county was the lord lieutenant, usually a peer, who was chosen by the king and who in time of emergency appointed militia officers from among "the eldest sons of the chiefest gentlemen or others of like behaviour in every shire."[62] Just below the lord lieutenant in dignity, and also appointed by the king, was the high sheriff, nominally the county executive officer. Yet as a matter of actual practice it was the justices of the peace who exercised most of the powers theoretically held by the sheriff; it was they who acted as the chief link between the crown and the overlapping parochial and manorial units. They too were designated by the king from among the gentry of the county, and were supervised by the King's Council and the King's Bench. These justices, meeting four times a year in the Court of Quarter

[60] *Ibid.*, I, 40.

[61] *Ibid.*, II, 69–76.

[62] Gladys S. Thompson, *Lords-Lieutenants in the Sixteenth Century* (London, 1933), p. 87.

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Sessions, constituted the supreme authority of the county, and all its major judicial, administrative and even legislative concerns were in fact handled by this body.[63] They heard criminal cases, and inextricably mingled with this jurisdiction was the bulk of the civil administration as well—the maintenance of the king's gaols, the fixing of wages, the suppression of disorderly houses, and like matters. The justices were grouped about the county in such a fashion that they might also meet in Special Sessions for less weighty affairs, such as the enforcement of certain statutes and the hearing of nonjury cases. Finally, an informal organization of Petty Sessions, or Privy Sessions, made it possible for two or three local justices to meet at the village inn or at one of their own houses for the transaction of parish business—for appointing overseers of the poor, sanctioning the rates, or committing offenders for trial at Quarter Sessions. Here was a thoroughly undemocratic and thoroughly responsible governing body.[64]

Let us conclude with a profile by which we may make concrete the infinite distance traveled by the New England frontier community in a single generation, not only from Suffolk and Essex but from Charlestown and Boston. Such a profile may be discovered in the town of Hadley.

In 1659 an event by then familiar in New England occurred in the Connecticut valley. The settlements which had been established there some twenty-odd years before by Thomas Hooker and his dissatisfied flock had themselves generated dissatisfactions by their religious policies, and a number of Hartford and Wethersfield citizens prepared to depart for a

[63] One is reminded in this respect of the Virginia county court. See *supra*, p. 573.

[64] Webb, *op. cit.*, I, 290–96. This was a setting in which it would be quite *unnecessary* for the villagers to trouble themselves about the affairs of their community. Contrasted with the American experience, this still appears to be true to a surprising extent even today. Mr. Merton, in the study noted above, calls attention to a survey made by Mass Observation of eleven places in England, including several "housing projects", in which housewives were interviewed. "There was no single reference to political activities, practically none to any local authority except insofar as it was a landlord, and only a few to various forms of social, cultural and religious activity." It follows from our analysis that one would have to look into the structure of leadership in these communities before it would be proper to tax the people there with want of civic virtue.

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more congenial location outside of Connecticut. Among them was Thomas Hooker's son Samuel. The General Court of Massachusetts considered them to be estimable persons and were happy to "remove all obstacles out of theire way" and to grant them land—"that this wildernes may be populated and the majne ends of our coming into these parts may be promoted."[65] The town of Hadley, about forty miles north of Hartford, was thus established, being named for Hadleigh in the county of Suffolk, heart of East Anglia. It had probably been centuries since a new settlement had been planted in Old England. Yet in New England the frontier—that fact unprecedented—had regularly for thirty years performed a now-recognized function; dissidents and ambitious young men might withdraw and set up new communities. In addition a check on the governmental structure was ever present: should the magistrates of the General Court remain too inflexible they stood to lose their best and most energetic citizens.

When the lands of Hadley were divided in April 1659, the largest share was only four times greater than the smallest, each of the heads of families receiving homelots and arable fields. In 1662 three young bachelors, John Taylor, John Ingram and William Pixley, formerly servants, arrived and applied for land, and each was granted property worth one-fifth the value of the town's largest holding.[66] Not a village in all England had witnessed such an occurrence as this, so simply noted in Hadley's annals. The barest fraction there would be "assessed to the rates"; there, we might imagine Taylor, Ingram and Pixley being employed in the parish workhouse.[66a]

Master John Russell (Harvard '45) was engaged by the town to be its first minister and was supported for many years at a salary of £80 per annum. Though his relations with the town were generally satisfactory, he appears to have alienated some members of his congregation, and in 1687 they cut ten pounds from his stipend.[67] One man in the English parish, it will be remembered (the local nobleman), had the "presentation

[65] Judd, *Hadley*, p. 21.
[66] *Ibid.*, p. 33.
[66a] See *supra*, p. 593 and note 59.
[67] Judd, *op. cit.*, pp. 52–53.

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of the living"; even the "chiefest and most discreet" of the parish (the vestry) had little or nothing to say in such matters.

A town meeting was established forthwith and a board of selectmen chosen. So vital was it that all be present at meeting that rules were made to enforce regular attendance; a fine of six pence was levied for a half-hour's tardiness and twelve pence for not arriving within the hour. The selectmen might transact ordinary business themselves, but such matters as "admitting inhabitants, giving of land, laying out highways, alienating fences and properties, erecting common buildings. . . , levying of rates, and some other things" must be done in meeting.[68] The range of business facing this community was clearly not such as could be handled by two or three justices of the peace meeting in Privy Sessions at the village inn.

It was in due course voted by the town that a meetinghouse be erected and a committee formed—Mr. Clarke, Lieutenant Smith, Mr. Westwood, and divers Goodmen—"to manage the work, order the form, call out men, and set the wages of men and teams."[69] Here, all must be made new. In England, the charm and loveliness of rural parish architecture lies in features added one by one, organically, through the centuries; scarcely a parish church exists but whose origins are lost in antiquity: nothing there is new; no one knows who "managed the work", who "called out the men".[70]

[68] *Ibid.*, pp. 76–77. [69] *Ibid.*, p. 50.

[70] "When the Domesday Survey was made in 1086, the Suffolk churches are stated to have amounted in number to 364, but it is difficult, for two reasons, to make any definite assertions about the exact number of churches at the period.

"Firstly. The Survey does not enumerate all the churches. . . .

"Secondly. The parts of a church are given, but it is impossible so to reckon the parts as to form a whole." V. B. Redstone, "Chapels, Chantries and Gilds in Suffolk", *Proc. Suffolk Inst. of Arch. & Nat. Hist.*, XII, 1–2 (Ipswich, 1904).

So dense is this texture of age that the features of the parish church may be identified for the English traveler in terms almost resembling a geological description—with perfect assurance that he will recognize their meaning. Take, for instance, this typical note in a Suffolk guidebook on the church at Hargrave: "a small Norman building, with Early English chancel of the time of Henry III. The doorways plain late Norman, the east window a good triplet, and the side windows of the chancel double lancets. There are sedilia, and a double Early English piscina. Some of the windows, and the font, are Perpendicular, as is the lower part of the tower. . . ." H. R. Barker, comp., *West Suffolk* (Bury St. Edmunds, 1907), p. 161.

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The five selectmen, the most important officers in the town, were chosen by popular election; for a century they would rarely be elected two years in succession. There were raters, constables and a recorder; there was a sealer of weights and measures and a "Clark of the writts"; there were tithingmen, surveyors, measurers, fence-viewers, and "commissioners to end small Causes." There were officials with quaint medieval names and traditional functions—hogreeves, pig-ringers, and haywards[71]—but here there was no lord's steward to appoint them and order their business. They must be chosen by the town. In all, there were thirty-five offices to be filled in a community of forty-seven families. The duties to be performed and the decisions to be made went much beyond those which might traditionally, as in the land of their fathers, be rotated among a dozen of the chief householders. In the tranquillity of the English hamlet these people would have been spared these burdens; the political experience being acquired by so many and under such stress at Hadley would never have been needed there. A distinction existed in Massachusetts Bay between "freeman" and "nonfreeman", and it must have existed at Hadley as well. But at Hadley such a distinction would have been a luxury: it is rarely alluded to in the town records.[72]

When in 1662 a "shire" was organized in western Massachusetts—Hampshire County—there were but three towns within its jurisdiction. This meant that the residents of Hadley were given even further "opportunities" for service in public capacities. There was a county court, but no king to appoint its judges. They were elected by the people. Unlike the English Court of Quarter Sessions, which took cognizance of literally everything concerning the county, this court did not even have full criminal jurisdiction, capital causes being tried at Boston. An entry of 1678 shows Jane Jackson, a servant, sentenced to 20 stripes for

[71] Judd, *Hadley*, pp. 77–79.

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 77. In a recent essay on freemanship it is asserted that such a situation as this was quite general—that the limitations placed upon voting or office-holding by nonfreemen, especially in local affairs, were in fact very slight. Besides, it was much easier to become a freeman, and their number was far greater, than is commonly supposed. E. Katherine Brown, "Freemanship in Puritan Massachusetts", *Am. Hist. R.*, LIX, 870–71, 872–74, 876 (July 1954).

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stealing from her master and lying about the theft, an offense for which she would have been hanged in England.[73] The difference need not be accounted for by loftier sentiments of humanity, but it does indicate a higher premium on manpower.

The Hadley militia mustered annually. But here there was no king's lord lieutenant, no "eldest sons of the chiefest gentlemen" from whom he might select the officers. Here, the officers were elected by their men; here, no ready-made structure of leadership existed. No savages lurked in the bosky groves of Old England; at Hadley, the danger was omnipresent for every member of the town. "Every man was compelled to go to meeting armed, or to pay a fine of twelve pence, and his arms were not to be stacked at the door but were to lie ready in his hand."[74] Fundamental military choices had to be made by the people of Hadley during the terrible days of King Philip's War in 1675. September 18, writes Increase Mather,

> was a black and fatal day, wherein there were eight persons made Widows, and six and twenty Children made Fatherless, all in one little Plantation, and in one day; and above sixty Persons buried in one dreadful Grave.[75]

The "plantation" was the little town of Deerfield and the "dreadful grave" was at Hadley. The following month Springfield was attacked and burned. John Russell wrote to the governor:

> Our town of Hadley is now like to drink next (if mercy prevent not) of this bitter cup; we are but about 50 families and are now left solitary. We desire to repose our confidence in the eternal and living God who is the refuge of his people, and to stand ready to do and suffer his will in all things. To his grace I commend you.[76]

This placed Hadley on the very edge of the Massachusetts frontier, and although Hadley did not suffer the fate of Deerfield, its people were faced with heart-breaking decisions which were not only military but even diplomatic in nature. They involved relations with friendly or neutral, though potentially hostile, tribes, and for those in policy-making positions a mistake might

[73] Judd, *op. cit.*, p. 98.
[74] Alice M. Walker, *Historic Hadley* (New York, 1906), p. 29.
[75] Increase Mather, *History of King Philip's War* (Boston, 1862), p. 86.
[76] Judd, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

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cost them their homes and families, as well as those of their neighbors. To this might be counterposed the picture of the English vestry, discussing the church rate.[77] Questions involving hostile nations were of course handled at Whitehall. Foreign affairs, even to the lords of the manor and justices of the peace, were as remote as another world.

Among the first settlers of Hadley was a worthy citizen who may well represent for us the prototype of the man of the future. He was Joseph Kellogg, originally a weaver of Boston and of Farmington, Connecticut. We have already met his great-great grandson on the frontier of Illinois—Seymour Kellogg, first settler in Morgan County, in 1818. Joseph was induced by the Hadley engagers to come there and operate a ferry across the Connecticut River, an occupation in which he prospered. We do not know what contributions he may have made to the affairs of Boston or Farmington, but it is certain that his presence was a substantial blessing, in the course of the years, to the town of Hadley. Joseph Kellogg, a man of middling estate, built his home, operated the ferry, managed his farm, and at the same time was most active in the public affairs of his community. He sat on the school committee and served as a selectman for eight terms. He fought in King Philip's War as a sergeant in the Hadley militia, became an ensign in 1678, and in the following year was made lieutenant, second only in rank to Captain Aaron Cooke. He died at three score and ten, esteemed in the memory of his fellow citizens.[78] Could such a virtuous and honorable career ever have beckoned to the simple weaver of Hadleigh in Suffolkshire?

It was in a figurative sense Joseph Kellogg and his numerous descendants, rather than John Winthrop and his, who pointed the way to Canton, to Marengo and Paoli and Corydon, to Jacksonville and points west. It is not easy to grasp the profound gulf between the experiences which had formed their respective characters. Kellogg had found himself in a setting where the making of important decisions needed *his* assistance; *he* had faced risks which his father had never known. Winthrop,

[77] Such a decision was, in any case, certified by higher authority.

[78] Judd, *op. cit.*, pp. 32, 46, 47, 68, 173, 211, 523, 620–21.

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from his youth, had been trained to make his own decisions. The Massachusetts frontier had brought more problems than he and his Assistants alone could handle; here, Joseph Kellogg found himself for the first time called upon to help solve them.

The basic thing had happened during his lifetime. The proprietor of the ferry, the landowner, the man who had commanded troops in battle, was no longer the weaver of Suffolk. At Hadleigh, the weaver might sometimes have watched his betters march off to honor and glory; at Hadley, Lieutenant Kellogg had no betters to protect him from King Philip's tomahawks. The prosperity of the community was little of the weaver's concern, but to Selectman Kellogg, each new bakery, each new sawmill, could instantly be seen in terms of shillings and pence. Tocqueville by the 1830s could see what had happened to Joseph's descendants on their westward trek; he could see that the Seymour Kelloggs, the Wesley Parks, the Samuel Coulters, had lost their English reserve and had acquired a vast self-confidence; the strident twang had replaced the softer accents of East Anglia: these men addressed him "as if addressing a meeting."

In certain respects it was in Virginia, after all, that John Winthrop's line was carried forward. There may have been faint welcome there for the Puritan, but when it came to leadership, Winthrop's political heirs would have found their places on the county court. Respect and deference would have surrounded them there; their careers would have been distinguished by intelligence and responsibility; *their* sons would have sat with the Thomas Bibbs, the Claibornes, the Harry Toulmins of Alabama and Mississippi.

3

It was among the Kelloggs and the Coulters that Frederick Jackson Turner grew up; it was to them that his devotion went; in them he found all that was prime and virtuous. It was thus characteristic that he should combine *their* virtues with those of Thomas Jefferson, never doubting but that these should go hand in hand. It was characteristic, that is, of a society which has always pooled its virtues as well as its experience. And yet the merits of Thomas Jefferson and those, say, of Stephen

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Douglas were of a different order altogether, stemming from a different order of experience. The attributes of Murray McConnel were not those of Thomas Bibb; Samuel Coulter's excellence was not of the same kind as that of Bezaleel Wells (indeed, we would probably have liked Wells better). We now understand that George F. Babbitt was after all a decent sort—but a *different* sort entirely from "Marse Chan". They are all separated by a gulf which is real, by the experience of solving problems and making decisions in places where there were not enough Winthrops, enough Jeffersons, Bibbs and Marse Chans to go around. A society of greater refinement and grace might have resulted if there had been. Even Turner never quite understood this, and one of his most distinguished critics has called it to our attention. "If his essays mean what they appear to mean," writes George Pierson, "then the doctrine is that we were most American just when we were least cultivated."[79]

Yet everything has its price, and it is particularly appropriate in a business culture that this be understood. If it is, we may safely award Frederick Jackson Turner his due. His insight may indeed have been crude in form, but, crude as it was, for sixty years it has remained in many ways the closest thing that we have had to a seminal contribution to the theory of American history.

Yet Turner, after all, has been preëmpting the frontier long past his time. It should no longer be necessary to force literal meaning from his texts, now that they have entered our cultural metaphor. At the same time a host of problems may be examined with fresh interest if we put in testable terms facts which he knew by instinct: the fact that the experience forced by the frontier was unique—that in a century of westward expansion it was repeated over and over, that in a multitude of forms it found its way into the daily habits of the people, making Americans truly and profoundly different from anyone else in the world.

Stanley Elkins
Eric McKitrick

New York City

[79] George W. Pierson, "The Frontier and American Institutions", *New England Quarterly*, XV, 234 (June 1942).

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REVIEWS

History of Economic Analysis. By JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER. Edited by Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter. New York, Oxford University Press, 1954.—xxv, 1260 pp. $17.50.

The ambitious task that the late Professor Schumpeter attempted is best presented in the description he supplied the publishers: "The book will describe the development and the fortunes of scientific analysis in the field of economics, from Graeco-Roman times to the present, in the appropriate setting of social and political history and with some attention to the developments in other social sciences and also in philosophy. The ideas on economic policy that float in the public mind or may be attributed to legislators and administrators, whether or not embodied in elaborate systems, such as liberalism or solidarism and the like, which are commonly referred to as economic thought, come in only as part of that setting. The subject of the book is the history of the efforts to describe and explain economic facts and to provide the tools for doing so."

At his death in 1949, Schumpeter was still engaged in his burdensome task. His widow was, fortunately, an economist in her own right; with the help of able former students and colleagues of Schumpeter, she spent her few remaining years assembling manuscripts and editing the volume. For sheer massiveness the treatise is unparalleled in Anglo-American economic literature. More than twenty large-sized pages were necessary to contain the index of authors who move across 1184 pages of text.

To set the stage, Schumpeter begins with a 50-page introduction on "Scope and Method", where he discusses the "Techniques of Economic Analysis", "Contemporaneous Developments in Other Sciences", and "The Sociology of Economics". The history proper is divided into three sections of approximately equal size. The first, from antiquity to 1780, traces the story up to the emergence of economics as a recognized special field; the second, from 1790 to 1870, covers the "classic" period; and the third, which extends roughly to World War I, covers the "neo-classical" period. The conclusion, a 50-page section, deals with "A Sketch of Modern Developments", of which a substantial part is devoted to Keynes.

For the specialist in economic theory, the volume will be a serviceable reference book, for here Schumpeter utilized fully his exceptional gifts as a master economist, linguist and bibliophile. And what might other-

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wise have become a dull account is enlivened by Schumpeter's love of controversy. He was an encyclopedist with a persistent point of view.

To Schumpeter the ideal economic analyst is the gifted mathematical economist. Consequently, the greatest economist is Leon Walras, "whose system of equations, defining (static) equilibrium in a system of interdependent quantities, is the Magna Carta of economic theory" (p. 242). But this does not prevent Schumpeter from finding some merit even in men whom respectable historians generally dismissed to the underworld of popular economic thought; notably Henry Carey and Henry George. Again, while Schumpeter does not rate Sismondi highly as an analyst, still he says "some of his recommendations—for example, the recommendation that employers should be made to guarantee their workmen security against unemployment, sickness, and destitution in old age—are among his most genuinely original contributions" (p. 494).

One is moved by Schumpeter's passion as he contrasts the flashy but famous Werner Sombart with the "indefatigable research worker", Arthur Spiethoff. He comments that the "difference between the fame of the two men—not only with the public at large—provides food for thought on the subject of the sociology of science" (p. 816).

In such a massive undertaking, errors and ambiguities were bound to occur. Thus we are left with the impression that the three authors of the famous Bullion Report of 1810 agreed in the "analysis" of the depreciation of the exchanges (p. 707). We know, however, from the correspondence of one of the authors, Francis Horner, that while they had agreed on the remedy—resumption of specie payments—they had disagreed as to the causes. Justus Erich Bollmann, whom students of American history know as a member of the "Burr Conspiracy", is correctly described as occupying a "considerable position in the history of the theory of banking in America" (p. 714); but the pamphlets on which Schumpeter based his verdict were published in England in 1819, and dealt with the monetary controversy in England.

In view of the influence of General Francis A. Walker in bringing about the renovation of economic theory in England as well as in the United States, Schumpeter should have supplied more concrete evidence for his opinion that Walker's contribution has been overrated. Schumpeter's evaluation in an earlier work (*Economic Doctrine and Method*) that Walker was a very original thinker would, I think, still hold.

Finally, Schumpeter's ebullience occasionally led him to pass judgments on matters beyond the competence of an economist. The world of science in general, as well as Yale University in particular, will be surprised to learn from his account that Yale produced only "two stars of the

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first magnitude" in the field of science, Irving Fisher and Willard Gibbs (p. 871).

These are minor defects of a provocative work in the characteristic Schumpeterian manner.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY JOSEPH DORFMAN

The Logic of British and American Industry: A Realistic Analysis of Economic Structure and Government. By P. SARGANT FLORENCE. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1954.—xvi, 368 pp. $5.00.

Professor Florence has pioneered in the statistical analysis of the organization of industry. His latest book presents an extension and revision of his findings, based on research undertaken over a considerable period in the past. The scope of Florence's work is remarkable. His discussion ranges from such topics as the determinants of the size of plants and firms, to the relative efficiency of private and socialized industry, and to the obstacles to industrial efficiency raised by the British system of education.

If the book can be said to have a central theme, it is that production on a large scale is more efficient than production on a small scale, but is often obstructed by the illogic, ignorance or incompetence of producers and consumers. Moreover, production on a large scale involves problems of organization within the firm (at this point Florence discusses, in considerable detail, the "hierarchical", "functional" and "line-and-staff" systems of management organization) as well as problems of external control over the firm, which can be solved by the wise application of techniques ranging from anti-trust laws to nationalization.

These propositions are not novel, but the author claims that while others have relied on casual observation and conjecture, his own conclusions are developed by sound reasoning from carefully observed and measured facts. He describes his work as a realistic analysis of the logic of industrial structure, and the implied emphasis is on the words "realistic" and "logic".

The high standards thus set by the author are, however, frequently not met. To some extent this is inevitable, since there simply is not enough information for a completely realistic and comprehensive study of industrial organization. It is impossible to discuss the important and controversial problems in this field without considerable reliance on conjecture and plausible but untested assumptions. It is irritating, however, to find this aspect of Florence's work glossed over by the continual insistence that his analysis is "realistic".

In particular, a careful examination of chapter ii reveals that the "bold

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proposition" that "large scale production tends to result in maximum efficiency" (p. 48) remains at the end of the chapter, as it is at the beginning, a "working hypothesis" unproved by data, and clinging uneasily to a foundation of "logic", in the face of the admitted numerical predominance of small firms in many industries. Since a firm may be "small" in relation to others in its industry and in relation to its market, and yet "large" as far as the "logical" conditions of maximum efficiency are concerned, no amount of reasoning can tell us much about the relative efficiency of actual firms of different sizes.

While the lack of data is an inevitable handicap, Florence has not by any means fully exploited all the data that are available, and the statistics that are used are not always analyzed as fully as readily available techniques would have permitted, so that much of the information is wasted. For example, by assuming that concentration of employment in the largest three firms of an industry is about the same thing as concentration in the largest four firms, the author finds that the general level of concentration is about the same in the United States and Britain. More careful analysis of the same statistics suggests, however, that concentration is higher, on the average, in Britain. In general the similarities in the industrial structure of Britain and the United States, while striking enough, are exaggerated by the use of very rough methods of correlation analysis.

The data supporting the proposition that there has been a rising trend in the ratio of salaried employees to wage earners in manufacturing consist of figures for 1909 and 1939 for the United States, and 1924, 1935 and 1948 for Great Britain (Table IVA, p. 139), even though statistics from other United States censuses (including that of 1947) are available. It is hardly safe to deduce the existence of a trend from two or even three figures, and from an over-all ration which may be affected by changes in the relative size of different industries.

Florence's work is thus characterized by insufficient care in the exploitation of the statistical data, and fairly loose reasoning. It is, moreover, written in an irritating style, with much repetition and many "asides".

Nevertheless, the book contains many significant contributions to our knowledge of industrial structure. Florence's technique for measuring the geographical concentration of industry, and his exploration of the relation between geographical concentration and plant size are major contributions. His discovery of many similarities in the measurable aspects of industrial structure in Great Britain and the United States is also of considerable interest.

G. ROSENBLUTH

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY
KINGSTON, CANADA

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The Public Corporation: A Comparative Symposium. Edited by W. FRIEDMANN. University of Toronto School of Law, Comparative Law Series, Volume I. Toronto, The Carswell Company, Ltd., 1954.—vi, 612 pp. $10.00.

The volume under review undertakes the comparative study of the public corporation in thirteen countries, including six members of the British Commonwealth (Australia, Canada, Great Britain, India, New Zealand and South Africa), the United States, the U.S.S.R., France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Israel. It includes also a discussion of the international public corporation, which, although it shares some legal and organizational problems with the national entities, stands apart from them because of its unique political context.

This collection of essays deals with a large and heterogeneous assortment of institutions, not all of which fit neatly within the editor's working definition: "For the purposes of the inquiry," he writes, "the 'Public Corporation' was broadly defined as an institution operating a service of an economic or social character, on behalf of the government, but as an independent legal entity; largely autonomous in its management, though responsible to the public, through government and parliament, and subject to some direction by the government; equipped on the other hand with independent and separate funds of its own, and the legal and commercial attributes of a commercial enterprise" (p. 541). This definition would not apply to the many corporate bodies with traditionally "governmental" functions, whose incidental treatment in this volume is so useful in helping the reader to distinguish problems inherent in all public administration from those which may result from state provision of economic and social services.

Moreover, the definition strictly construed might well have excluded such prominent nondepartmental enterprises as the Soviet public corporations, which could hardly be called responsible to the public, as well as the German *Bundesbahn* and *Bundespost*, neither of which is a true "legal person". The *Bundespost* is one of those illuminating intermediate forms which in politics as in biology serve to draw attention to the reality underlying the scientist's taxonomy. Like the *Bundesbahn*, it enjoys a convenient legal status (exemplified by its right to sue and be sued in its own name) outside the verbal formula of legal personality. Furthermore, its organizational, financial and budgetary separateness does not involve isolation from the ordinary machinery of government: the *Bundespost* is under the full command of the Federal Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, a member of the government. Inclusion of these "borderline" organizations has greatly enhanced the value of the study to the social scientist and no doubt to the lawyer as well.

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The collected essays, while necessarily not entirely uniform in content, are uniformly excellent in quality, so far at least as can be judged by a reader without legal training. The non-lawyer may well find the treatment of such subjects as the extent to which a public corporation is "under the shield of the Crown" in the British Commonwealth, or the applicability of public versus private law in such countries as France, more exhaustive than he would require. Similarly, the detailed essay by the former Legal Adviser to the British National Coal Board on the whole range of that body's legal relationships will be best appreciated by legal specialists. Nevertheless, the social scientist can profit from the wealth of material on such topics as the history and present extent of public enterprise in the various nations, methods of exercising financial and budgetary control over these concerns, their internal organization, their labor relations, and their relations with ministers and parliaments. To my fellow-economists, I recommend particularly Professor Hazard's valuable résumé of the history and problems of the Soviet corporations.

The empirical nature of the study will also help the student to avoid an error common in discussions of the British public corporation and perhaps not entirely absent in Professor Friedmann's otherwise exemplary "Comparative Analysis" which concludes the volume. This error is the lumping of several different characteristics under the term "autonomy", which is then likely to be treated as an indivisible attribute of a particular institutional form. In considering the public corporation and its related forms, the beginning of wisdom is the distinction among legal convenience, accounting separateness, and freedom from routine financial and employee safeguards. Beyond this, there is that concept of a sphere of independent final responsibility which appears to characterize one of the leading British theories of the public corporation. But these matters are primarily important in the study of laws and institutions as instruments rather than as specimens for formal classification. To the social scientist, the present volume should be useful at the very least as a catalogue of cases for further investigation.

Washington, D. C. Lucile Sheppard Keyes

Regularization of Business Investment. A Conference of the Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research. Edited by Melvin G. de Chazeau. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1954.—xxvi, 513 pp. $8.00.

In this collection of essays, twenty-six corporate and academic economists reëxamine the rôle private enterprise can play in eliminating, or at least decreasing, fluctuations in employment and output through regularization of business investment. Although each essay is a complete unit,

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the book as a whole deals with two closely linked issues: Has private enterprise a self-interested responsibility to dampen business cycles and, if so, how can this responsibility be discharged?

Most of the authors take the position that business does have such a responsibility and concentrate their analyses on the obstacles to increased business investment during depressions and to decreased investment during inflationary booms. It is perhaps ironic that the time when more and more business men and economists recognize these problems is also the time when the exigencies of the defense budget deprive these problems of much of their significance. Coupled with growing awareness of its social responsibilities is post-war management's growing fear of the "prospective costs of failure" to do "something about the business cycle within the framework of a private enterprise economy" (M. G. de Chazeau's paper "Regularization of Fixed Capital Investment by the Individual Firm", p. 89). The major costs of failure apparently include government deficit finance and/or government intervention (D. M. Wright's "Comment", p. 72).

Although the hostility of business men to government control can be easily understood and justified, widespread reluctance to countenance deficit finance during periods of depressed economic activity is less easily explained. Indeed, in the absence of the fear of unbalanced federal budgets during those periodic declines which afflict peacetime capitalist economies, this book need never have been written. Private enterprise would not have to consider assuming a responsibility for which it is so poorly equipped. Competitive conditions in most American industries dictate that even the largest businesses look to their profits if they are to survive. This blunt fact is the rock on which most of the authors founder. Except in the case of a few sheltered industries, such as the utilities and the railroads, the difficulties analyzed by the authors appear insurmountable (more so, however, to the business than to the academic economists). For example, can a business firm reasonably be expected, merely because a boom is in progress, to postpone investments necessary to developing and marketing new products which enable it to displace its competitors? Or, during a depression, can it be expected to invest in new capacity when present capacity is excessive and new capacity may become obsolete before prosperity returns? Overcoming the impressive obstacles to regularization in even the utility and railroad industries probably requires tax adjustments and government loans. In addition, regularization by utilities would require the right to include unused property in the rate base. (See de Chazeau's paper, K. T. Healy's "Regularization of Capital Investment in Railroads", and E. W. Morehouse's "Regularization of Business Investment in the Electric Utility Industry".)

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Despite the care with which most problems are approached, a crucial one remains not only unsolved but almost completely unanalyzed. Although some authors correctly distinguish between fluctuations about low and high levels of average output, no one adequately explains why dampening fluctuations about *low* average output would raise (or even maintain) the average. Admittedly, at a level of *maximum* (or almost maximum) output, additional investment is inflationary, and postponement of investment to later slack periods would raise average output measured over the full cycle.

But there is no inherent reason why dampening fluctuations about a deeply depressed level of output would raise average output—especially if even the most vigorous booms fail to restore full employment. Dampening might reduce uncertainty and conceivably could lengthen the time in which business men require investments to pay for themselves. It might also reduce the reluctance of business men to resort to external financing, but neither occurrence assures higher average output. Efforts directed toward investment regularization may not only be wasted but, worse still, actually reduce "total investment, excluding inventories, . . . over . . . the cycle" (D. B. Woodward's "Appraisal", p. 489).

Despite this defect, the book performs a useful function by bringing between two covers a wealth of material describing investment decision-making and the difficulties involved in regularization. Perhaps the most important message is presented by D. M. Wright in his already quoted "Comment": "Since . . . business cannot by itself, through self-planning, avoid the business cycle, . . . [the] assumption of responsibility will only boomerang violently when the next depression occurs. 'No responsibility without power' is an ancient maxim of political thought . . . as applicable to the case of business enterprise as to any other" (p. 73).

Leon Quinto

Pennsylvania State University

Trade, Aid, or What? By Willard L. Thorp. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954.—xv, 224 pp. $4.50.

Mr. Charles E. Merrill, well-known investment banker, is responsible for the volume entitled *Trade, Aid, or What?* His generous gift to Amherst College in establishing the Merrill Center for Economics made possible the conference on international economic policy which was held at "The Orchard" at Southampton in the summer of 1953. The results of this conference have been assembled and interpreted by the Director of the Center, Willard L. Thorp, in a wise and sophisticated summary. The group who participated in the discussions at the Merrill Center should be expected to produce such a book. It consisted of government officials,

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bankers, business men and publicists who came from abroad as well as from the United States. The amount of material condensed into 200-odd pages is so rich that any comprehensive review would need to be as long as the book itself.

Since World War II, international trade has expanded to levels well beyond those of pre-war days. Per capita productivity throughout the world has grown by leaps and bounds. But the severe strains which still characterize the international economic scene demand continuous attention. The questions to be answered, if tensions are to be lessened, have been summarized in the simple rubric, Trade, Aid or What? But the answer is highly complex. The economists offer no answer in purely economic terms. Even when they agree on objectives to which every country would subscribe—such as "the desirability of a steadily expanding national income, a reasonably equitable distribution of that income, an economic structure and deployment of resources which will make the best use of the latter, a relatively stable course of production and employment, and a reasonable . . . international trade . . ." (p. 16)—these objectives fail to produce agreed answers in terms of specific policies. "The differences in regard to policy making spring principally from two sources: First, from . . . incompatible objectives of policy—stability or progress, equality or incentive, saving or spending, a narrow definition or a wide definition of the group whom policy should benefit; second, . . . [from the] efficacy of different instruments of policy . . ." (p. 22). It is expecting too much to ask the economists purely on their own grounds to decide on wise policy even within the economic field.

Translated into the specific subject matter discussed in concentrated form, the judgment is reached that, while a high degree of free choice will produce optimum use of resources, under some circumstances tariffs are necessary; sometimes quantitative restrictions are necessary; on occasion export and import controls are necessary; at times multiple exchange rates are wise. Likewise, particular domestic monetary, fiscal or financial policies of governments might be more important in their effects on international trade than are some of the more specifically recognized commercial policies which have been mentioned. Furthermore, the domestic policies toward investment may be such as to encourage funds and enterprise to stay at home while domestic policies of other countries may encourage enterprise to stay away.

An example of the interrelationship of problems and policies referred to is the European Coal and Steel Community (p. 85). The United States government had to decide whether or not to lend its influence in Europe to the establishment of this institution. Was it a social arrangement which would be in the interest of the United States? Would it increase

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or hamper European productivity? Would it hinder or liberalize trade? Would it encourage or discourage special subsidies to the two basic industries involved? Would it do away with manipulated freight rates? Would it substitute new cartel agreements for old? The answers to these questions are that the Coal and Steel Community might have good or bad results and that the decision to proceed with the Plan "probably was more important as part of a strategy to unite Europe than as a device to increase the efficiency of the European steel and coal industries" (p. 86). The basic assumption is that, for many reasons, an "integrated" Europe would be "better" than the present Europe.

If this description of the book seems to say that the answer to the question, "Trade, Aid, or What?", is "Trade and Aid and Politics", this would be completely misleading. The wisdom which is so apparent throughout the book lies in recognizing that there are possible alternative commercial and economic policies which, if followed consistently and courageously, can produce conditions in line with national ideals and that in matters of social policy the only people who are certain of answers are those who know little of the problems.

Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr.

University of California
Berkeley

The Impact of Strikes: Their Social and Economic Cost. By Neil W. Chamberlain and Jane M. Schilling. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1954.—viii, 257 pp. $4.00.

There is little correlation between the amount of publicity given to the current national-emergency strike issue and scientific measurement of the actual impact of these strikes. Therefore, the advances being made in the empirical study of strike impact have important implications for national and state policy. Recently, some economists in evaluating strikes, using more precise definitions of national-emergency strikes than that of the Taft-Hartley Act, have concluded that few, if any, prominent strikes are "national emergencies". Professor Chamberlain and Mrs. Schilling of the Yale Labor and Management Center utilize a different and inductive technique to measure the economic and, to a lesser extent, social effects of seventeen strikes in "basic"—coal, steel, railroads—industries on consumers and producers. Their findings are the basis for recommendations for a substantial reorientation in both strike policy and collective bargaining arrangements.

This study's technique involves assessing the current importance of products involved in a strike to both direct and indirect consumers, user-producers and suppliers. The importance derives from a combina-

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tion of relative measures of the cultural necessity (to consumers) or market necessity (to producers); the effect of diminishing stocks on consumption; and the substitutability of other products. These measures, taken as of a day (usually near the strike end), frequently the strike peak, are weighted by the numbers involved in the various groups, then a single total value is assigned to the strike. In measuring strike impact, the authors make provision for the effect of the prevailing economic climate, including the opportunity for recovering "lost" production following the strike's end.

The product of this method, according to the authors, can be put to many uses. Although an individual strike score may in itself have little significance, it provides a basis for ranking strikes for relative impact. Thus, the steel and rail strikes occupy intermediary positions between high and low coal strikes. A fluoroscoping of the patterns of strikes in individual industries is permitted. The effect of railroad strikes on consumers is immediate and inelastic, on producers the effects mount as the strike proceeds; strikes in basic industries have generally affected producers more substantially than consumers; the indirect effects of coal disputes are particularly significant.

There are inherent limitations in the method of which the authors are keenly aware. Data on the effects of strikes are incomplete and uncertain. The devices for translating these into statistical terms are frequently questionable. The end total may be misleading, even for ranking purposes. Strikes of lesser intensity may receive high ratings because they affect large numbers. Strikes affecting the public intensely will receive low scores because they are not permitted to run much of a course. Using a late strike day may reflect growing impact, but not the strike's total impact. Some end totals are open to question—making equal the 1949 steel strike, which occurred during a period of widespread steel unemployment, with the 1946 steel strike during a reconversion period requiring full production. In evaluating the 1949 steel strike and the concurrent coal strike, no account is taken of a likely steel production drop even without a steel strike.

Should the method be a basis for formulating public policy? The varied impacts of strikes analyzed, even in one industry, support the authors' conclusion that any classification approach which singles out certain industries—particularly those affecting consumers—will not serve to reduce major disputes. Specifically, they conclude that coal, steel and railroad strikes have a more basic effect on employment and income than on the consuming public. What is needed, therefore, is administrative flexibility which is not geared to a consumer approach alone. Less justifiable, however, is another sweeping proposal they make to reorient public policy. They favor encouragement of simultaneous bargaining by

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components of complementary industries—coal, steel and General Motors—while not increasing simultaneous bargaining by competing companies. Similar agreement patterns could then be applied elsewhere. Their proposal stems from a rather tenuous finding that concurrent strikes of both basic steel and steel-fabricating plants, such as occurred in 1946, have a lesser impact than serialized strikes. Proposals for such simultaneous bargaining could imply an unprecedented degree of governmental intervention. Appositively, their proposal might well be used to support a disastrous "Balkanization" of bargaining in steel and coal.

Although a first step in strike-impact theory, this study has major significance. The method—which provides a rough estimate of the impact of past strikes, but not of future strikes—needs refining. Its greatest value is to show the need for reëxamination of the bases for present public strike policies.

JOSEPH P. GOLDBERG

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Theory and Method in the Social Sciences. By ARNOLD M. ROSE. Minneapolis, The University of Minnesota Press, 1954.—xii, 351 pp. $5.00.

Arnold Rose, Professor of Sociology at the University of Minnesota, is perhaps best known for his research in the field of race relations and his collaboration with Myrdal on *An American Dilemma*. His writings, however, have also ranged widely over problems of theory and methodology in the fields of sociology and social psychology and the relation of those fields to other social sciences. In the present volume he brings together in revised form some of these earlier contributions accompanied by several new essays.

The volume is not a unified work but rather a collection of essays loosely integrated under five major headings: social theory, values in social research, the contributions of sociological theory to the other social sciences, methodological issues in sociology, and some specific techniques of sociological research. Despite the diversity of topics, two qualities run throughout the work. Rose exhibits powers of critical analysis by pointing to generally neglected methodological and theoretical problems, and he also brings to these problems much erudition from a variety of non-sociological fields.

In general, the work will be maximally useful for the specialized student or established scholar, but it can also serve as a supplement to a general textbook in advanced courses in sociology or social psychology. Professor Rose has supplied a number of aids for students using the work, such as introductory passages for orientation and extensive citations.

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Inevitably, in such a work the essays are of somewhat uneven quality and not of uniform interest. Moreover, the many topics that are touched on produce a certain sense of abortiveness for the reader. A provocative point is made, only to be dropped without further elaboration, while Rose turns to the next topic.

This reviewer found the following essays most worthy of attention. In a new essay, "Voluntary Associations in France", the only empirical research study in the volume, Rose provides valuable comparative information on a problem of continuing interest to social scientists. The relative unimportance of voluntary associations in France is demonstrated and then related to certain characteristics of French society. The essay is an original and significant substantive contribution and incidentally shows the gains from the combination of a variety of research methods, survey techniques, historical, legal and institutional analysis. In the special area of his past work, intergroup conflict, Rose is naturally very good. Two previously unpublished essays, "Some Suggestions for Research on Race and Culture Conflict" and "Group Conflict and Its Mediation: Hypotheses for Research", are systematic treatments of past theory in this field. They present many insightful suggestions for further research, and illustrate Rose's excellent critical powers in evaluating past writings. Two previously published essays, "Public Opinion Research Techniques Suggested by Sociological Theory" and "Problems in the Sociology of Law and Law Enforcement", should be very useful to practitioners of social research. They constitute demonstrations of the potential contribution of social theory to these other fields.

While the remainder of the volume is generally interesting, certain essays appear of minor importance. A listing of some of the other titles will convey an idea of the contents. "A Theory of Social Organization and Disorganization" is a previously unpublished essay which won a prize award of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. The section on "Values in Social Research" contains three essays: "The Selection of Problems for Research", "Where Social Action and Social Research Meet", and "The Social Responsibility of the Social Scientist". The last two sections of the work, on "Methododology" and "Research Techniques", contain such essays as "Generalizations in the Social Sciences", "Popular Logic in the Study of Covert Culture", and "A Deductive Ideal-Type Method". This reviewer wishes Professor Rose had been somewhat more discriminating in a number of instances. Perhaps he should have considered more carefully whether some of the essays, already well known, needed to be reprinted.

HERBERT H. HYMAN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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French Administrative Law and the Common-Law World. By BERNARD SCHWARTZ. New York, New York University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1954.—xxii, 367 pp. $7.50.

More than sixty years ago F. J. Goodnow wrote his pioneer work, *Comparative Administrative Law.* Since then no American lawyer has written a major book on the subject: this is in striking contrast with the great interest in problems of comparative government in faculties of political science and government. After spending fifteen months in France, Professor Schwartz, Director of the newly established Institute of Comparative Law at the New York University School of Law, has written an account of the *droit administratif.*

The comparative lawyer may assign himself differing objectives. He may content himself with an exposition of the foreign system. Or he may, besides giving an account of the foreign constitution in the idiom understood by the lawyers in his own country, point out the similarities and differences in his own system. Or he may go further and attempt a value judgment on the respective merits as a whole of the foreign system and his own law. Wisely, the author has followed the second of these three methods, although he does in his final chapter consider some possible reforms in the light of French experience.

The mainspring of French administrative law is of course the *Conseil d'Etat.* Napoleon remodeled the successor of the old *Conseil du Roi* in order to obtain for himself direct control of the Executive. It has become not only the chief adviser of the Executive but also a court of justice which affords to the citizen a quite remarkable degree of protection against the Executive. Its personnel is mostly drawn from those who have passed out at the head of their class in the *Ecole Nationale d'Administration*—they are the élite of the French Civil Service. Of the five sections of the institution, only one performs purely judicial functions, and all the members of that section will have had experience of other administrative duties at some stage in their career. From 1 January 1954 the judicial functions of the *Conseil d'Etat* have been largely appellate; local administrative courts, the *Conseils de Préfecture,* which for a long time have discharged some administrative and judicial tasks of lesser importance, have now been made the general administrative courts of first instance.

In common-law countries it is assumed that the judicial and executive functions should be sharply separated and that as far as possible litigation concerning the Administration should be conducted in the same courts and according to the same laws as those for private citizens. In France

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judicial review of the legality of administrative acts and suits against the Administration are the business of these separate administrative courts. Moreover, the laws which they apply are quite different. In contrast to French private law, there is no code, and the *Conseil d'Etat* has been free to formulate for itself separate principles of public law. In consequence judicial control of the Executive is at once simpler and wider, and the liability of the state to the citizen for damage inflicted on him through the functioning of the Administration is very much more extensive than that of either governments or even private individuals in Anglo-American law.

Professor Schwartz provides a lucid account of these basic principles of French administrative law. At the same time, one has doubts whether he has imparted a full understanding of the system. The slant of his work is toward comparing the effectiveness of judicial review by the *Conseil d'Etat* and by the ordinary common-law courts. (Are not American administrative lawyers now very much preoccupied with the technicalities of judicial review?) It is impossible to evaluate separately the judicial function of the *Conseil d'Etat*. It must be looked at as a whole—as a body with a highly developed *esprit de corps* which (although it is not itself actively engaged in administration) is endeavoring, from a position of detachment, at one and the same time to raise administrative standards of performance and to afford full relief for the citizen where the Administration falls short.

One also has looked in vain for answers to the questions that the French textbooks do not answer. How does the *Conseil d'Etat* rule the Executive? Why do departments habitually do as it orders them, and what happens if they do not? How does the doctrine of precedents compare with that of the common-law system? What is the range of regulatory functions handled by administrative tribunals? Are any of these bodies exercising mixed judicial and administrative functions or are all acts either pure active administration or judicial? Do any statutes give ministers discretion so wide as to curtail the control of the *Conseil*, and, if so, what can the *Conseil* do? What are the procedures of the *Conseils de Préfecture*? How does the scale of damages awarded by the *Conseil d'Etat* compare with ours? The *Conseil* may appoint one third of its councillors from outside the Civil Service: does it?

A Court of Conflicts decides disputes whether a case is within the jurisdiction of the civil or the administrative courts. Professor Schwartz rejects the system of separate courts on the ground that "justice for the citizen in France is all too often a process of marching the king's men up the hierarchy of one set of courts, only to have them march down again

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to the set in which the citizen should have been brought in the first place." He shows that it *can* happen that the litigant might proceed in each of the three courts before, after long delay, he is able to have his case decided. What he does not show is: how often does this happen?

The book purports to compare French law with Anglo-American law. Your English reviewer is constrained to point out that the comparison, as far as it relates to England, is perfunctory. Professor Schwartz has discharged with thoroughness and accuracy his primary task of introducing to the American reader the essentials of the leading French textbooks on administrative law: one hopes that his book will inspire some much-needed detailed studies of the French system in action.

HARRY STREET

THE UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM, ENGLAND

Why Dictators?: The Causes and Forms of Tyrannical Rule since 600 B.C. By GEORGE W. F. HALLGARTEN. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1954.—xiv, 379 pp. $5.50.

Dr. George W. F. Hallgarten, well known for his *Imperialism Before 1914*, has written an extremely readable historical and sociological survey of the forms of dictatorship from the tyrants of ancient Greece to Mao Tse-tung. In his method of a comparative analysis of the political technique of dictatorship he acknowledges the influence of Max Weber. By this method he wishes to prove "that there were typical situations—both economic and social—in which certain kinds of dictatorships arose, and were, indeed, bound to do so whenever the basic situation repeated itself" (p. 2). Dictatorships, in contrast to despotism, are, according to Hallgarten's definition, always supported by broad masses which are pushed into action by a social crisis or revolution. For this reason, until the most recent times dictatorships have been restricted to the Western world with its city life and city capitalism.

Dr. Hallgarten distinguishes four types of dictatorships, which he calls classical, ultra-revolutionary, counter-revolutionary and pseudo-revolutionary. The most frequent type has been the first one, found in ancient Greece and Rome, in the Renaissance and in Reformation England, reaching its modern climax in the two Napoleons and living on today mostly in the Hispanic world. The rule of these dictators, as the author states (p. 104), almost always strengthened the development of money economy, and thus led to the growing emancipation of masses. As a feature of lasting significance, this progressive social movement cut straight across the political reaction which followed the downfall of most of these

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men, and tended to shorten that reaction considerably. The ultra-revolutionary dictators, from Savonarola and Robespierre to Lenin, tried to make the lowest masses rule society. Finally counter- and pseudo-revolutionary dictators led their revolution "with permission from above." Here many readers may question the author's background philosophy, as when he writes (p. 183), "While a Nietzsche felt urged to compel the sinking feudal stratum to make a last-ditch stand, it caused others to offer the collapsing class their doubtful services as saviors of society", or when he describes Nietzsche as a man who "though not himself of noble birth had a family background which made him, a half-orphan mainly brought up by women, still more conservative and domineering than the staunchest aristocrat" (p. 191). In reality, the typical pseudo-revolutionary dictators like Hitler and Mussolini rejected all established orders, monarchy and aristocracy, all traditional hierarchies and faced only their egos and the masses.

The last part of the book deals with dictatorships in the present world and contains many shrewd observations. The author insists rightly on a common trait of Hitler and Stalin and their movements, their hostility to the West and to Western traditions. The German nationalists and the Russian Communists were at one in regarding the Weimar Republic as too Western and democratic. The underlying attitudes are even more similar than the author allows when he writes (p. 306) that Hitler looked down upon the West as dirt and decay while Stalin hated it for its wealth and capitalism. Stalin and the Slavophiles had equally regarded the West as decaying, while Hitler, as Spengler and many Prussian militarists did, despised capitalism and money-power. Very happily Dr. Hallgarten defines the U.S.S.R. foreign policy (p. 331) as a system of revolutionary expansion with predatory traits. Just as in the expansion of the French Revolution, motives of revolutionary propaganda, of political security and of exploiting foreign countries are inextricably mixed. The U.S.S.R. foreign policy occupied those geographical spaces the French Revolution failed to penetrate. As the Russian nationalist Danilevsky and the French historian Michelet foresaw a century ago, it was Russia's claim of having solved the peasant problem (which the propagandists of Alexander II claimed as achieved by the peaceful emancipation of the serfs with their land and which Stalin's propagandists claimed to be achieved by expropriation and collectivization) that became the vehicle of successful revolutionary penetration.

HANS KOHN

CITY COLLEGE OF NEW YORK

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Politics and Opinion in the Nineteenth Century: An Historical Introduction. By JOHN BOWLE. New York, Oxford University Press, 1954.—512 pp. $4.50.

The truth of a political theory, Mr. Bowle states (pp. 465, 477, 482), is to be assayed by pragmatic standards. Some theories have promoted life—these are true. Others have brought ruin—these are false. By the end of the eighteenth century, we are told, through the long development described in his earlier *Western Political Thought*, there had been worked out from Hellenic, Hebrew, Roman and Christian origins a true and healthy tradition, that of "constitutional commonwealth". How far was this enriched or diminished by each of the theorists of the nineteenth century? As we answer this question we shall be passing judgment on the validity of each theory. To aid us in our task the author summarizes the ideas of thirty-seven men.

This book, although it probably will be a favorite in undergraduate courses in the history of political thought, is disappointing. It has several of the commendable qualities and features of the other volume—a fluent style, short biographical sketches in the footnotes, succinct expression—but it seems superficial. The synoptic technique, while not the best, will produce a tolerable result when one deals with Aristotle, St. Thomas, or Hobbes. But an author who contributes only sprightly brevity to a piece on Godwin, Acton, Sorel, or Mazzini is not likely to help his readers toward an understanding of the nineteenth century. Mr. Bowle has done little—besides noting that an agrarian society was being supplanted by an industrial, urban, world-wide society—to depict the vast complex of constitutional, social and national revolutionary movements that prompted many of his theorists to take up their pens. Disregarding his title, he has not woven in the background of popular opinion. This concentration on books and pamphlets would be quite reasonable if Mr. Bowle had undertaken to analyze, rather than merely to repeat tersely, the views contained in these writings. The fact remains, however, that the usefulness of his book, within the strict limits of its type, is assured generally by the industry and honesty with which the author has prepared his short digests.

The only section by which the student is likely to be misled is the one dealing with Hegel. Scarcely two pages (pp. 39–40) are allotted to the long, elaborate argument—the major part of *The Philosophy of Right*—in which Hegel sought to show that certain institutions and rights, such as private property, the monogamous family, equality before the law regardless of race, religion or estate, publicity of trials, due process of law, were inevitable consequences of the human capacity for conscious action. No mention whatsoever is made of Hegel's controversial views on public

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opinion and on governmental institutions; and these are important in any discussion of democracy. Surely Hegel's notion of dialectic development and the logical and historical difficulties thereof are too central in the system to be passed over in one casual paragraph. Mr. Bowle's criticisms of Hegel, directed mainly at the "international" side of his theory, do little to improve the discussion. He charges (p. 41) that "*The Philosophy of Right* and *The Philosophy of History* contain most of the nonsense which has subsequently bedevilled political thought." He accuses Hegel of giving "joyous acceptance" to war and of glorifying conflict. Hegel's limitations, he writes (p. 41), "were to prove singularly pernicious." Yet, it can be argued that Hegel was not attempting to devise an account of the past that would pass our author's pragmatic test—that is, the promotion of human "adaptation to environment" (p. 11)—and that instead he was explaining, without such ulterior motive, what he believed actually happens in history. What he saw was a succession of wars and rumors of wars wherein high character did not preserve men from death and wherein noble cultural achievements did not shield cities from destruction. This cheerless analysis may be quite wrong. Nor did Hegel have a "bellicose" mind. It is more accurate to say that he found consolation in his faith, which he believed was supported by the incessant development of the Western political tradition, that behind the dismal, disheartening political scene, a better future was being worked out providentially. This hope of progress may be a pious dream, but it dies hard—notice especially Mr. Bowle's plea (p. 24) that man "realize the power and compassion of Mind" and his vision (p. 483) of the "the ordered cities, the far-flung territories, of a World Commonwealth of all Mankind and of the enrichment of life they may express."

In the preface of his earlier work Mr. Bowle said that his survey was no substitute for the originals. The danger of a handy book of summaries is that undergraduates, publishers and even teachers may forget that the ideas that could not be enunciated by their exponents in less than several hundred pages cannot be understood simply by reading fourteen-page digests.

J. B. STEWART

BARNARD COLLEGE

Stresemann and the Revision of Versailles: A Fight for Reason. By HENRY L. BRETTON. Stanford, Stanford University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1953.—xii, 199 pp. $3.00.

This penetrating and judicious study analyzes the policies of Stresemann as Germany's "Locarno" foreign minister (1923–1929) against his background as a former militant pan-German. During World War I, he had

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been a "most vociferous annexationist and militarist" whose "annexationist program was sweeping indeed" (pp. 16–17). The book shows the measure, and the results, of the conversion of this firm believer in *Machtpolitik* to "a spirit of conciliation, international co-operation and humanism . . . whatever ulterior motives one might attribute to him" (p. 3).

His early revisionist policy is summarized by Bretton as having been composed of two elements: the promotion of the stab-in-the-back legend, and "the charge that Allied motives underlying the peace settlement were base and immoral" (p. 26). In 1925, he stated that "Germany's basic military weakness spells out the limits, the nature and the methods of Germany's foreign policy" (p. 38). For Stresemann, the determination to undo the political order resulting from Versailles was axiomatic as a first step toward more far-reaching goals; the crucial question was whether to overcome the "basic military weakness"—as the nationalist opposition demanded and Hitler eventually did—or whether success was obtainable without war, which was Stresemann's position. He stated the following five major objectives, in view of Germany's military weakness: (1) "it was necessary to fight French aggressiveness" (the author seems to accept the thesis of French aggressiveness in the 1920's without substantiating it; see, for example, p. 96); (2) "Germany was to become the center of German minorities in Europe, the core of the German cultural community, the protector of German minorities against" their countries of residence (shadows of the concept of the ethnic *Volk* state which was bound to play havoc with the European system of ethnically nonhomogeneous nation states); (3) Germany's eastern boundaries had to be revised; (4) Germany had to regain some colonies; and (5) she was to promote the self-determination of European peoples, especially with reference to the union of Austria with Germany. According to the author, Stresemann's diplomatic methods showed three major approaches: exploitation of Allied disunity and rivalry; maximum utilization of their fear of the consequences of the Russian Revolution; and utilization of Germany's economic strength, "in order to nullify certain peace arrangements and treaty provisions" (p. 45).

The book shows in considerable detail that Stresemann conceived the Locarno pacts, not as final settlement, but as instruments for future changes without resort to war. "If Germany was to renounce all [territorial] claims in the West, then changes had to be permitted in the East" (p. 119). "Stresemann categorically refused to recognize the finality of the territorial boundary settlement. . . . Future territorial revision was to be assured by the promotion of irredentism in the countries contiguous to Germany" (pp. 152, 153).

The author surmises that, once Stresemann's "pattern of revisionism"

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is established, certain basic diplomatic and political analogies can be drawn with respect to present-day Germany and her international position. His study "seeks to discover the sequence in which the several attacks against the peace treaty—and against the political order resulting from it—were launched" (p. 3). The author states that Stresemann's unpublished papers (*Nachlass*) now available in microfilm in the National Archives in Washington, D. C., tend to strengthen the impression that he "at times found it difficult to extricate himself from his past. . . . Considerations of diplomacy and statecraft tended to alienate the man from his former associates—making them his bitterest enemies. . . ." This, Bretton calls rightly "the principal element in the tragedy and the epic that was Stresemann" (p. 71).

The motivations and aspirations of the great policy-makers, like the national trends they express, are highly complex. Characteristically, even this scholarly and sympathetic study gives some contradictory evaluations of Stresemann's personality and his attitudes on specific topics, for example, his knowledge of German secret armament (pp. 145–147), and so on. Stresemann died with a broken heart because he wanted to combine the un-combinable, namely, the ethnocentric nationalism of old with the supranational necessities of his own day. In spite of his sincere intentions and great acumen, his objectives would, at best, have postponed the true stabilization of Europe and, at worst, as actually happened, fertilize against his will the very forces which were to erupt into disaster within a short time.

JOHN H. E. FRIED

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

The Incompatible Allies: A Memoir-History of German-Soviet Relations, 1918–1941. By GUSTAV HILGER and ALFRED G. MEYER. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1953.—xiii, 350 pp. $5.00.

Gustav Hilger's personal participation in the conduct of Germany's relations with Russia has spanned the entire period from Brest-Litovsk to Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union. Of German parentage, but born and educated in Russia, he was unusually well equipped to understand and interpret Russian developments. His thoughtful account is an important contribution to the history of recent diplomacy, and its value has undoubtedly been enhanced by the scholarly collaboration of Dr. Meyer.

Hilger's work, in 1918, for the repatriation of German prisoners from Russia brought him into close contact with the turbulent life of defeated and revolutionary Russia, and he adds new and vivid details concerning

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Mirbach's assassination in July of that year and the Soviet leaders' fear of German retaliation. His account of the steps, first in the field of prisoner exchange and then in commercial relations, by which German-Soviet contacts were gradually renewed from 1920 on, adds much new detail and fresh perspective. In July 1920 the advance of the Red Armies into Poland and to the borders of East Prussia led to the first formal proposal by Germany for the renewal of political relations, broken in November 1918, only to be rebuffed by the Soviet government in the flush of revolutionary overconfidence.

Little is added to the general accounts of the Rapallo Treaty, but Hilger gives a thoughtful appraisal of its advantages and limitations for both partners. His portrait of Count Brockdorff-Rantzau is an intimate and vivid one, and he adds many new details of the post-Rapallo relations between Moscow and Berlin—for example, concerning the crisis over the abortive Communist uprisings of 1923 in Germany and the conflicts in high-level Soviet policy between the Comintern and the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.

The obscure history of coöperation between the Reichswehr and the Red Army is clarified in part, although here Hilger seems to display great reticence, relying largely on excerpts from the Seeckt archives and on contemporary newspaper accounts. Contrary to the general impression that military collaboration had rapidly shrunk to almost nothing after 1928, it now appears that it continued on a substantial scale into mid-1933, and was then broken off on Soviet initiative. Hilger also adds useful details on the background of the Berlin Treaty of 1926, showing that it was not based on a sudden decision to balance Germany's ties between East and West, but was the result of long negotiation.

Hilger's memoirs reflect the reluctance with which the Soviet leadership, after 1933, sought new ties with the West for its own support against Hitler's hostility, and records, without exaggerating their significance, a number of Soviet soundings for a closer relationship with Germany in the following years. He throws some significant new light on Ambassador Nadolny's sudden dismissal in 1934 after vainly urging his government to improve its relations with Russia. His account of the origins of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939 adds nothing essential to the documentation published by the Department of State, but fills in significant brush-strokes of the atmosphere of German-Soviet coöperation. That he believed that the conclusion of the pact would strengthen peace by persuading Britain and France to press Poland to meet Hitler's minimum demands seems, as he frankly states, naïve in retrospect, but sincerely felt at the time.

Tracing the deterioration of Soviet-German coöperation after August

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1940, Hilger adds little that is significant, but the incidents he describes have the weight of personal participation and clear recollection. He recounts a personal and unauthorized effort which he and Count Schulenburg made, in late May or early June 1941, to urge the Soviet leadership to take the initiative in warding off a German attack by new approaches to Berlin. His conclusion, weighty because of his personal knowledge, is that Stalin believed, in June 1941, that Hitler was building up pressure to demand territorial and economic concessions and that the Soviet leadership was taken by surprise when the attack came out of the blue and without negotiations.

PHILIP E. MOSELY

THE RUSSIAN INSTITUTE OF
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

America, Britain, & Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941–1946. By WILLIAM HARDY MCNEILL. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1953, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs.—xviii, 819 pp. $15.00.

Based wholly on published materials, this monumental volume can offer little that is actually novel to those who have followed closely the events it covers. Nevertheless, the systematic, detailed and lucid history of the Grand Alliance, from its painful forging in the heat of the early war years to its dissolution in the mists of the cold war, will impart fresh insights and heightened understanding to the most indefatigable student of these fateful years.

Inevitably the unity, flow and dramatic quality of Mr. McNeill's account suffer from the persistent demands of methodology and the repetitive pattern imposed by a survey presentation. This loss of the full sense of sustained movement is in a measure compensated for by the clarity of thought, incisiveness of style and maturity of judgment displayed throughout. The heavy weight of nearly eight hundred closely written pages is lifted by a refreshing wit and irony, too often confined, however, to the fine print of footnotes. The author permits himself the luxury of a concluding chapter devoted to reflections and general observations on the significance of the heroic events he has recorded.

From so rich and varied an offering, the informed reader will find much that quite suits his tastes and experience, together with a certain amount that will be less palatable. Among the significant theses and judgments with which this reviewer finds himself in hearty accord, one in particular stands out. Mr. McNeill makes a very strong case against the American practice of separating military and political objectives in the prosecution of the war. The author correctly appraises this aber-

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ration as a "peculiar form of narrow professional specialization, deeply rooted in the traditions of the American army and navy". Lest all the blame seem to fall on our admirals and generals of this period, it is fair to point out this American tradition lost much of its pertinence when, during the years between the two world wars, it hardened into dogma. The twenties and thirties saw the prestige of our military establishment at a very low ebb. Its leaders were subjected so monotonously to demands that they eschew politics and tend to their business, that they can scarcely be blamed for having learned the lesson so well.

Needless to add, our frustrated British allies had no sympathy for so simple a formula to cover the complex relation of military means to political ends. This fact, as Mr. McNeill does not tire of pointing out, lay at the root of much of the conflict between these two partners in the alliance. As for the Russians, so far as they were able to comprehend this formula, they apparently dismissed it as a devious capitalistic fraud. Mr. McNeill does not, of course, always endorse the political objectives of Britain's wartime policy, much less Russia's. He merely emphasizes the grave error of a military strategy often pursued without due regard for transcendent political considerations.

The Russians were notable beneficiaries of this error. To the author's delineation of Stalin's policies, the reviewer must in some measure take exception—not without hastening to admit that, for the foreseeable future at least, no two students of the phenomenon are likely to see eye to eye. In the early pages of his study ("The Russian Outlook"), Mr. McNeill offers a reasonable and realistic analysis of the relation and influence on Soviet policy of (1) Marxist principle and Bolshevist revolutionary drives, and (2) expediency and nationalist-imperialist drives. Throughout the greater part of his narrative, however, the author so emphasizes the motive of expediency as opposed to that of design as to leave the reader quite unprepared for the supposedly abrupt shift in tactics which became obvious in 1944. Apropos of the brutal Soviet reaction to the Warsaw uprising of August, Mr. McNeill comments: "The glimpse of Stalin's Moloch-face which had been fleetingly accorded the West could not be forgotten easily."

This reviewer is impelled to believe that the Soviet dictator early acquired and early exhibited this face. It will seem to many readers that Mr. McNeill's own work demonstrates that Marxian principle and nationalistic expediency in Stalin's policy were no mere mixture of separable ingredients but were, indeed, always present in organic union. This is not to imply that the author leaves his reader with any illusions as to the nature of the threat posed by Soviet policy as it had developed through 1946.

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If readers are certain to disagree with some aspects of Mr. McNeill's analysis of Stalin's motives, they are only less likely to differ with him in his appraisal of Roosevelt's. Though he is no enigma, certainly, in anything like the sense that Stalin is likely to remain, the President's motives, objectives and manner of operating are sure to engender endless controversy. To the present reviewer, however, no single aspect of Mr. McNeill's lengthy work rings more true than his description of the singular mixture of idealism and national self-interest which was American policy, unless it be his analysis of President Roosevelt's rôle in the formation of this policy.

In sum, Mr. McNeill has produced a valuable and distinguished contribution to the history of the Second World War. It is devoutly to be hoped that his informed but forthright treatment of Anglo-American relations will contribute to the further strengthening of the unwritten alliance among the English-speaking nations which both preceded and survived the Grand Alliance itself.

If the undersigned may be permitted to close on a personal note, he would wish to express his satisfaction in reviewing a volume which so successfully follows a course which he himself once charted but was unable to complete.

S. Everett Gleason

Washington, D. C.

The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879–1921. By Isaac Deutscher. New York and London, Oxford University Press, 1954.—xii, 540 pp. $6.00.

It is not a mere irony of fate that Bolshevism came to power in a backward and predominantly peasant land—rather than in an advanced country with a highly developed capitalism and a large working class, as the Bolshevist theory prescribed. The contradiction was sufficiently important to have troubled Lenin in one of his last writings. It is an underlying theme of Stalin's last work, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* And it is, in a way, the nub of Trotsky's tragedy.

Of the three men who became most prominent in fashioning the 1917 revolution, it was Trotsky who was perhaps quickest to sense that the weakness of Russia's social structure afforded a unique opportunity for the Bolsheviks. At other times he seemed aware that Lenin's tight, rigid Communist party organization, designed to function in just such a situation, tended inevitably toward dictatorship, but at the moment of the revolution he accepted this organization completely as the means to power. He himself became loudest in advocating and rationalizing

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dictatorial measures in the name of emergency after emergency which arose from the seizure of power in the midst of chaos. Retention of power was already becoming the end instead of a means. And by the time he clearly realized the logical succession from a very small party acting in the name of a minority working class to a Central Committee acting in the name of the party to a dictator acting in the name of the Central Committee, Trotsky was already fated to be the dictator's outstanding victim.

The story of Trotsky, who epitomized an intellectual and romantic strain in the Russian revolutionaries, is a fascinating one, and it is surprising that so little attention has been paid to him in recent years. There comes to mind only the portion devoted to him in Bertram Wolfe's *Three Who Made a Revolution.* Deutscher points out that "for nearly thirty years the powerful propaganda machines of Stalinism worked furiously to expunge Trotsky's name from the annals of the revolution, or to leave it there only as the synonym for arch-traitor." He adds that "the work of the tomb-robbers has, in this present instance, been so persistent that it has strongly affected the views even of independent Western historians and scholars." However this may be, the fact is that Trotsky's influence on events since the twenties has hardly justified the kind of interest which his figure evoked when he was the first Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs and later Commissar for War, while his times have not receded far enough into the past to attract marked historical interest. Deutscher has performed a useful service in reminding us now of the important rôle which Trotsky played.

Deutscher's first volume, *The Prophet Armed,* covers the period from Trotsky's childhood in the Ukrainian countryside to the end of the Civil War, when Trotsky was at the height of his fame. It describes Trotsky's intellectual awakening; his involvement in the complex Marxist factions and his leadership of the St. Petersburg Soviet in the 1905 revolution; his ten years of exile in Vienna and Paris; his joining with Lenin in 1917, his part in the insurrection and the Brest-Litovsk peace, and his feat of organizing the Red Army in the midst of the Civil War.

The author treats his hero with obvious sympathy, which lends insight to his interpretation of the man; but, while he does not minimize Trotsky's arrogance and other unpleasant qualities, he mars an otherwise scholarly and painstaking work by his admiring emphasis on Trotsky's talents, which should need no underscoring. The description of Trotsky's journalistic career, for instance, contains a number of exaggerations.

Deutscher places great stress on Trotsky's foresight and perceptiveness. Trotsky's ideas were indeed forerunners of many important elements of policy, as in his development of the theory of "permanent revolution",

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his resort to the services of Tsarist Army officers and his "neither peace nor war" formula at Brest-Litovsk. But, often as not, he compromised or vacillated and spoke for two contrary policies within a short period of time, so that his touches of foresight and genius are blurred by his erratic shifts.

Deutscher has made fine use of the Trotsky Archives at Harvard and the rich collection of the Hoover Library at Stanford, and the account of the early differences and clashes among the revolutionaries is illuminating. It was at the moments when great events were in the making, however, that Trotsky's temperament came into its own, and it is in the description of his hero as a man of eloquence and energy in times of crisis that Deutscher's biography is most vivid.

Inevitably, such a man as Trotsky was out of place in the party "politicking" after the revolution succeeded and in the administrative-managerial machine which took over when the Civil War ended; moreover, as an internationalist and a Westernizer Trotsky represented attitudes incompatible with the inward Russian drive which set in when the hopes of revolt in the West died down. By nature and career a romantic revolutionary, he remained one when "the revolution" settled down into "the regime". From that point the line leads inexorably to the assassin's axe in Mexico City in 1940. Deutscher's second volume, *The Prophet Unarmed*, will deal with this latter part of Trotsky's life.

LEO GRULIOW

THE CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS
NEW YORK, N. Y.

The Allies and the Russian Revolution: From the Fall of the Monarchy to the Peace of Brest-Litovsk. By ROBERT D. WARTH. Durham, Duke University Press, 1954.—viii, 294 pp. $4.50.

The theme of this scholarly and informative book is expressed as follows: "Allied policy and diplomacy in the period concerned was based on an almost total lack of understanding of the forces and events of the Russian Revolution. The Allies . . . were primarily concerned with the efficient conduct of the war, but the idealistic reasons for which they were supposedly fighting were nowhere more glaringly contradicted in practice than by their Russian policy."

Professor Warth maintains that the Allies helped to bring about the triumph of Bolshevism by a number of unwise actions: The principal error, he says, was to encourage the Russian Provisional Government to prosecute the war vigorously, thereby weakening the already feeble support which it had among the people. The Government found itself in the embarrassing position of having to reassure

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the Allies of its determination to continue the war, while at the same time promising the Russian masses that it would bring about peace.

Closely connected with this mistake was the refusal of the Allies to proclaim a set of war aims which would have counteracted Bolshevik propaganda to the effect that the war was an "imperialist" one for the seizure of territory. The Bolsheviks consequently were able to strengthen and capitalize on the natural inclination of the Russian soldier to think that he had nothing to fight for.

One of the worst of the sins of the Allies was their support of reactionary General Kornilov in his attempt to overthrow the Provisional Government by force. Kerensky had to seek aid from the armed proletariat of Petrograd who, though temporarily his saviors, soon became his masters. Once the Bolsheviks were in power (says Dr. Worth), the Allies committed the further error of failing to respond to Trotsky's appeals for military aid against the Germans, and thus left the Bolsheviks with no choice but to carry out their intention to ratify Brest-Litovsk.

At times Dr. Warth seems to take excessive advantage of the superiority of hindsight. Of course the Allies were "primarily concerned with the efficient conduct of the war." In 1917 and early 1918 a German victory seemed quite possible, and it was only natural that the Allies were desperately eager to keep Russia in the fight. While the Bolsheviks succeeded in getting Russia out of the "useless slaughter", the only thing that saved them from complete destruction by the Germans was the fact that the Allies continued the struggle. Just as the author tends to be a bit too hard on the Allies, so he is not very charitable toward some of the Russian leaders. It is all too easy to slip into the habit of ridiculing the blindness and indecision of those who failed—Milyukov, Kerensky, and others—without giving them due credit for the fact that, unlike the Bolsheviks, they were not willing to suppress their opponents by dictatorial means.

Another fault is the difficulty of the author in sticking to the subject. It was not necessary to go into the details of Russian participation in the war under the Tsar, the various stages of the revolution, the career of Trotsky before 1917, or British internal politics. It must be said, however, that no matter what his subject, Dr. Warth writes unusually well and shows great skill in the use of colorful quotations.

The book contains an impressive thirty-three-page bibliography of American, British, French, Italian and Russian sources, and, what is more, the author gives evidence of having read them. He has erected impressive arguments on a foundation of solid scholarship.

THOMAS T. HAMMOND

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

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Hungarian Premier: A Personal Account of a Nation's Struggle in the Second World War. By NICHOLAS KÁLLAY. With a Foreword by C. A. Macartney. New York, Columbia University Press, 1954.—xxxix, 518 pp. $6.00.

Nicholas Kállay was prime minister of Hungary from March 1942 until March 1944 when the German occupation ended both his premiership and his country's fragile independence in Nazi-dominated Eastern Europe. In fact, the Nazis had blotted out for a while Hungary's independence once before, when in April 1941 they invaded Hungary en route to Yugoslavia. Premier Count Paul Teleki, in his desperation, committed suicide—but the régime headed by Regent Admiral Nicholas Horthy survived the crisis. Hungary, under Teleki's successor, Ladislas Bárdossy, declared war on Russia, but otherwise the country remained free from direct Nazi intervention and, in comparison with her neighbors, something of an "island of freedom". Bárdossy, however, was of the opinion that it would serve Hungary's interests to become an unequivocal ally of Nazi Germany. Horthy dismissed him, therefore, and it became Kállay's job to keep both Hungary's war effort and her adaptation to Nazi norms in domestic affairs at a minimum. Moreover, as the war progressed and Germany's defeat became a certainty, Kállay tried to disassociate Hungary from Germany and conclude a separate peace.

Kállay succeded in resisting German demands for further troops after the Hungarian army met disaster in the battle at Voronezh; he sabotaged economic coöperation with Germany; he protected the refugees and prisoners of war who found asylum in Hungary from all over Europe; he resisted German pressure to apply the Nazi method of extermination against the one million Jews in Hungary; he established contact with the Western Allies and agreed on the preliminary conditions under which Hungary would turn against Germany. The essential point in this agreement and in Kállay's entire policy was, however, the assumption that the Western Allies would reach the frontiers of Hungary. This they did not do, and Kállay's mission ended in failure when in March 1944 the Germans, who seemed to be well informed about his secret negotiations, occupied Hungary. Regent Horthy was meeting with Hitler in Austria at the time of the occupation and when he returned home he appointed a pro-Nazi cabinet, while Kállay, in order to escape German vengeance, found refuge in the Turkish Legation at Budapest. After Horthy's unsuccessful coup in October, when the Nazi mob took over the power, Kállay was forced to leave his asylum. He landed finally in the German concentration camp at Dachau, where American troops liberated him.

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It was an honorable, although hopeless, attempt Kállay was engaged in, while trying to save his country. Kállay, who is now a member of the Hungarian National Council in exile, claims that he and his associates foresaw "what a Russian victory would mean to us and to the whole world" (p. 349). But, realistic as his views may seem to some people today, it is nothing less than fantastic to believe, as he does (pp. 381–382), that the failure of Anglo-Hungarian collaboration was "one of the essential causes" of the tragedy of half of Europe. Had this collaboration developed, he maintains, Churchill could not have been voted down at the Teheran Conference over the question of attacking in the Balkans. And: "If Hungary could have been made into a base, British and American influence would be prevailing today in the Balkans and on the Danube." The Western Allies, after all, could hardly have risked losing the coöperation of the Soviet Union for the sake of establishing collaboration with Hungary. It was anything but realistic to assume, as Kállay did, that Hungary could stand firm in the East against Russia and coöperate in the meantime with the Western Powers. Nor was the country, as the dreadful events after the German occupation in March 1944 have proved, so solidly united behind Kállay's policy as he expected it to be.

Kállay is right in deploring the shortsightedness of Western policy pursued in Central Europe since the First World War, but he himself is short-sighted enough in overlooking Hungary's decadence under the Horthy régime. He repeats *ad nauseum* Hungary's devotion to the Western values of freedom, democracy, humanism and liberalism, but he pretends not to know how far the reactionary Horthy régime deprived the Hungarians of enjoying these values.

Of course, Kállay's failure to bring over his country to the Allied side was not caused by the lack of democracy inside Hungary. The principal cause of his failure lay in the military realities of the Second World War. In the inter-war period, however, the reactionary, nationalistic policy of the Horthy régime contributed much to the failure of coöperation among the Danubian nations—a failure which played a prominent rôle in Europe's tragic road to the Second World War.

Kállay seems to be little aware of the mistakes Hungary had committed toward her neighbors—although he is anxious to point out the mistakes of the former Little Entente. He singles out especially Eduard Beneš as a target for his critical remarks, and he attributes to Beneš statements that the late President of Czechoslovakia never made, such as, for instance (p. 54): "rather Hitler than the Habsburgs"; or "rather Stalin than the West, rather Bolshevism than peace among the peoples

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of the Danube Basin." Kállay's views, in general, are representative of the old Hungarian ruling class which perished with old Hungary in the Second World War. Since he points out in the preface that his views today differ in many respects from those he had held in the past, it is a great pity that he did not revise his memoirs in the light of his present views. For, in Kállay's memoirs we hear the voice of a perished world only, "speaking as from beyond the grave"—as C. A. Macartney says in his instructive introduction, written with sympathy for Hungary of the past.

STEPHEN BORSODY

PENNSYLVANIA COLLEGE FOR WOMEN
PITTSBURGH, PA.

China's Management of the American Barbarians: A Study of Sino-American Relations, 1841–1861, with Documents. By EARL SWISHER. Far Eastern Association Monograph No. 2. New Haven, Far Eastern Publications, 1953.—xx, 844 pp. $7.50.

In his foreword to this volume, Professor Merle Curti predicts that "the publication of this material will be quickly and generally recognized as a major event in Far Eastern Studies." Now available in English is an extensive collection of the most important Chinese official documents dealing with Sino-American diplomatic relations during twenty formative years. These are selected, for their relevancy to America, from the dispatches sent to the Emperor by high Chinese officials charged with "managing" the Occidental barbarians who were demanding privileges of trade and residence in the Middle Kingdom. Some are Imperial comments and edicts sent through the Grand Council. The 546 selected documents, filling 600 pages in translation, make it possible to study at first hand Chinese policy formation and Chinese attitudes toward the American in China. They complement the already abundant published sources from the American side. The originals have been available in Chinese since 1930, but they were scattered through a vast collection and have been little used. Professor Swisher's tireless labors have resulted in a compact source book that ought to be in every library concerned with America's foreign relations.

In addition to his skillful translating and careful editing, Professor Swisher has provided valuable introductory essays. They treat the history of the documents themselves, the Chinese system of handling foreign affairs during the mid-nineteenth century, and the Chinese

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officials who dealt with American representatives. These essays dispel many illusions. It is clear, for example, that China's relations with the West were not handled casually. The Emperor and his most intimate advisory body, the Grand Council, directed these affairs personally. At the point of contact, Canton or the "Treaty Ports", those responsible for conduct of foreign affairs were important officials, although they often used underlings for face-to-face dealings and were dependent upon Imperial approval for practically all decisions.

The stereotypes which Chinese officials had concerning the "national character" of the Occidential barbarians is revealed from an essay based upon the correspondence between officials and with their Emperor. This furnishes an interesting insight into one of the fundamental problems of intercultural relations. Chinese at first had difficulty in distinguishing between the traits of the English, French, Americans and Russians. All were "by nature inscrutable" or "inherently cunning and malicious". As they began to make comparisons, Chinese officials discovered that "while all barbarians are insatiably avaricious by nature, Russian barbarians are inscrutable and French barbarians are crafty." Americans compared with Russians "are trustworthy and their speech reasonable, but they are very suspicious and obstinate." Chinese officials gradually became convinced that they could expect nothing but good intentions from the United States and no assistance against either the British or the Taipings.

The years 1841–1861 saw a violent readjustment of relations between China and the West. Two wars and two sets of fundamental treaties completely altered the system of intercourse between Western states and China. America's emissaries were such men as Caleb Cushing, Peter Parker, William B. Reed and John S. Ward. Through the writings of the Chinese officials who dealt with them we learn the impression they made and the problems they created. There are suggestions here for many fruitful lines of research. Throughout the work Professor Swisher calls attention to the American documents which correspond to the Chinese series under review. There is an excellent bibliography as well as useful appendices.

This second monograph published by the Far Eastern Association marks an important step forward in making fundamental Chinese historical material available to Western scholars. It is a major event in Far Eastern Studies.

C. MARTIN WILBUR

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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Uruguay: Portrait of a Democracy. By RUSSELL H. FITZGIBBON. New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1954.—xiii, 301 pp. $5.75.

The thesis that communism is not likely to gain much ground in a country in which some other social movement has captured the imagination of the people is borne out by this very well-written book by Professor Fitzgibbon, though he nowhere specifically makes this point.

For the past half-century Uruguay has been the scene of a democratic but nonetheless profound social transformation. During the nineteenth century her history was a dreary succession of dictatorships, followed by revolutions, but she has developed in the twentieth century into the most democratic and probably the most socially advanced country of the hemisphere. Although several previous books have been written on various aspects of the country's extensive social and economic changes, and Uruguay is every once in a while referred to, in what is supposed to be a complimentary fashion, as "the Switzerland of South America", her case has certainly not received the attention which the events in Mexico or Argentina have. But the Uruguayan revolution is important and has the great advantage—unlike the situation across the Rio de la Plata—of presenting a hopeful and optimistic picture. It is for that reason, if for no other, that this book of Professor Fitzgibbon's is both timely and useful. In addition it has the great advantage of being written in a very readable and pleasant prose.

Uruguay has experimented in various fields of public affairs. Her great president José Batlle y Ordóñez was more or less a Socialist, though he himself never liked to be called one, and the members of the country's orthodox Socialist party are loath to admit that he was one, since he never belonged to their group. Beginning with his second presidency in 1911, he instituted a series of experiments in public ownership which continue in operation to the present day. He set up a government-owned packing house, thus giving competition to the private enterprises owned by great foreign meat packers. He set up government-owned interurban and city bus and trolley car systems. He put the nation's *Banco Central* deep into commercial banking, and today it conducts two thirds of this type of business. He put the government into the insurance business. He established a government monopoly of the petroleum refining business which today is also a major distributor of petroleum products. Most recently, the railroads have been nationalized. In the field of social security, too, Batlle took pioneer steps, which his successors have followed. Most of the workers in Montevideo were brought under some kind of social security coverage, providing principally

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old-age pensions. Many years after Batlle's death, the agricultural workers were also brought under this system.

Of widest interest, perhaps, was Batlle's and Uruguay's experimentation with the plural executive. After visiting Switzerland, he came back home convinced that this was the answer to the dictatorship problem in Latin America, or at least in his own country. He and his friends pushed through the 1917 constitutional convention a modified form of plural executive. The president remained in charge of the military and foreign affairs and shared control of finances with the nine-member Executive Council, which supervised all of the rest of the executive's functions. This system fell a victim of the Great Depression, but in recent years Batlle's old idea has been revived, in a more comprehensive form than previously. Under the constitutional revision of 1951 the presidency is replaced by a nine-man Executive Council, which has control of all of the executive powers. Both the major parties are represented in the Council, with the majority party having six and the minority group three members.

Professor Fitzgibbon discusses all of these aspects of the Uruguayan reform program. His discussion raises one very interesting point: the extent to which one individual can influence the entire development of a nation. The author argues, and this reviewer believes quite rightfully so, that it was the imprint of Batlle's personality which was fundamentally responsible for changing Uruguay from one of the most turbulent and backward to one of the most stable and democratic countries in the world today.

Dr. Fitzgibbon's work is much more than just a discussion of the political changes wrought by Batlle and his successors. It is virtually a motion picture of Uruguay—its history, landscape, economy, politics, cultural life. The author has done a remarkable and commendable job of giving his readers a picture of one of the few hopeful parts of the world in which we live.

Robert J. Alexander

Rutgers University

The Reformation in England. Volume II: *Religio Depopulata.* By Philip Hughes. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1954.—xxv, 366 pp. $7.50.

It requires some courage to add another book to the vast literature on the English Reformation. The field has been worked over again and again by historians and propagandists almost from the very moment that Henry VIII broke from Rome. A great deal of this literature,

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from the point of view of critical historical scholarship, is negligible, either because it is careless of the facts or because it is obviously biased in its interpretation of them. This book belongs in a different category. It is the second volume of what promises to be a three-volume history of the English Reformation from the Henrician revolt to the death of Elizabeth. It bears the imprimatur of the Roman Church. Father Hughes writes as a Roman Catholic. First to last, there can be no doubt where his sympathies lie in the long battle of the contending creeds. But he writes also as a careful scholar, with due reverence for his sources. It is characteristic of him that he draws his facts for his story of the Marian persecutions almost entirely from Foxe's *Book of Martyrs*, though he dissents of course from Foxe's inferences and conclusions.

There is nothing new in his facts. He derives them all from well-known printed sources and, if one may judge from his bibliography and his footnotes, he has by no means exhausted the material in print. For example, he seems to have made no use at all of the French dispatches for Mary's reign, though Vertot published most of them nearly two centuries ago and Professor Harbison has shown how important they are. Indeed, Father Hughes seems to have ignored Harbison's *Rival Ambassadors at the Court of Queen Mary* altogether, although it is one of the most important recent contributions to our knowledge of Mary's reign.

Protestant historians are likely to dissent from Father Hughes's unqualified denunciation of the government under Edward VI. There are surely a good many kind things to be said for the Duke of Somerset, "the good Duke" as the English called him. With all his faults Somerset was one of the few Englishmen of his time in high places who had a decent respect for the welfare of the little man and, in matters religious, one of the first of the Latitudinarians. And I must dissent emphatically from the author's appraisal of William Cecil, whom he declares to have been "traitor in turn to Somerset, to Mary and to Northumberland". All the evidence at hand goes to prove that Cecil served Somerset faithfully while he was Lord Protector, and when Somerset fell and went to the Tower, Cecil presently joined him there. It was not until later, when Somerset's ill-advised efforts to recover his old position alienated virtually all his friends that Cecil turned against him. As for Northumberland, Cecil, recognizing that he was the actual head of the state, accepted office from him, but as a civil servant, not as a henchman. So far was he from being a traitor to Mary, that he risked his life in support of her right to succeed. Actually at this time and always Cecil was the loyal servant of the legitimate Tudor; his devotion was to the Crown —not to any of the party leaders about the Crown.

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Dispassionate historians might have expected a more just appraisal of Thomas Cranmer who, with all his frailties, was the architect of the Church of England and whose death for his faith stands in edifying contrast to the turncoat attitudes of most of the Marian bishops. And one could have wished that Father Hughes had seen something more in *The Book of Common Prayer* than its position in matters controversial. It was, and probably still is, the greatest book of devotion in the English language and has brought consolation to thousands of worshippers outside the Anglican communion.

Father Hughes is exceptionally good on the reign of Queen Mary. His discussion of the Marian persecutions is fair and in my opinion sound, though it is hard to understand why he has made no mention of Cranmer's last heroic gesture at the stake and of Hugh Latimer's magnificent parting message. Regarding the Marian exiles, Father Hughes seems to have been led quite astray by Christina Garrett's fantastic hypothesis. After admitting that the hypothesis has been rejected by competent critics, he goes on to picture William Cecil as the guiding spirit in a project to organize and utilize the English exile communities in Switzerland and Germany as nurseries for an expected Protestant reëstablishment in England. What little we know about Cecil's contacts with the exiles makes it clear that they were much more disposed to regard him as an apostate deserter than as an invisible guiding hand.

Father Hughes's final words on Mary's religious policy reveal him at his best: "What has happened in England in these years of Mary's reign was not, in fact, the repression by a Catholic government of heresy invading a Catholic country, but the repression of heresy by Catholic politiques in a country where heresy has lately been fully established, a country that is already in great part indifferent to religion; and herein, it seems to me, lies the greatest scandal of the business, and the ultimate reason why it was so easy to exploit it against Catholics in the generation that followed, and to root in it so powerful an anti-Catholic tradition."

Conyers Read

Villa Nova, Pa.

Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Ordeal. By Frank Freidel. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1954.—320 pp. $6.00.

In *Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Apprenticeship*, Professor Freidel not only got his multivolume biography of Roosevelt off to an impressive start by presenting a totally credible picture of his early years, but also made an important contribution to our understanding of the politics of the Progressive era and the Wilson years. In *Franklin D. Roosevelt:*

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The Ordeal, Professor Freidel carries the Roosevelt story from 1919 down to the gubernatorial campaign of 1928. If anything, this second volume is even more valuable than the first, not only in tracing out the difficult story of Roosevelt's business career and of his struggle to recover from the nearly fatal attack of poliomyelitis, but in giving us what is surely the most important contribution to our understanding of the political history of the 1920s since William Allen White's biography of Coolidge.

It is difficult to see how Professor Freidel could improve on his approach to his subject. He is critical of Roosevelt's political and business activities during these years without ever resorting to debunking, never losing sight of Roosevelt's personal stature or his place in history. His treatment of Roosevelt's paralysis is heart-rending without ever being maudlin. He shows the growth in Roosevelt's political understanding in the 1920s without falling into the pitfall of imposing the Roosevelt of the New Deal years on the Roosevelt of the 'twenties. Most impressive, Professor Freidel has resisted the temptation to tell us all he knows about Roosevelt. He has sifted the tons of manuscripts at Hyde Park and elsewhere; gone through the shelves of memoirs; interviewed many of Roosevelt's friends and co-workers—and then contented himself with presenting a lean volume of only 270 pages of text.

The account of Roosevelt as a business man throws a good deal of light on Roosevelt's personality, on the climate of the 1920s, and on the origins of the New Deal. Roosevelt is revealed as a Wall Street plunger who "found the buying and selling of securities a delightful game, and engaged in it on a sizeable scale" and as one who "could not resist the temptation to dabble incessantly in promotions of all sorts." He was nothing loath to use his political connections to drum up business for his firm; on one occasion, he sent a vice president of his firm to call on William McAdoo, when McAdoo was attorney for Edward Doheny's Mexican Petroleum Company, at the same time writing McAdoo that Doheny "is a good friend of mine and I feel sure . . . will be very glad to have you place the business our way." At the same time, Roosevelt was interested in the trade association movement, serving as president of the American Construction Council. The future President explained: "The tendency lately has been toward regulation of industry. . . . But government regulation is not feasible. It is unwieldy; it is expensive. It means employment of men to carry on this phase of the work; it means higher taxes. The public doesn't want it: the industry doesn't want it. . . ." His years with the American Construction Council proved frustratingly fruitless, in part, ironically enough, because he could not win sufficient support from Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover. A few years later, Roosevelt was to draw the moral in the National

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Industrial Recovery Act; trade associations could not embark on economic planning without the instrument of government coercion.

Professor Freidel's account of Roosevelt's struggle to walk again—the "ordeal" of the title—is a study in human courage which has an appeal wholly apart from Roosevelt's place in history. Freidel wisely spends less time in hypothesizing about the impact of Roosevelt's struggle with paralysis on his political thought than on a straightforward chronicle of Roosevelt's attempt to regain the use of his legs. There is an interesting description of the development of Warm Springs, Roosevelt observing: "I sometimes wish I could find some spot on the globe where it was not essential and necessary for me to start something new—a sand bar in the ocean might answer, but I would probably start building a sea wall around it and digging for pirate treasure in the middle." But it is not the Warm Springs development, or the insistence of Roosevelt and his friends that his illness was not the end of his political career, that is the theme of Freidel's book, but rather the remarkable personal courage of a crippled man who would not accept defeat. The most moving passage in the entire book is a description by Mrs. Hamlin of a summer evening with the Roosevelts in 1926: "He was carried in to a seat at the dining room table. He told the men not to return until 9:30. We wondered how he would spend the evening—probably staying in the dining room. But when dinner was over—Franklin pushed back his chair and said—'See me get into the next room.' He dropped down on the floor and went in on his hands and knees and got up into another chair by himself. My husband was so overcome at such courage and seeing that superb young fellow so pleased by being able to do this—that on the plea of hearing the telephone—he went into his den. . . ."

WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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